The topic of the human face is addressed from a biocultural perspective, focusing on the empirical investigation of how the face is represented, perceived, and evaluated in artistic portraits and self-portraits from the XVth to the XVIIth century. To do so, the crucial role played by the human face in social cognition is introduced, starting from development, showing that neonatal facial imitation and face-to-face dyadic interactions provide the grounding elements for the construction of intersubjective bonds. The neuroscience of face perception (...) is concisely presented and discussed, together with the psychophysics of face perception and gaze exploration, introducing the notions of the left visual field advantage and the left gaze bias. The results of experiments on the perception and the emotional and aesthetic rating of artistic portraits and self-portraits are reported, showing that despite participants’ inability to tell self-portraits and portraits apart, greater emotional, communicative-social, and aesthetic ratings were attributed to self-portraits. It is concluded that neuroscience and experimental aesthetics can contribute to better understand the human face, hence to better understand ourselves. (shrink)

The paper explores the possibilities and limits of naturalizing the experience of intersubjectivity. The existence of mirror neurons illustrates that an experience of intersubjectivity is already present on a more primitive, precognitive, and embodied level. A similar argument had been made in the first half of the twentieth century by phenomenologists, such as Edmund Husserl. This motivated Vittorio Gallese, one of the discoverers of mirror neurons, and other philosophers to connect the functioning of mirror neurons with Husserl’s phenomenology (...) of intersubjectivity as presented in his Cartesianische Meditationen. I argue that such attempts are grounded in an inadequate interpretation of Husserl’s analysis and turn into a circular argument. As such, they bypass a more primordial experience of intersubjectivity, which Husserl thematizes in Ideen II as the experience of an “expressive unity,” and which resists any project of naturalization from within. (shrink)

The current debate on why colonialism is wrong overlooks what is arguably the most discernible aspect of this particular historical injustice: its exreme violence. Through a critical analysis of the recent contributions by Lea Ypi, Margaret Moore and Laura Valentini, this article argues that the violence inflicted on the victims and survivors of colonialism reveals far more about the nature of this historical injustice than generally assumed. It is the arbitrary nature of the power relations between colonizers and the colonized (...) which is at the heart of the injustice of colonization, and violence was the way arbitrariness and domination was cemented. The example of colonialism in the Caribbean during the 16th and 17th centuries is used to expose the full extent of this historical injustice. (shrink)

The notion of validity for modal languages could be defined in two slightly different ways. The first is the original definition given by S. Kripke, for which a formula φ of a modal language L is valid if and only if it is true in every actual world of every interpretation of L. The second is the definition that has become standard in most textbook presentations of modal logic, for which a formula φ of L is valid if and only (...) if it is true in every world in every interpretation of L. For simple modal languages, “Kripkean validity” and “Textbook validity” are extensionally equivalent. According to E. Zalta, however, Textbook validity is an “incorrect” definition of validity, because: (i) it is not in full compliance with Tarski’s notion of truth; (ii) in expressively richer languages, enriched by the actuality operator, some obviously true formulas count as valid only if the Kripkean notion is used. The purpose of this paper is to show that (i) and (ii) are not good reasons to favor Kripkean valid- ity over Textbook validity. On the one hand, I will claim that the difference between the two should rather be seen as the result of two different conceptions on how a modal logic should be built from a non-modal basis; on the other, I will show the advantages, for the question at issue, of seeing the actuality operator as belonging to the family of two-dimensional operators. (shrink)

Aaccording to D. K. lewis (1973), would-couterfactuals and might-counterfactuals are duals. from this, it follows that the negation of a would-counterfactual is equiv- alent to the corresponding “might-not”-counterfactual and that the negation of a might-counterfactual is equivalent to the corresponding “would-not”- counterfactual. there are cases, however, where we seem to be entitled to accept the would- counterfactual and we are also equally entitled to accept the corresponding might-not-counterfactual and cases where we seem to be entitled to accept the might-counterfactual without (...) being equally entitled to reject the corresponding would-not-counterfactual. In this paper, I will show that a distinction between two types of rejections for counterfactuals (p-rejection and s-rejection) and the recognition that might-not-counterfactuals may play the role of p-rejections (by an application to counterfactuals of the lewisian approach to conversational scores) could explain why the problematic cases should not be seen as cases where the duality of would- and might-counterfactuals fails. (shrink)

