Memetyka to jedna ze współczesnych teorii kultury. Przyjmuje ona, że zasadniczym mechanizmem replikacji informacji pozagenetycznej jest naśladownictwo, a życie społeczne i kultura to wynik podatności naszych umysłów na jednostki naśladownictwa – memy. Artykuł stanowi krytyczną syntezę stanowiska memetyków wobec ludzkiego mimetyzmu i przybliżając inne koncepcje naśladownictwa, zmierza do ugruntowania wyjściowej tezy memetyki, że człowiek jest zwierzęciem mimetycznym.

We explore relationships between phenomenology and developmental psychology through an in-depth analysis of a particular problem in social cognition: the most fundamental access to other minds. In the first part of the paper, we examine how developmental science can benefit phenomenology. We explicate the connection between cognitive psychology and developmental phenomenology as a form of constructive phenomenological psychology. Nativism in contemporary science constitutes a strong impulse to conceive of the possibility of an innate ability to perceive others’ mental states, an (...) idea which also has a transcendental implication. In the second part, we consider how phenomenology can contribute to developmental science. Phenomenology can go beyond the necessary evaluation and reinterpretation of experimental results. Some phenomenological notions and theories can be put forward on a par with alternative cognitive-psychological models and compete with them on grounds of empirical adequacy. For example, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of pairing can constitute a viable account of how infants access other minds. We outline a number of ways in which this account can be tested and can thus contribute to generating empirical knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue in favor of a view on the nature of the human mind that is neither a reductionist physicalism nor any kind of dualism, whether of substance or property. I support neutral perspectivism, inspired by neutral monism, with a scientific and materialist content, which allows for the inclusion of conscious phenomenal experiences as part of causal chains of perceptive, emotional, cognitive and deliberative processes. Although there are still no theories, laws and data that allow a final (...) decision on the role of conscious phenomenal experiences in physical-chemical processes in the body, evidence collected in recent decades does not only strengthen our belief in the correlation between physical-chemical events and qualitative conscious experiences but also increases the number of reasons in favor of the thesis that these experiences do have an important functional role in the processes of collection and use of information by the organism. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the meaning of physical touch as it occurs in the nurse–patient interaction. There are two aspects of the nurse–patient relationship that are found in most nurse–patient interactions which together have profound implications for nurses as practitioners and as individual human persons. The first is the clinical intimacy of the nurse–patient relationship where nurses touch, rub, smooth, clean, dress and otherwise physically interact with patients. The other is the existential crisis, the possibility of loss, suffering and (...) death that lurks at the horizon of most, if not all, healthcare encounters. Edmund Husserl, Merleau‐Ponty and more recently Robert Sokolowski argue that tactile sensations and resultant perceptions are fundamental to all sensory perception. Further, they argue that tactile sensation is fundamental for the ongoing constitution of ‘my’ self as a person and for the development and exercise of human intersubjectivity. If tactile interaction is crucial to the development of our very selves as persons and a significant aspect of our interaction with patients includes direct or observed tactile sensations and if further these sensations occur around the context of existential crises for our patients, then nurse's very selves as persons are being challenged by these interactions. Here, then I examine the philosophical argument for the role of tactile sensations in our human development and briefly look at contemporary neurophysiologic research that supports this philosophical account. I then suggest ways such physical intimacy can lead to a strengthening or weakening of the person of the nurse and the nursing interaction and end with some thoughts about ways to support nurses in these activities. (shrink)

An understanding of the nature and development of nursing intuition can help nurse educators foster it in young nurses and give clinicians more confidence in this aspect of their knowledge, allowing them to respond with greater assurance to their intuitions. In this paper, accounts from philosophy and neurophysiology are used to argue that intuition, specifically nursing intuition, is a valid form of knowledge. The paper argues that nursing intuition, a kind of practical intuition, is composed of four distinct aspects that (...) include: embodied knowledge rather like that knowledge we have when we have learned to ride a bicycle; well‐trained sensory perceptions attentive to subtle details of complex, often rapidly changing situations; a significant store of pertinent conceptual knowledge; and a history of habitual actions intentionally directed towards achieving the best outcomes for our patients. Contemporary neurophysiology research strongly suggests that human persons experience other persons such that they directly understand the meaning of a variety of different human actions, intentions, emotions, and sensations in immediate, non‐reflective, and non‐conceptual perceptions. This research is supported by the philosophical theories of Jacques Maritain and Yves R. Simon found in their accounts of practical knowledge. Together, these accounts offer us a rich view of the reality of nursing intuition that helps us understand why we find intuitive actions in some but not all nurses and gives us some specific information about how to develop intuition in young nurses. Finally, this research shows us a path for further research. (shrink)

We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependent on more immediate processes of embodied social interaction. (...) We draw on the enactive approach to cognitive science to further clarify this strong notion of `social interaction' in theoretical terms. In addition, we indicate how this interaction theory (IT) could eventually be formalized with the help of a dynamical systems perspective on the interaction process, especially by making use of evolutionary robotics modeling. We conclude that bringing together the methods and insights of developmental, phenomenological, enactive and dynamical approaches to social interaction can provide a promising framework for future research. Keywords: theory of mind; cognitive science; phenomenology; embodied cognition; dynamical systems theory; enactive approach; social cognition; interaction theory; evolutionary robotics. (shrink)