The purpose of this phenomenological-hermeneutic study was to illuminate the meaning of being in ethically difficult care situations. The participants were 20 enrolled nurses employed in six intensive care units in Sweden. The results reveal a complex human process manifested in relation to one’s inner self and the other person, which transforms desolation into consolation through becoming present to the suffering other when perceiving fragility rather than tragedy. The main point of significance here is for all health professionals to create (...) an ethical work environment and strive for praxis that fosters ‘athomeness’, which renders us free to transform desolation into consolation. Consolation is of significance in ethics because it makes us available and helps us to fulfil the demands of life, while desolation makes us unavailable to others. (shrink)

El presente artículo desarrolla la comprensión marceliana de la esperanza como fruto de una experiencia de comunión intersubjetiva. De tal modo que la esperanza nos abre un nuevo horizonte de sentido para el itinerario vital, anunciando ya una plenitud intersubjetiva imperecedera. Así, podremos reconocer una fuente de renovación personal y comunitaria en la vivencia de la intersubjetividad, como condición metafísica de la existencia personal que responde a la profunda exigencia de trascendencia del hombre.

The work of Gabriel Marcel is retrieved and set in relation to the question of moral epistemology. I begin by surveying Marcel’s long-running critique of a false dilemma with implications for the nature of our knowledge of values. According to this dilemma, a person’s knowledge of something is either objective, and therefore transcendent but impersonal, or it is subjective, and therefore personal but immanent, reaching only one’s inner states. Applied to the knowledge of values, this false dilemma leaves philosophy with (...) a choice between accounts of value-knowledge as scientific/objective knowledge or value-knowledge as self-knowledge. Building on Marcel’s critique of this false dilemma, I suggest a program for a Marcelian moral epistemology that identifies the comportments by which human person are receptive to values and hence to knowledge of values. Two examples of such comportment are discussed in relation to the problem of value-knowledge: exigence and fidelity. (shrink)

This article compares two attempts to return to realism after Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’. Quentin Meillassoux, representing the ‘speculative realism’ school, rejects both Kantian and post-Kantian idealism in favour of a materialism based on the epistemology of the modern sciences. But Meillassoux is unaware of the element of choice in his philosophical position, and he does not solve the essential problem posed by idealism which concerns the place of the subject in being. Ricœur, on the other hand, sublates Kant by a (...) deeper embrace of finitude that leads to the self-displacement of the subject, and a ‘Second Copernican Revolution’, one that he freely admits can only be arrived at by Jaspersian ‘Philosophical Faith’. The article concludes by showing how crossing the border into theological faith offers a virtue-ethical perspective on the question of realism and idealism: it is in fact the choice between a childlike humility that receives reality as it is, and an arrogant self-positing that puts the subject in the position of God. (shrink)