In this paper, I claim that two ways of defining validity for modal languages (“real-world” and “general” validity), corresponding to distinction between a correct and an incorrect way of defining modal valid- ity, correspond instead to two substantive ways of conceiving modal truth. At the same time, I claim that the major logical manifestation of the real- world/general validity distinction in modal propositional languages with the actuality operator should not be taken seriously, but simply as a by-product of the way (...) in which the semantics of such an operator is usually given. (shrink)

The problem of the status of metaphysics -- what it is and what it is for, what use it is - has been with us for millennia, at least since Plato took issue with the Sophists, and continues to the present day. Here I attempt an intervention in this perennial dispute, with the aim of providing some kind of rapprochement between the factions. This intervention is based on how Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) understood metaphysics and the position presented here is (...) thus called `Peircean realism'. The basic idea is that everyone has a metaphysics and has to have one, just to get by in everyday life, and this is no different for scientific inquirers in their professional work. The subject matter of metaphysics is thus presuppositions, whether it is what we rely on to go shopping or to discover the Higgs boson. We rely on these in our activities and expect them to have an effect on outcomes, so when our expectations are frustrated, doubt may be thrown on our presuppositions. We would thus like the ability to inquire into our presuppositions so as not to repeat mistakes, but our instinctive, evolved capacity for reasoning may not be up the job, since it is entwined with what we take for granted. Instead, Peirce develops a science of good reasoning that includes a theory of inquiry, which would allow us to scrutinise our presuppositions, to perform metaphysical inquiry. The starting point for this science of good reasoning is basic principles of combination and organisation, because these are involved in all activity, and these are Peirce's categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. This is also where I start in the exposition of and argument for Peircean realism as a scientific -- that is, truth-directed -- metaphysics that provides the best possible general presuppositions to the natural and human sciences, the special sciences that deal with matters in their particularity; that Peircean realism is a viable metaphysics for those sciences. This exposition and argument comprises the first part of this thesis. In the second part, the case for Peircean realism is further bolstered by turning a critical eye on positions that are deficient from the Peircean point of view, in that they lack one or other category and thus starve the special sciences of the resources they need, or that they try to ignore metaphysics entirely. All this is meant to demonstrate that metaphysics is unavoidable, that we need all three of Peirce's categories for a viable metaphysics for the special sciences, and that Peircean realism is just such a metaphysics. (shrink)

War crimes are being committed in Ukraine today, but who should be held responsible? By looking at the literature on responsibility and violence by Philippa Foot and John Harris, this article argues that there are grounds for holding Vladimir Putin responsible for war crimes in Ukraine, even if he did not give the command for these crimes and other atrocities to be carried out.

This paper focuses on the concept of symbol and tries to outline its function as a means of communication. In order to describe the communicative qualities of symbol, it is necessary to show its ethical nature. The paper analyses the role symbols play in intersubjective relations, in the construction of the individual’s reality, and in the human ability to attribute meanings and assign functions.The conceptual frame- work for the understanding of what symbol is, how it works, and how it is (...) made is a particular combination of phenomenology and pragmatism, which lies on the theory of ‘appresentation’, as we can find it in Alfred Schütz’s viewpoint. The paper invites a reflection on the power of symbol, particularly on its power to communicate the incommunicable. (shrink)

Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our common beliefs are widespread. For example, if eliminativism is our BPT, then our BPT conflicts with common beliefs about the existence of middle-sized composite artifacts. “Compatibilism” is the name usually given to a theoretical attitude, according to which, in the case of a conflict between BPT and a common belief P, we should try to find a reconciliation. The two major variants of compatibilism are “semantic compatibilism” (SC) and “cognitive compatibilism” (CC). (...) According to SC, to be reconciled with BPT is the “real” version of the content of our ordinary assertions; according to CC, to be reconciled with BPT is the mental state we are “really” in while thinking P. In this paper, we present a new kind of compatibilism, epistemic compatibilism (EC). According to EC, to be reconciled with BPT is the explanation of why we believe that P. After presenting EC, we will argue that it fares better than SC and CC for at least two related reasons: EC does not rely on any form of what we call semantic or cognitive “recarving”; thus, EC avoids some sceptical problems that aect the other two versions of compatibilism. (shrink)

