La vida es razón hermenéutica. El arte, como todo fenómeno cultural, es interpretado por Ortega como cosa humana, como algo que sólo tiene sentido en el contexto de la vida humana. Todo texto artístico necesita interpretación porque ningún decir humano es plenamente presente a sí mismo. Ningún texto se dice totalmente a sí mismo. Siempre supone un mundo y reclama siempre otros textos. La limitación del texto se debe a la finitud del ser humano. La interpretación es un signo de (...) la finitud humana. Esto significa que la filosofía hermenéutica de Ortega es también una filosofía de la finitud. (shrink)

Much NGO (Non-Governmental Organisation) fund-raising and publicity concern disasters, emergencies and the immediate relief of suffering. Donations and support may follow but they are prompted all too often by a superficially informed compassion or guilt with donors having little understanding of the results of their action. For all their impact, such campaigns can amount to demagogic sentimentalism leading to ‘compassion fatigue’ and lack of sustained support once media attention moves elsewhere. They thus undermine the unique mission of NGOs themselves. This (...) paper urges a different and more strategic approach to communication by NGOs, one which takes account of their unique status and their mission to promote solidarity. It argues that as well as solving problems of underdevelopment, NGOs need to remain independent and to shape public opinion if they are to flourish. And for this they need stable funding from informed donors giving in a spirit of solidarity to support development carried out explicitly in the name of human solidarity. The paper sets out guidelines for NGOs to communicate in ways likely to gain the support of such donors. And it describes the la Florida project in Columbia as an example of how the beneficiary can — in the spirit of solidarity — be brought to the centre of NGO action and communication. (shrink)

Resumen: El principal objetivo de este trabajo es pensar el concepto de meditación en la filosofía de Ortega y Gasset. La meditación es la esencia de la filosofía para Ortega. Meditar y filosofar son sinónimos. La filosofía no es mera teoría, sino que implica también práctica. El elemento teórico sólo tiene sentido cuando surge de la vida, pero ante todo la teoría sólo vale si vale para vivir. El ser humano para Ortega piensa porque vive, pero lo fundamental es que (...) piensa para vivir. Sólo los pensamientos que se alcanzan viviendo tienen valor para vivir. La meditación filosófica está siempre supeditada a la vida.The principal aim of this work is to think the concept of meditation in the Ortega y Gasset’s philosophy. For Ortega, meditation is the essence of philosophy. To meditate and to philosophize are synonymous. Philosophy isn’t simply theory, but it also implies practice. The theoretical element only makes sense when it arises from life, but above all theory only have value if it have value for life. For Ortega, human being thinks because he lives, but is fundamental that he thinks for life. Only thoughts reached by living have value for life. Philosophical meditation is always subordinated to life. (shrink)

Este artículo muestra cómo las vanguardias artísticas de principios del siglo XX representan para Ortega y Gasset una nueva sensibilidad: la tendencia a deshumanizar el arte. Este arte deshumanizado es una reacción contra el popular arte romántico y naturalista, por lo que se propone como nuevo arte impopular. Lo que define es el deshumanizar y su esencia es la desrealización, o sea, la destrucción de la realidad. Para Ortega el objeto estético es un objeto metafórico, a saber, una irrealidad o (...) virtualidad; desrealizar implica la fuga de la realidad. El arte es un mundo incomunicado con la realidad porque es irrealidad. Pero precisamente porque es irrealidad, el arte puede aumentar el mundo. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se desarrollan las bases para la enumeración de las reglas del método a partir del pensamiento filosófico de Eduardo Nicol. En la propuesta temática del autor, amanece la necesidad de repensar el método concediéndole dos funciones preeminentes, tales como son, por un lado, la de servir de cedazo a las diferentes impresiones, así como a los distintos intereses exógenos a la razón buscadora de la verdad. Así también, por otro lado, el método constituye la instancia a (...) partir de la cual se inhiben las arbitrariedades en el discurso de la verdad. (shrink)

Ortega, aunque comprime su metafísica hasta formularla con su “Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia”, no escribe apenas de esa circunstancia: de su condición y posibles aspectos. Del binomio con que explica la vida trabaja solo en la reacción del individuo, convertida su propuesta metafísica en una ética que confía en las fuerzas del sujeto para desarrollar su proyecto vital en cualquier entorno. Aún es de día, que publica Miguel Delibes en 1949, con la España de posguerra de fondo, puede (...) leerse como una réplica a esta ética que Ortega llama de la ilusión: Su protagonista, ante una circunstancia abiertamente hostil, es incapaz de desarrollar el programa que quiere para su vida. La trama funciona como planteamiento de una ética que recalcula las posibilidades del individuo para realizarse en un entorno adverso. (shrink)

