John Stuart Mill provides a classic defense of individual and group rights to liberty with respect to purely private or self-regarding matters: The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself … directly, and in the first instance, … his independence is, of right, absolute.… From this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; (...) freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived. (shrink)

In a recent discussion of Amartya Sen's concept of the capabilities of people for functioning in their society – and the idea of targeting people's functioning capabilities in evaluating the society – G. A. Cohen accuses Sen of espousing an inappropriate, ‘athletic’ image of the person (Cohen, 1993, pp. 24–5). The idea is that if Sen's formulations are to be taken at face value, then life is valuable only so far as people actively choose most facets of their existence: if (...) they fare well in the material stakes, for example, they must fare well as a result of active choice and effort, not because anyone else looks after them. ‘That’, says Cohen, ‘overestimates the place of freedom and activity in well-being’ (p. 25). (shrink)

This is a comprehensive anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Apart from the classics, most of the selections in the third edition are new, as are the introduction and bibliography. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.

A central point of debate over environmental policies concerns how future costs and benefits should be assessed. The most commonly used method for assessing the value of future costs and benefits is economic discounting. One often-cited justification for discounting is uncertainty. More specifically, it is risk aversion coupled with the expectation that future prospects are more risky. In this paper I argue that there are at least two reasons for disputing the use of risk aversion as a justification for discounting (...) when dealing with longterm decisions, one technical and one ethical. Firstly, I argue that technically, it implies an inconsistency between theory and practice. And secondly, I argue that discounting for uncertainty relies on a form of individualism which, while reasonable in standard microeconomic theory where an agent chooses how to spread her own consumption over her own lifetime, is inappropriate in the context of intergenerational social decisions. (shrink)

Sen’s “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” was meant to crystallize his fundamental criticism against the welfaristic basis of welfare economics in general, and social choice theory in particular. This paper vindicates Sen’s criticism, arguing that its logical relevance is not lost in light of recent criticisms against his method of articulating individual rights in terms of a person’s decisive power in social choice. We show that some recent proposals that Sen’s articulation failed to capture a strong libertarian tradition of (...) free contract and that an appropriate formulation of this tradition wipes off the Sen impossibility cannot be sustained. We then show that the game form articulation of rights casts serious doubts on the Sen articulation of liberty, but the Sen impossibility strenuously comes back in the context of realizing conferred game form rights as well as in the context of initial conferment of game form rights. (shrink)

This article is an axiomatic approach to the problem of ranking game forms in terms of the predictability they offer to individuals. Two criteria are proposed and characterized, the CardMin and the CardMax. Both compare game forms on the basis of the number of distinct outcomes that can result from the choice of a CardMin (resp. CardMax) strategy. The CardMin (resp. CardMax) strategy is defined as a strategy leading to the smallest (resp. highest) number of different outcomes. In both cases, (...) the lower these numbers the better the game form. (shrink)

In Multi Agent Systems it is often the case that individual preferences are not compatible and coalitions compete to achieve a given result. The paper presents a language to talk about the conflict between coalitional choices and it expresses deontic notions to evaluate them. We will be specifically concerned with cases where the collective perspective is at odds with the individual perspective.

Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not (...) forthcoming. (shrink)

We present a new notion of game equivalence that captures basic powers of interacting players. We provide a representation theorem, a complete logic, and a new game algebra for basic powers. In doing so, we establish connections with imperfect information games and epistemic logic. We also identify some new open problems concerning logic and games.

A claim that certain purely private matters should be beyond the reach of society's laws, moral rules, and other customs is central to the distinctive liberalism of John Stuart Mill. On Liberty, perhaps the most eloquent defense of individual liberty ever written, laments the hostility allegedly displayed in modern mass societies toward “the right of each individual to act [in private matters] as seems good to his judgement and inclinations”. In Mill's view, a free society must design its institutions with (...) due regard for what he terms “individuality.” That is, public authority, whether in the form of law, customary opinion, or economic power, must be self-limiting so that it does not interfere with the rights of individuals to choose as they like with respect to such private concerns as religious faith, reading materials, living companions, and consumption of drugs and alcohol. Individuals and voluntary groups should be permitted to do whatever they prefer within their private spheres even if everyone else in society dislikes what they do, is annoyed by them, and actually chooses not to be around them or to befriend them. (shrink)

This paper is about the measurement of specific freedoms freedom functionbeing free to performconditional probability of success.negative freedom is membership of powerful coalitions.”.