Commonsense ontology often conflicts with the ontology of our best scientific and philosophical theories. However, commonsense ontology, and commonsense belief systems in general, seems to be remarkably efficient and cognitively fundamental. In cases of contrast, it is better to find a way to reconcile commonsense and ”theoretical” ontologies. Given that commonsense ontologies are typically expressed within natural language, a classical procedure of reconciliation is semantical. The strategy is that of individuating the ”ontologically problematic” expressions of natural language and paraphrasing the (...) sentences in which they appear in a (formal) language whose commitments are compatible with those of our best theories. We believe that this strategy of reconciliation, though quite standard, especially in the philosophical literature, is problematic: for a start, it forces us to conclude that the ”real content” of our commonsense expressions and beliefs is different from what it appears. Commonsense ontology becomes just an illusion. We will thus propose an alternative approach: according to our view, a commonsense ontology is reconciled with a theoretical ontology in case it is shown that the explanation of why we believe in the existence of a problematic entity is compatible with our best theories. We will call this kind of reconciliation ”epistemic”. The advantage of an epistemic reconciliation is that commonsense ontology is treated in its own right and could be taken prima facie. Another advantage of the view is that epistemic reconciliation can be analysed through the notion of explaining away: a commonsense ontology is epistemically reconciled with a theoretical ontology if and only if the problematic entities of the commonsense ontology are explained away by ”respectable” entities of the theoretical ontology. In the final part of the paper, we sketch a formal analysis of explaining away. (shrink)

Questo lavoro propone un confronto tra diversi strumenti utilizzabili per modellare la conoscenza di dominio in ambito didattico: le mappa concettuali, Novak e Cañas (2006), (uno strumento tradizionalmente utilizzato nelle scuole) e le ontologie computazionali (dei sistemi formali di modellazione concettuale, attualmente molto usati nei sistemi di intelligenza artificiale per le loro capacità di “ragionamento automatico”, si veda Guarino, (1995)). Nello specifico, questo articolo presenta il risultato di un un doppio esperimento sul campo condotto presso il Liceo Scientifico “Guido Parodi” (...) di Acqui Terme in cui gruppi di studenti paragonano lo strumento della mappa concettuale e quello dell’ontologia nella risoluzione di due problemi di “misconcezione” (o errata concettualizzazione): uno indotto attraverso la consegna di appunti e materiali didattici contenenti informazioni volontariamente contraddittorie tra loro (caso che potrebbe corrispondere alla situazione in cui uno studente prende - per qualche motivo - degli appunti in modo scorretto) e l’altro legato ad una complessità concettuale intrinseca all’argomento. (shrink)

“If you find it strange that, in setting out these elements, I do not use those qualities called heat, cold, moistness, and dryness, as do the philosophers, I shall say to you that these qualities appear to me to be themselves in need of explanation. Indeed, unless I am mistaken, not only these four qualities, but also all the others (indeed all the forms of inanimate bodies) can be explained without the need of supposing for that purpose any other thing (...) in their matter than the motion, size, shape, and arrangement of its parts.” So does Descartes, in his The World, or Treatise on Light [Le Monde ou Traité de la Lumière], express the uniphenomenal principle of the physical world, which is the basis - or foundation - of his great cosmic synthesis. The uniphenomenal character of Cartesian physics - namely, explaining all phenomena and appearances from a single primordial phenomenon (and substance) - has such a great semantic and intuitive value for the structure of the human mind that Plato, even before Aristotle’s hyle, had come to contemplate his concept of chora, the cosmic and universal matrix at the base of all phenomena, existing before and beyond the coming into existence of the elements and of sensible things. Even the physics of Democritus is uniphenomenal. A perfect example of uniphenomenal physics in our time is the Spacio-fluido-dynamics of the scientist Marco Todeschini (Bergamo, 1899 - 1988) who, with his monumental Teoria delle apparenze [Theory of Appearances] of ’49 tried to clear a path towards the hope of reaching a Cartesian kind of unified cosmic synthesis. (We accept only the fundamental concept of Todeschi’s theory here, that is, the uniphenomenal character of his physics, without occupying ourselves with criteria such as the value or the plausibility of his hypotheses.) This concept of uniphenomenal physics will serve as an ultra-clear instrument to dissipate the epistemological fog of AI (Artificial Intelligence). (shrink)

In this article I propose a new problem for the classical analysis of knowledge (as justified true belief) and all analyses belonging to its legacy. The gist of my argument is that truth as a condition for a belief to be knowledge is problematic insofar there is no definition of truth. From this, and other remarks relating to the possibility of defining truth (or lack thereof) and about what truth theories fit our thoughts about knowledge, I conclude that as long (...) as truth is unquestioningly taken as a condition of knowing, knowledge can never be defined in a way that could satisfy our intuitions about it. (shrink)

Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of uncon- scious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and col- leagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under (...) scrutiny. Recent findings seem to show that information processed by the dor- sal stream for online action contributes to visual awareness. Some interpret these results as showing that some dorsal stream processes are conscious visual processes (e.g., Gallese, 2007; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide new support for the more traditional view that blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious per- ceptual processes. I argue that individuals with blindsight do not have access to the kind of purely qualitative color and size information which normal individuals do. So, even though people with blindsight have a kind of cognitive consciousness, visual information process- ing in blindsight patients is not associated with a distinctly visual phenomenology. I argue further that while dorsal stream processing seems to contribute to visual awareness, only information processed by the early dorsal stream (V1, V2, and V3) is broadcast to working memory. Information processed by later parts of the dorsal stream (the parietal lobe) never reaches working memory and hence does not correlate with phenomenal awareness. I con- clude that both blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious visual processes. (shrink)

The article explores the place of women and migrants in Italian Neorealist and New Migrant cinema, arguing that New Migrant cinema continues and reworks key Neorealist tropes and tendencies. It intends to render explicit how an ensemble of films challenge the stereotypes concerning gender, national and cultural identities. Among the figures that are scrutinized are the borgatari, extracomunitari, popolane and terrone. Its main objective is to demonstrate how the cinematic expression of these figures in Italian Neorealist and New Migrant cinema (...) enhanced the reinvention of italianità and the generalised understanding of gender. It also aims to explain why the cross-fertilisation between migration studies, urban studies and gender studies is indispensable for comprehending this reinvention. Particular emphasis is placed on the shared interest of Roberto Rossellini’s Roma città aperta and Vittorio De Sica’s Il tetto in the plight over housing and the special character of the urban landscape of Rome. The article also sheds light on certain common concerns of Italian Neorealist and New Migrant cinema, especially as far as national and gender narratives are concerned. Pivotal for the reflections developed here are the roles of Anna Magnani in Roberto Rossellini’s Roma città aperta, Luchino Visconti’s Bellissima and Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Mamma Roma. (shrink)

Husserl’s phenomenology is developed in explicit contrast to naturalism. At the same time, various scholars have attempted to overcome this opposition by naturalizing consciousness and phenomenology. In this paper, I argue that, in order to confront the issue of the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism, we must distinguish between different forms of naturalism. In fact, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is developed in contrast to a metaphysical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as a mind-independent ontological domain that can be known (...) as it is “in itself”, independently of the cognitive relationship. At the same time, I argue that the genetic development of phenomenology, through the investigation of the temporal structure of experiences, leads to an empirical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as the objective pole in a process of co-constitution of the subject and the object of experience. -/- Winner of the Philosophy Essay Prize “Vittorio Sainati” XIIth Edition. (shrink)

Interest in idealism has increased substantially since the publication of Sprigge’s Vindication of Absolute Idealism in 1984,1 and again with more vigor over the last decade in the context of the mind-body problem and panpsychism. This will probably not come as a surprise to objective idealists, among which Vittorio Hosle has proposed that philosophy cycles through stages with some form of idealism as end point of each cycle.2 More recently, David Chalmers mused about a corresponding development in the worldview (...) of single individuals from materialism over dualism and panpsychism to idealism.3 Traditional accounts of idealism include for instance those of Plato, Plotinus, Leibniz, Berkeley, or Hegel. An overview of contemporary approaches is given in the article by Chalmers, where he mentions amongst others a recent collection of essays on idealism,4 but also for instance the (recently extended5) works of Philip Goff on Russellian monism.6 A more classically oriented collection of works on idealism was edited by Hosle and Suarez Muller.7 In his article ‘Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem’, David Chalmers presents a classification of possible versions of idealism with the goal of assessing the prospects of idealism in the context of the mind-body problem without having to pay too much attention to its ‘historical baggage’. This goal seems to me highly laudable and the resulting classification an important contribution to the contemporay discussion. In addition, the conclusions drawn from the subsequent analysis seem very plausible from the viewpoints of dualistic, panpsychistic and similar thinking. I nevertheless believe that the presented classification is not really adequate to capture the core of traditional idealistic thinking, which in turn leads to somewhat distorted conclusions about the opportunities for idealism to play a role for understanding the mind-body problem: First, the distinction between micro- macro- and cosmic idealism ist not fitting well into the idealistic venture. Instead, idealism is artificially reduced to a bad alternative to panpsychism. Secondly, the initially mentioned, but afterwards not discussed again difference between subjectinvolving and non-subject-involving idealism needs to be further extended, to account for the special role of subjects in traditional accounts of objective idealism. To elaborate on this, I will first give a short summary of Chalmers classification and some of the mentioned problems with idealism. Afterwards I will come back to my two objections in more detail. (shrink)

