In 1978, Barbara Carper named personal knowing as a fundamental way of knowing in our discipline. By that, she meant the discovery of self‐and‐other, arrived at through reflection, synthesis of perceptions and connecting with what is known. Along with empirics, aesthetics and ethics, personal knowing was understood as an essential attribute of nursing knowledge evolution, setting the context for the nurse to become receptively attentive to and engaged within the interpersonal processes of practice. Although much has been done over the (...) 40 years since Carper described these ways of knowing, and we have seen enormous advances in empirics and ethics, and I would argue even in aesthetics (understanding the subtle craft of nursing in action), personal knowing may not have attracted its fair share of critical unpacking. Further, we see increasing evidence of a distortion on how forms of personal knowledge, including beliefs and attitudes, are being taken up within segments of the profession; these include legitimizing idiosyncratic positionings and, most worrisome, challenges to the idea that there are and ought to be fundamental truths within nursing that stand as central to disciplinary knowledge. In this paper, the author reflects on the confusion that a continued uncritical deference to personal knowing may be creating and the evolving interests it seems to serve. (shrink)

The use of correlational probability values (p‐values) as a means of evaluating evidence in nursing and health care has largely been accepted uncritically. There are reasons to be concerned about an uncritical adherence to the use of significance testing, which has been located in the natural science paradigm. p‐values have served in hypothesis and statistical testing, such as in randomized controlled trials and meta‐analyses to support what has been portrayed as the highest levels of evidence in the framework of evidence‐based (...) practice. Nursing has been minimally involved in the rich debate about the controversies of treating significance testing as evidentiary in the health and social sciences. In this paper, we join the dialogue by examining how and why this statistical mechanism has become entrenched as the gold standard for determining what constitutes legitimate scientific knowledge in the postpositivistic paradigm. We argue that nursing needs to critically reflect on the limitations associated with this tool of the evidence‐based movement, given the complexities and contextual factors that are inherent to nursing epistemology. Such reflection will inform our thinking about what constitutes substantive knowledge for the nursing discipline. (shrink)

Pragmatism emphasizes practical consequences and empirical explanations rather than introspective contemplations. However, the arguments of pragmatists are not uniform, as shown by the four prominent pragmatists presented in this article. The major difference between them is that Peirce and Haack acknowledge an objective truth, whereas James and Rorty do not. Thus, for a fuller understanding of the pragmatist view of our knowledge, both camps must be consulted. In the nursing field, pragmatism is occasionally referred to as a guiding philosophy. However, (...) the influence of James and Rorty has been greater than that of Peirce and Haack on pragmatists, which may risk leading to a skewed understanding of pragmatism by nursing scholars. Still, the four pragmatists share naturalism, which rejects a metaphysics that defines the nature of knowledge before our enquiry and emphasizes experience and practice. Pragmatic naturalism can help ensure that nursing theory does not deviate from clinical practice. This article also explores the broad adaptability of the ideas of all four pragmatists to philosophical issues in nursing, such as mixed‐methods research, epistemic relativism and realism. By showing that pragmatism can be relevant and stimulating to each of these topics, the article demonstrates that the different approaches to pragmatism can provide more inspiration for nurses and nursing researchers in the future. (shrink)

In this essay, I advance an argument against the expansion and acceptance of postmodern metaphysical antirealist ideologies in the development of nursing theory in North America. I suggest mystical theoretical explanations of care, the rejection of empirical epistemology, and a return to divinity in nursing represent an intellectual dead end, as these ideas do little to help resolve real‐world health issues and also negate the need for the academic discrimination of bad ideas. I examine some of the philosophical foundations of (...) nursing theory and deconstruct some of the more preternatural theories that have become established as the dominant conventional wisdom in the academy. It is argued that this can be characterized as a form of self‐deception, and overall has had a negative impact on advancement of the nursing profession and public health care. Reasons behind the widespread acceptance of these irrational theoretical stances in nursing and the ongoing support for mystical therapeutic interventions are explored. (shrink)