We present a new notion of game equivalence that captures basic powers of interacting players. We provide a representation theorem, a complete logic, and a new game algebra for basic powers. In doing so, we establish connections with imperfect information games and epistemic logic. We also identify some new open problems concerning logic and games.

This paper examines the exercise of individual or group rights within the game form approach. It focuses in particular on what it means for a strategy or action to be feasible and admissible. Admissibility is best discussed in relation to two basic distinctions among rights, passive and active rights on the one hand and negative and positive rights on the other. It is argued that while there are quite a few cases in which the outcomes of mutual rights exercising are (...) to the fore, there are many situations where the uninhibited exercise of individual or group rights and not particular outcomes are what society is primarily interested in. (shrink)

The paper seeks to interpret the liberal paradox in a framework where individual rights are represented as game forms. Several close counterparts, in this framework, of Sen’s theorem are considered, and their intuitive significance is discussed.

The paper intends to show, that W. N. Hohfeld's theory of fundamental jural relations is relevant to economic theory, and that Hohfeld's system can be reconstructed by the concepts of 'liberty space' and 'ability space', understood as an agent's Spielraum for action. The first half of the paper is devoted to an exposition of Hohfeld's system and to the question of its relation to the economic analysis of property rights. The second half concerns Spielraum theory and the reformulation of Hohfeldian (...) distinctions in terms of liberty spaces and ability spaces. It is argued that the reformulation is useful, inter alia, for describing exchange of property rights by contract. El artículo intenta mostrar: que la teoría de las relaciones jurídicas fundamentales de W. N. Hohfeld es relevante para la teoría económica y que el sistema de Hohfeld puede ser reconstruido mediante los conceptos de "espacio de libertad" y "espacio de capacidad", entendidos como el Spielraum para la acción del agente. La primera mitad del artículo está dedicada a la exposición del sistema de Hohfeld y al problema de su relación con el análisis económico de los derechos reales. La segunda mitad se refiere a la teoría del Spielraum y a la reformulación de las distinciones hohfeldianas en términos de espacio de libertad y espacio de capacidad. Se argumenta que esta reformulación es útil, inter alia, para describir el cambio de los derechos reales mediante contratos. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of some of the most important philosophical papers by Peter Gärdenfors. Spanning a period of more than 20 years of his research, they cover a wide ground of topics, from early works on decision theory, belief revision and nonmonotonic logic to more recent work on conceptual spaces, inductive reasoning, semantics and the evolutions of thinking. Many of the papers have only been published in places that are difficult to access. The common theme of all the (...) papers is the dynamics of thought. Several of the papers have become minor classics and the volume bears witness of the wide scope of Gärdenfors’ research and of his crisp and often witty style of writing. The volume will be of interest to researchers in philosophy and other cognitive sciences. (shrink)

The paper axiomatises a generalised utilitarian aggregation rule, under which different weights are assigned to utilities depending on the different rights involved. The relationship between actions, rights and the evaluation of utilities is investigated. Application is made to a famous example, Edwin-Angelina-the Judge, which appears in the social choice literature.

Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of applications in diverse branches of philosophy. No criticism (...) is reviewed. Game theory is shown at work in discussions about epistemological dependence, liberalism and efficiency, Hume’s concept of convention, morality and rationality, and distributive justice and egalitarianism. A guide to the literature provides hints at applications in collective intentionality, epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, logic, philosophy of language, and political philosophy. (shrink)

Ever since its first publication in 1970, Amartya Sen's paper “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” has served as the starting point for almost all discussions of liberty in social choice theory. However, a number of people, myself included, have argued that Sen's theorem rests on a misleading characterization of liberty . In a recent paper, addressed to a philosophical audience, Sen has provided a careful defence of his theorem against this charge. I shall argue that this defence does not (...) work. (shrink)