The Contingency Postulate of Truth. - Is there a statement that cannot be false under any contingent conditions? Two well-known philosophical schools have given contradictory answers to this question about the existence of a necessarily true statement: Fallibilists (Albert, Keuth) have denied its existence, transcendental pragmatists (Apel, Kuhlmann) and objective idealists (Wandschneider, Hösle) have affirmed it. Dieter Wandschneider has (following Vittorio Hösle) translated the principle of fallibilism, according to which every statement is fallible, into a thesis which he calls (...) the contingency postulate of truth (CPT). It says: <For every true statement there are contingent conditions.> If this postulate were true, it would mark an insurmountable boundary of knowledge: a final epistemic justification would then not be possible. Wandschneider has therefore developed a counterargument to show that the contingency postulate of truth cannot be formulated without contradiction and implies the thesis that there is at least one necessarily true statement. This essay deals with the systematic question whether the contingency postulate of truth really cannot be presented without contradiction. To this end I will first present the contingency postulate and the associated problems (I.). Then I will analyze Wandschneider's argument against the consistency of the contingency postulate (II.) and finally reject it with the help of some considerations from the field of epistemic logic (III.). (shrink)

Il breve saggio si propone di esaminare la centralità della figura materna nell’opera di un ingegnoso costruttore di storie della letteratura italiana del Novecento: Alberto Moravia. La scelta dell’Autore nasce dalla rilevanza della tematica nella sua opera, in cui peraltro è quasi sempre assente il punto di vista femminile delle “voci” delle donne. Ciò sembra paradossale e questa circostanza è di grande interesse critico. In particolare, a dispetto delle interpretazioni più canoniche, secondo cui Moravia – negli scritti realizzati tra il (...) 1929 e il 1964 – ha inteso compiere una “distruzione” dell’immagine materna nel quadro di una visione pessimista della famiglia borghese, dovremo considerare un più complesso e articolato universo materno nello scrittore romano, in cui è possibile ricostruire cinque modelli – la “madre autoritaria”, la “madre-non madre”, la “madre padrona”, la “madre-angelo custode” e la “madre-seduttrice” –, ben esemplificati nei principali romanzi ma che si ritrovano nei racconti che Moravia scrive ininterrottamente dagli anni Trenta agli anni Sessanta, la cui mole ha determinato, ancor oggi, una mancanza di studi sistematici. In secondo luogo, la tematica della madre sarà esaminata nelle trasposizioni cinematografiche italiane delle opere letterarie di Moravia. Va ricordato che il rapporto dello scrittore con il cinema fu particolarmente intenso. Per un verso, la “settima arte” rivestì un ruolo non secondario nella formazione ed esperienza estetica dell’Autore romano, che al cinema si interessò anche professionalmente nelle vesti di critico cinematografico, a partire dal primo dopoguerra, dapprima, per La nuova Europa e Libera stampa, poi, per L’Europeo e L’Espresso, a cui dobbiamo aggiungere l’attività di saggista per numerose riviste specializzate. Per altro verso, il cinema italiano non solo ha attinto a “mani basse” dall’opera di Moravia per sceneggiature di pellicole, che furono pietre miliari della sua storia. L’elenco dei romanzi e racconti adattati al grande schermo rende conto della grande influenza nella cultura italiana degli anni Cinquanta e Sessanta: La provinciale (1953) di Mario Soldati, La romana (1954) di Luigi Zampa, Peccato che sia una canaglia (1954) di Alessandro Blasetti, Racconti romani (1955) di Gianni Franciolini, La ciociara (1960) di Vittorio de Sica, La giornata balorda (1960) di Mauro Bolognini, Risate di gioia (1960) di Mario Monicelli, Agostino (o la perdita dell’innocenza) (1962) di Mauro Bolognini, La noia (1963) di Damiano Damiani, Gli indifferenti (1964) di Francesco Maselli, Le ore nude (1964) di Marco Vicario, La donna invisibile (1969) di Paolo Spinola, Una ragazza piuttosto complicata (1969) di Damiano Damiani, L’amore coniugale (1970) di Dacia Maraini, Il conformista (1970) di Bernardo Bertolucci, e molti altri ancora. Come avremo modo soltanto di accennare, il successo della letteratura moraviana nel mondo del cinema italiano si deve a molteplici fattori, tra cui la raffigurazione dei personaggi e degli ambienti, la focalizzazione su certe tematiche e, non da ultimo, lo stile narrativo, particolarmente adatto alle trasposizioni cinematografiche. Come caso di studio, ci soffermeremo, infine, sulla figura materna della versione filmica de La noia di Damiani, con l’obiettivo di verificare se nel passaggio dal libro alla pellicola, quella particolare connotazione della madre autoritaria abbia subito delle alterazioni. L’ipotesi che muove l’analisi è che la stesura delle sceneggiature, la raffigurazione dei personaggi e la messa in scena delle sequenze filmiche facciano emergere un riadattamento adeguato al largo pubblico, con il sovvertimento dell’andamento cronologico, alcune “lacune” di ordine psicologico nella raffigurazione dei protagonisti e un certo cedimento moralistico alla cultura ancora dominante negli anni ’50 e ’60, in cui la figura materna, sia quando è incattivita dalla povertà che quando è inaridita dalla ricchezza, anela comunque agli affetti familiari, trovando in essi una qualche forma di redenzione. (shrink)

