Leibniz Reinterpreted tackles head on the central idea in Leibniz's philosophy, namely that we live in the best of all possible worlds. Strickland argues that Leibniz's theory has been consistently misunderstood by previous commentators. In the process Strickland provides both an elucidation and reinterpretation of a number of concepts central to Leibniz's work, such as 'richness', 'simplicity', 'harmony' and 'incompossibility', and shows where previous attempts to explain these concepts have failed. This clear and concise study is tightly focussed and assumes (...) no prior acquaintance with Leibniz or optimism. It thus serves as an ideal entry point into Leibniz's philosophy. (shrink)

In this study I discuss G. W. Leibniz's (1646-1716) views on rational decision-making from the standpoint of both God and man. The Divine decision takes place within creation, as God freely chooses the best from an infinite number of possible worlds. While God's choice is based on absolutely certain knowledge, human decisions on practical matters are mostly based on uncertain knowledge. However, in many respects they could be regarded as analogous in more complicated situations. In addition to giving an overview (...) of the divine decision-making and discussing critically the criteria God favours in his choice, I provide an account of Leibniz's views on human deliberation, which includes some new ideas. One of these concerns is the importance of estimating probabilities – in making decisions one estimates both the goodness of the act itself and its consequences as far as the desired good is concerned. Another idea is related to the plurality of goods in complicated decisions and the competition this may provoke. Thirdly, heuristic models are used to sketch situations under deliberation in order to help in making the decision. Combining the views of Marcelo Dascal, Jaakko Hintikka and Simo Knuuttila, I argue that Leibniz applied two kinds of models of rational decision-making to practical controversies, often without explicating the details. The more simple, traditional pair of scales model is best suited to cases in which one has to decide for or against some option, or to distribute goods among parties and strive for a compromise. What may be of more help in more complicated deliberations is the novel vectorial model, which is an instance of the general mathematical doctrine of the calculus of variations. To illustrate this distinction, I discuss some cases in which he apparently applied these models in different kinds of situation. These examples support the view that the models had a systematic value in his theory of practical rationality. (shrink)

According to a common reading, Spinoza and Leibniz stand on opposite ends of the modal spectrum. At one extreme lies ‘‘Spinoza the necessitarian,’’ for whom the actual world is the only possible world. At the other lies ‘‘Leibniz the anti-necessitarian,’’ for whom the actual world is but one possible world among an infinite array of other possible worlds; the actual world is privileged for existence only in virtue of a free decree of a benevolent God. In this paper, I challenge (...) both of these readings. Spinoza is no necessitarian and Leibniz is no anti-necessitarian – at least as these characterizations are usually understood. Rather, I contend, Spinoza and Leibniz are both anti-essentialists; they believe that the modality of objects can vary relative to how those objects are conceived. This shared commitment to anti-essentialism allows them to consistently affirm both necessitarianism and its denial, relative to different ways of conceiving the world. Their embrace of this modal theory, I further argue, is grounded in their similar views on metaphysical perfection, ontological plentitude, and the principle of sufficient reason. (shrink)

En este artículo, presentamos primero un análisis de la proposición “Dios elige siempre lo mejor”, con el fin de indagar qué tipo de necesidad cabe atribuírsele. Puesto que Leibniz rechaza la necesidad geométrica en el ámbito de la libre elección divina, examinamos luego qué clase de relación hay entre el entendimiento y el bien, es decir, si corresponde prioritariamente a la razón juzgar sobre el bien o lo mejor. Del mismo modo, analizamos a continuación el vínculo que liga a la (...) voluntad con el bien, por cuanto este último parece ser, al mismo tiempo, el objeto natural de la voluntad. En ambos casos, el análisis se aplica tanto a Dios como a las criaturas racionales. Una aparente inconsistencia parece suscitarse entre un entendimiento y una voluntad que “se disputan” el mismo objeto. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que, aunque la prioridad de examinar sobre el bien pueda recaer en una u otra facultad, según el contexto escritural, la cuestión carece de sentido al aplicársela a Dios. En suma, la ambivalencia se diluye cuando advertimos que ello resulta de una ficción humana, a saber que hay un hiato entre deber y querer. (shrink)