In the first place, I discuss the main papers and books on Durkheim published in recent years, where no attention is given to the phenomenological interpretations of his work. Then I expose different phenomenological readings of Durkheim, some of them positive, some negative, some ambivalent. Later I find that there is in Durkheim an implicit practice of phenomenology, inspired by Descartes’ Meditations on first philosophy. Consequently, I support Tyriakian’s thesis that there is in Durkheim an implicit phenomenological approach, despite his (...) positivism. Then I wonder whether this tacit approach produces a phenomenological ontology of the social world. I find that it actually does, especially in what regards to social facts considered as things. I argue that Durkheim’s conception of social things is consistent with Husserl’s notion of ideal objectivities. I conclude that Durkheim’s rule of considering social facts as things is part of his phenomenological legacy and that it does not contradict the idea that they also are “states lived”. (shrink)

Human beings make themselves with language in history. Language defines human beings making them subjects of their being and mode of being. In this sense language is essential and exclusive of humans. The problem with language consists in explaining the reality of language, something internal to speakers but manifesting itself as external to them.

A theory of knowledge is the explanation of things in terms of the possibilities and capabilities of the human way of knowing. The human knowledge is the representation of the things apprehended sensitively either through the senses or intuition. A theory of knowledge concludes about the reality of the things studied. As such it is a priori speculation, based on synthetic a priori statements. Its conclusions constitute interpretation, that is, hermeneutics. Linguistics as the science studying real language, that is, the (...) language spoken, reverts to human subjects in as much as they speak, say and know. Language thus must be studied as a theory of knowledge. (shrink)

This dissertation is a critical re-assessment of Latin American philosophical tradition and its quest for an authentic philosophical identity. This re-evaluation is brought about through s distinct reading of the writings of the Peruvian Marxist, Jose Carlos Mariategui . The analysis which is exercised in this inquiry proposes that its philosophical production should not be considered as an obscure or secondary form of European philosophy, or in the most unfortunate case, as a radical denial of the latter's philosophical heritage. ;In (...) attention to the central question concerning this dissertation it is claimed that a hermeneutic strategy of devising a re-interpretation of a single theorist could yield preferable and more illuminating results than just an extensive survey of the numerous philosophers who belong to the Latin American philosophical tradition. The "case study" which has been performed is that of the Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos Mariategui . ;This dissertation argues that regardless of the broad range of studies on the writings of this Peruvian revolutionary thinker, there is still much to say about his idiosyncratic interpretation of the Peruvian society of his times and about his eminently anti-dogmatic conception of Marxism. In his own discursive practice he unveiled a critical response to the inherent and rigid determinism of the Marxist dogmatic orthodoxy widely accepted in Latin America and the rest of the world during his lifetime. His self-education and theoretical practice is described as a virtual "ingestion" of the 1920s Marxism and many other non-Marxist philosophical and theoretical notions which were critically transformed into an innovative and effectual thought replete with revolutionary relevance. ;The purpose in stressing this point in Mariategui's critical "adaptation" of Marxism is to accentuate the undeniable Eurocentric core of Marxism with which the Peruvian thinker had to contend. The reading of Mariategui which has been suggested, characterizes his theoretical practice as an immanent critique of Eurocentric Marxism. The relevance that Mariategui's writings bear for the problem of Latin American philosophy can be posited as a critique by practice of the traditional discourses of legitimation imposed on non-Eurocentric forms of thought. (shrink)

In this study a toolbox is proposed: the “sebucán”, paradigm/phármakon, as a phenomenological hermeneutics spiral of the person’s emancipation, which opens in a school device: the narrated and discontinuous reading. Thus, the school as a place of stories, of reading and of writing, is assumed like a challenge to distinguish the person’s place, his/her word, suffering, feeling, thinking, in synthesis: his/her singularity, because phenomenologically speaking it’s all about making place to a speaking being in his/her autonomy/”heteronomia”, politically and etically speaking. (...) One of the main targets of this study is the achievement of a critical hermeneutics phenomenology and from the diad mimesis/metaphor of the school person who lives and suffers violence. For this purpose we take the narrative text as a main reference, especially fictional stotytelling, in order to apply the “sebucán” as a phenomenological spiral to show the efficacy of a toolbox to the service of the emancipation of the school person. (shrink)