(CONTENIDO: LA FILOSOFÍA DE ALTHUSSER A 50 AÑOS DE LIRE LE CAPITAL Pedro Karczmarczyk, 3; DISCURSO Y DECRETO: SPINOZA ALTHUSSER Y PÊCHEUX Warren Montag 11; ALTHUSSER LECTOR DE GRAMSCI Vittorio Morfino 43 LAS ABSTRACCIONES, ENTRE LA IDEOLOGÍA Y LA CIENCIA João Quartim de Moraes 67 ELOGIO DEL TEORICISMO. PRÁCTICA TEÓRICA E INCONSCIENTE FILOSÓFICO EN LA PROBLEMÁTICA ALTHUSSERIANA, Natalia Romé 85 MARXISMO Y FEMINISMO: EL RECOMIENZO DE UNA PROBLEMÁTICA1 115 Luisina Bolla* / Pedro Karczmarczyk* 115 RRESEÑAS El materialismo de Althusser. (...) Más allá del telos y del Eschaton de Vittorio Morfino, por Valentín Huarte 153; El sujeto en cuestión, Pedro Karczmarczyk (ed.) por Constanza Storani; 159 La posición materialista. El pensamiento de L. Althusser entre la práctica teórica y la práctica política, de Natalia Romé, por Ingrid Sarchman y Carolina Collazo 164. (shrink)

Self-consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people today disagree with the evolutionary history of humans. But the nature of self-consciousness is still to be explained, and the story of evolution has rarely been used as a framework for studies on consciousness during the 20th century. This last point may be due to the fact that modern study of consciousness came up at a time where dominant philosophical movements were not in favor of evolutionist theories (Cunningham 1996). Research on consciousness (...) based on Phenomenology or on Analytic Philosophy has been mostly taking the characteristics of humans as starting points. Relatively little has been done with bottom-up approaches, using performances of animals as a simpler starting point to understand the generation of consciousness through evolution. But this status may be changing, thanks to new tools coming from recent discoveries in neurology. The discovery of mirror neurons about ten years ago (Gallese et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 1996) has allowed the built up of new conceptual tools for the understanding of intersubjectivity within humans and non human primates (Gallese 2001, Hurley 2005). Studies in these fields are still in progress, with discussions on the level of applicability of this natural intersubjectivity to non human primates (Decety and Chaminade 2003). We think that these subject/conspecific mental relations made possible by mirror neurons can open new paths for the understanding of the nature of self-consciousness via an evolutionist bottom-up approach. We propose here a scenario for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution by a specific analysis of two steps of evolution: first step from simple living elements to non human primates comparable to chimpanzees, and second step from these non human primates to humans. We identify these two steps as representing the evolution from basic animal awareness to body self-awareness, and from body self-awareness to self-consciousness. (we consider that today non human primates are comparable to what were pre-human primates). We position body self-awareness as corresponding to the performance of mirror self recognition as identified with chimpanzees and orangutans (Gallup). We propose to detail and understand the content of this body self-awareness through a specific evolutionist build up process using the performances of mirror neurons and group life. We address the evolutionary step from body self-awareness to self-consciousness by complementing the recently proposed approach where self-consciousness is presented as a by-product of body self-awareness amplification via a positive feedback loop resulting of anxiety limitation (Menant 2004). The scenario introduced here for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution leaves open the question about the nature of phenomenal-consciousness (Block 2002). We plan to address this question later on with the help of the scenario made available here. (shrink)

