The philosophical debate on secession has hitherto revolved primarily around the question of self-determination rather than that of distributive justice. Normative theorists of secession have approached the question of secession mostly in terms of the right that the secessionist group has to secede. Much less attention has been paid to the extent and the nature of obligations or duties that the seceding group might have toward the group it is leaving behind. At best, secession theorists have introduced clauses to the (...) effect that secession should not undermine the remainder state’s viability nor violate prior arrangements of reciprocal cooperation. While these clauses certainly reflect a certain concern for distributive justice, I argue that they are insufficient in two respects: they are problematically minimal in what they require, and the justification given for these clauses accounts only for part of the normative picture. In this paper, I address these two shortcomings by arguing that the seceding group might have significant duties of distributive justice toward the remainder group, and that these duties are associative in nature and stem from a concern to secure non-domination within the pre-secession polity. What is gained from my non-domination account, then, is that it is analytically more comprehensive and normatively more accurate. In arguing for claims and, the paper contributes both to the debate on secession as well as to the conceptualization of associative duties and of non-domination. (shrink)

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All theories of the right to secede either understand the right as a remedial right only or also recognize a primary right to secede. By a right in this context is meant a general, not a special, right (one generated through promising, contract, or some special relationship). Remedial Right Only Theories assert that a group has a general right to secede if and only if it has suffered certain injustices, for which secession is the appropriate remedy of last resort.1 Different (...) Remedial Right Only Theories identify different injustices as warranting the remedy of secession. (shrink)

This paper explores the question of whether there can be a right to secede from a liberal state by examining the concept of a liberal state and the different forms of liberalism that may be appealed to in order to justify secession. It argues that where the foundations of the state’s legitimacy are conceived in terms of a non-derivative right to self-determination, then secession from a liberal state may be a justified form of action for different types of groups including (...) ‘illiberal’ ones. If, however, a broader definition of political legitimacy is adopted – one that is predicated upon the liberal notions of individual moral autonomy and equality – then the right to independent statehood will generally not include a right to secede from a state that already upholds these principles. Consequently, liberal theorists of secession are forced to choose between particularizing a right of independent statehood to groups trapped in illiberal states, or acknowledging that the right to secede includes a right to establish an ‘illiberal’ state that bestows upon its citizens unequal rights and entitlements other than a right of exit. (shrink)

Résumé: Les analogies peuvent être des outils précieux d’argumentation lors-qu’elles sont bonnes, mais quand elles sont mauvaises, elles faussent inévitablement la question qu’elles sont censées élucider. Tel est le cas de la comparaison entre la sécession et le divorce, qu’il s’agisse du divorce sous conditions ou du divorce sans égard à la faute. L’objectif de cet article est de montrer que la sécession se distingue empirique ment d’un divorce par trois différences significatives: entre personnes et peuple, entre mariage et union (...) politique, et entre divorce et sécession. Cela révèle que les deux versions de l’analogie du divorce sont inadéquates. Même si, cependant, ces écarts pou vaient être comblés et que l’analogie du divorce sous condition puisse être sauvée, je conteste le caractère approprié de l’autre version en montrant qu’aborder la sécession comme un divorce civil entraînerait des implications normatives contre-intuitives qui enlèveraient tout attrait à l’analogie du divorce sans égard à la faute, ou qui amèneraient ceux qui l’emploient à promouvoir des modifications irréalistes aux institutions légales internationales. (shrink)

We defend the moral and legal right to secede in accordance with plebiscitary theory. Our paper has three main goals. First, by offering a schematic characterization of plebiscitary theory, the main arguments in its favour (and the main objections to them), we contribute to clarify the structure of this complex debate. Second, we stress the point that, if the moral right to secede is established, the resistance for its inclusion into positive law is unjustified. Finally, by addressing old and new (...) objections to plebiscitary theory, we hope to make a compelling case for a wider recognition of secessionist rights. (shrink)

The secession issue appears to many contemporary thinkers to reveal a fatal flaw in the idea of national self-determination. The question is whether national minorities who come to want to be politically self determining should be allowed to separate from the parent state and form one of their own. Here the idea of national self-determination may lead us in one of two opposing directions. If the minority group in question regards itself as a separate nation, then the principle seems to (...) support its claims: if the Québécois or the Catalans come to think of themselves as having national identities distinct from those of the Canadians or the Spanish, and to seek political independence on that basis, then if we are committed to national self-determination we should support their claims. But we then face the challenge that once national identities begin to proliferate there is no feasible way of satisfying all such claims, given elementary facts of geography and population spread. (shrink)

The principle of national self-determination holds that a national community, simply by virtue of being a national community, has a prima facie right to create its own sovereign state. While many support this principle, not as many agree that it should be formally recognized by political institutions. One of the main concerns is that implementing this principle may lead to certain types of inequalities—between nations with and without their own states, members inside and outside the border, and members and nonmembers (...) inside the same nation state. While these inequalities may arise, I shall argue that they are not unjust. These worries are partly the results of confusing two types of interests that a national group may have—in cultural affairs and in political affairs. While a national community should enjoy rights over their cultural affairs, this does not grant them authority over other non-cultural, political affairs. Once the distinction is drawn, we can see that there are constraints on the implementation of this principle. Consequently, these inequalities justify setting limits to a group’s right of self-government, although they do not conclusively refute the right itself. (shrink)

Secession is again a hot political topic. Consider the recent events in Catalonia. In an illegal referendum in October 2017, amid large-scale demonstrations and violent interventions by the Spanish...

The secession of prosperous regions may negatively affect the redistributive scheme of an established state. As a consequence, the capacity of its welfare system to support the inhabitants of poorer regions may be significantly reduced. Some authors assert that affluent groups who opt for full political independence violate duties of solidarity. This objection to the secession of prosperous regions can be based on different views of distributive justice. Here, following a distinction that has been introduced by Allen Buchanan, ‘subject centred’ (...) and ‘justice as reciprocity’ theories are explored. It is argued that both theories fail to support the case against the secession of wealthy groups. ‘Subject centred’ theories cannot explain special duties toward compatriots, whereas ‘justice as reciprocity’ theories cannot justify restrictions on exit rights. However, this does not mean that separatists have no moral duties vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. They are obliged to dissolve the political union in a fair way, e.g., by accepting responsibility for some share of the public debts. (shrink)

RésuméLes analogies peuvent être des outils précieux d'argumentation lors-qu'elles sont bonnes, mais quand elles sont mauvaises, elles faussent inévitablement la question qu'elles sont censées élucider. Tel est le cas de la comparaison entre la sécession et le divorce, qu'il s'agisse du divorce sous conditions ou du divorce sans égard à la faute. L'objectif de cet article est de montrer que la sécession se distingue empiriquement d'un divorce par trois différences significatives: entre personnes et peuple, entre manage et union politique, et (...) entre divorce et sécession. Cela révèle que les deux versions de l'analogie du divorce sont inadéquates. Même si, cependant, ces écarts pouvaient être comblés et que l'analogie du divorce sous condition puisse être sauvée, je conteste le caractère approprie de l'autre version en montrant qu'aborder la sécession comme un divorce civil entraînerait des implications normatives contre-intuitives qui enlèveraient tout attrait à l'analogie du divorce sans égard à la faute, ou qui amèneraient ceux qui l'emploient à promouvoir des modifications irréalistes aux institutions légales internationales. (shrink)