Making enactivism even more embodied

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The full scope of enactivist approaches to cognition includes not only a focus on sensory-motor contingencies and physical affordances for action, but also an emphasis on affective factors of embodiment and intersubjective affordances for social interaction. This strong conception of embodied cognition calls for a new way to think about the role of the brain in the larger system of brain-body-environment. We ask whether recent work on predictive coding offers a way to think about brain function in an enactive system, and we suggest that a positive answer is possible if we interpret predictive coding in a more enactive way, i.e., as involved in the organism’s dynamic adjustments to its environment.
Reprint years
2014
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GALMEE
Upload history
Archival date: 2014-11-05
View other versions
Added to PP index
2014-11-05

Total views
809 ( #6,348 of 2,448,378 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #16,612 of 2,448,378 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.