It is agreed by most people that self-consciousness is the result of an evolutionary process, and that representations may have played an important role in that process. We would like to propose here that some evolutionary stages can highlight links existing between representations and the notion of self, opening a possible path to the nature of self-consciousness. Our starting point is to focus on representations as usage oriented items for the subject that carries them. These representations are about elements of (...) the environment including conspecifics, and can also represent parts of the subject without refering to a notion of self (we introduce the notion of "auto-representation" that does not carry the notion of self-representation). Next step uses the performance of intersubjectivity (mirror neurons level in evolution) where a subject has the capability to mentally simulate the observed action of a conspecific (Gallese 2001). We propose that this intersubjectivity allows the subject to identify his auto-representation with the representations of his conspecifics, and so to consider his auto-representation as existing in the environment. We show how this evolutionary stage can introduce a notion of self-representation for a subject, opening a road to self-conciousness and to self. This evolutionary approach to the self via self- representation is close to the current theory of the self linked to representations and simulations (Metzinger 2003). We use a scenario about how evolution has brought the performance of self-representation to self-consciousness. We develop a process describing how the anxiety increase resulting from identification with endangered or suffering conspecifics may have called for the development of tools to limit this anxiety (empathy, imitation, language), and how these tools have accelerated the evolutionary process through a positive feedback on intersubjectivity (Menant 2004, 2005). We finish by summarizing the points addressed, and propose some possible continuations. (shrink)

CONTENTS: -/- SEZIONE I IL TUTTO E' UNO? IL RISVEGLIO DI UN PROBLEMA TRA SCOLASTICA E RINASCIMENTO Il principio omne causatum est compositum fra Tommaso e Cajetano Igor Agostini, p. 25 Parti e tutto in Montaigne. La natura e l'individuo tra frammentazione e integrazione Raffaele Carbone 45 Le minuzzarie e il tutto. Giordano bruno e la conoscenza universale Maurizio Cambi 75 -/- SEZIONE II A PARTIRE DA CARTESIO. COME PUO' ESSERE UN TUTTO L'UOMO? -/- Mente/Corpo in Cartesio. Spunti per un'interpretazione (...) mereologica Stefano Di Bella 93 Nos sumus ex Deo et pertinemus ad Deum. Appartenenza, dipendenza e relazione nel pensiero e nel lessico di Arnold Guelincx Cristina Santinelli 115 L'integrità di corpo e mente nell'"invenire" terapeutico di E. W. von Tschirnhaus Manuela Sanna 133 L'indivisibilità della natura umana e della società in Francesco Longano. Un episodio della ricezione di Locke in Italia Roberto Evangelista 147 -/- SEZIONE III L'IRROMPERE DELL'ORGANICO. LA BIOLOGIA FILOSOFICA TRA SEI E SETTECENTO -/- Convenienza e discrepanza. Parti e tutto nella Lettera 32 di Baruch Spinoza Francesco Toto 169 Mereologia della sostanza e mereologia del vivente in Leibniz Enrico Pasini 197 Teleologia e mereologia dell’organismo da Leibniz a Bonnet Francesco Piro 209 Il nesso delle parti: mereologia e scienza secondo Christian Wolff Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero 239 Il problema del tutto e delle parti. il caso del vitalismo di Montpellier Charles T. Wolfe 257 -/- SEZIONE 4 TOTALITA' CRITICHE: DALLA CRISI DEL NATURALISMO ILLUMINISTICO ALLA FILOSOFIA DELLE CULTURE -/- La logica del tutto (e delle parti di tutto, vale a dire niente) in Dom Deschamps Jean-Claude Bourdin 273 l’(in)afferabile forma. Totalità e contingenza nel pensiero di Kant tra Critica della ragion pura e Critica del giudizio Luigi Imperato 303 la relazione Parte-Tutto nel primo Schelling Giuseppe D’Anna 327 Hegel o della totalizzazione dello spazio di interiorità Vittorio Morfino 343 A partire da Kant: Begriffsbiìldung teleologica e relazione Parti-Tutto nelle indagini di Rickert sulla logica delle scienze storiche della cultura Edoardo Massimilla 359 . (shrink)

The notion of representation is at the foundation of cognitive sciences and is used in theories of mind and consciousness. Other notions like ‘embodiment’, 'intentionality‘, 'guidance theory' or ‘biosemantics’ have been associated to the notion of representation to introduce its functional aspect. We would like to propose here that a conception of 'usage related' representation eases its positioning in an evolutionary context, and opens new areas of investigation toward self-representation and self-consciousness. The subject is presented in five parts:Following an overall (...) presentation, the first part introduces a usage related representation as being an information managed by a system submitted to a constraint that has to be satisfied. We consider that such a system can generate a meaningful information by comparing its constraint to a received information (Menant 2003). We define a representation as being made of the received information and of the meaningful information. Such approach allows groundings in and out for the representation relatively to the system. The second part introduces the two types of representations we want to focus on for living organisms: representations of conspecifics and auto-representation, the latter being defined without using a notion of self-representation. Both types of representations have existed for our pre-human ancestors which can be compared to today great apes.In the third part, we use the performance of intersubjectivity as identified in group life with the presence of mirror neurons in the organisms. Mirror neurons have been discovered in the 90‘s (Rizzolatti & al.1996, Gallese & al.1996). The level of intersubjectivity that can be attributed to non human primates as related to mirror neurons is currently a subject of debate (Decety 2003). We consider that a limited intersubjectivity between pre-human primates made possible a merger of both types of representations. The fourth part proposes that such a merger of representations feeds the auto-representation with the meanings associated to the representations of conspecifics, namely the meanings associated to an entity perceived as existing in the environment. We propose that auto-representation carrying these new meanings makes up the first elements of self-representation. Intersubjectivity has allowed auto-representation to evolve into self-representation, avoiding the homunculus risk. The fifth part is a continuation to other presentations (Menant 2004, 2005) about possible evolution of self-representation into self-consciousness. We propose that identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics has increased anxiety, and that the tools used to limit this anxiety (development of empathy, imitation, language and group life) have provided a positive feedback on intersubjectivity and created an evolutionary engine for the organism. Other outcomes have also been possible. Such approach roots consciousness in emotions. The evolutionary scenario proposed here does not introduce explicitly the question of phenomenal consciousness (Block 1995). This question is to be addressed later with the help of this scenario.The conclusion lists the points introduced here with their possible continuations. (shrink)

The constructivist perspective has shed new light on the conception of psychopathology and the practice of psychotherapy, surmounting the shortcomings of behaviorism and rationalist cognitive thought, by abandoning the empiricist principle of associationism. In this field, Vittorio Guidano introduced the Cognitive Post -Rationalist model, influenced by attachment theory, evolutionary epistemology, complex systems theory, and the prevalence of abstract mental processes proposed by Hayeck. Guidano conceives the personal system as a self-organized entity, in constant development. The role of the post (...) - rationalist therapist is to strategically upset the system in search of newer and more flexible ways to construct personal experience. (shrink)

Copyright©Daniel Fidel Ferrer, 2018. 1. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976. 2. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Concordances. 3. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Indexes. 4). Metaphysics. 5). Philosophy, German. 6). Philosophy, German – Greek influences. 7). Heidegger, Martin; -- Wörterbuch. 8). Ontology. 9). Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Concordances. 10). Heidegger, Martin, 1889–1976—Homes and haunts— Germany—Todtnauberg. I. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. Language: English (Preface and Introduction). Language: German (Main Index). Includes bibliographical references. Cover graphics by Shawn Rodriguez. Motto At the beginning (...) of a section in GA 97. Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942 1948), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) quotes Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646- 1716) with the sentence (GA 97, e-text page 329, printed text page 325): "Qui me non nisi editis novit, non me novit." "He who knows me only from my publications does not know me.” Table of Contents 1). Preface and Introduction. 2). Outline of main manuscripts (in German). 3). Main Index (in German). An Index to Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) two printed volumes Zum Ereignis Denken; Gesamtausgabe Volumes GA 73.1 and GA 73.2 (published in October 2013 by Verlag Vittorio Klosterman). This Preface and Introduction to the Main Index are mostly written in English. Nevertheless, the Main Index is an index to a volume Gesamtausgabe GA 73.1 and 73.2 of Martin Heidegger's collected writings and that text is in German. Note: this is only an index and does not include the actual text of Zum Ereignis-Denken (GA73.1-2), because that book is protected under current copyright law. The actual printed two volume ends with page 1496 (GA 73.2). The entire book is listed under six (I to VI) main headings in the two printed volumes (Zum Ereignis-Denken (GA73.1-2). The six main headings from the table of contents are: Zu Ereignis I. Zerklüftung und ἀλήθεια Zerklüftung des Seins. Zu Ereignis II. Die Seinsfrage und das Ereignis. Zu Ereignis III. Das Da-sein. Zu Ereignis IV. Wesen des Entwurfs – Vorgehen. Zu Ereignis V. Abschied. Eine Reihe von Manuskripten zum Ereignis (1943-1945) Zu Ereignis VI. Ontologische Differenz und Unterschied . (shrink)