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Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press (1990)

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  1. Could a Feminist and a Game Theorist Co-Parent?Karen Wendling & Paul Viminitz - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):33 - 49.
    Game theorists assume that rational defensibility is a necessary condition for moral, social, or political justification. By itself, this is a fairly uncontroversial claim; most moral or political philosophers would agree. And yet game theorists tend to be advocates of the free market. External critics of game theory usually claim this is because game theorists assume that individuals are atomistic and self-interested. Game theorists themselves deny this, however, for what strike us as good reasons. In principle, game theory has no (...)
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  • Years of moral epistemology: A bibliography.Laura Donohue & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):217-229.
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  • On three alleged theories of rational behavior.Stuart Rachels - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (4):506-520.
    What behavior is rational? It’s rational to act ethically, some think. Others endorse instrumentalism — it is rational to pursue one’s goals. Still others say that acting rationally always involves promoting one’s self-interest. Many philosophers have given each of these answers. But these answers don’t really conflict; they aren’t vying to describe some shared concept or to solve some mutually acknowledged problem. In so far as this is debated, it is a pseudo-debate. The different uses of ‘rational action’ differ merely (...)
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  • Moral sentiments and reciprocal obligations: The case for pension fund investment in community development.Gordon L. Clark - 2000 - Ethics, Place and Environment 3 (1):7 – 24.
    Squeezed between increasing entitlement expenditures and static or declining real revenues, state-funded urban development is increasingly perceived as an unaffordable luxury. At the same time, the power and significance of the banking sector is giving way to new kinds of financial institutions that have little or no interest in community development. Not surprisingly, it is often argued that pension funds ought to be more sensitive to community needs. However, some analysts argue that pension funds are properly only the agents of (...)
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  • On being a lonely brain‐in‐a‐vat: Structuralism, solipsism, and the threat from external world skepticism.Grace Helton - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (3):353-373.
    David Chalmers has recently developed a novel strategy of refuting external world skepticism, one he dubs the structuralist solution. In this paper, I make three primary claims: First, structuralism does not vindicate knowledge of other minds, even if it is combined with a functionalist approach to the metaphysics of minds. Second, because structuralism does not vindicate knowledge of other minds, the structuralist solution vindicates far less worldly knowledge than we would hope for from a solution to skepticism. Third, these results (...)
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  • Conventions, morals and strategy: Greta’s dilemma and the incarceration game.Kaushik Basu - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.
    Conventions and leaders are believed to be the two pillars of justice and order in society. This paper evaluates this proposition and draws attention to two intriguing ways in which these pillars can malfunction. The argument is constructed by creating two new games, Greta’s Dilemma and the Incarceration Game. An awareness of these problems can help us use our ‘moral intention’ to reexamine our own collective behavior and to design prior conventions, which limit the power of the leader.
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  • Social Contract: The Only Game in Town.Jan Narveson - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (4):695-711.
    David Gauthier a dit un jour que le contrat social constitue la seule option permettant de parvenir à une morale rationnelle. Je soutiens qu’il a raison. La morale se compose de règles notionnelles visant tout le monde, partout. Seuls les individus sont rationnels, et ils ont des intérêts divers. Le contrat social propose des principes auxquels chacun, compte tenu de sa situation sociale et environnementale, consent bien qu’ils limitent les activités par lesquelles chacun poursuit ses buts. Il n’existe aucun autre (...)
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  • Moralité et maximisation de l'avantage : l' « insensé » de Hobbes décrit-il des agents rationnels?Emmanuel Picavet - 2006 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 4 (4):427-438.
    Cet article développe un argument destiné à montrer que la conception des lois de nature chez Hobbes, ainsi que la conception de leurs relations avec les raisons de l’action, l’obligation et la rationalité individuelle, sont des repères importants pour les débats contemporains sur les limites de la conception de la rationalité individuelle en termes de maximisation unilatérale de l’avantage personnel. Les vues de Hobbes ont un intérêt permanent à la fois pour les théoriciens de la décision et pour les philosophes (...)
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  • Democracy and Education: About the Future of a Problem.Jürgen Oelkers - 2000 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 19 (1):3-19.
    In 20th century's European theory of education there was little interest in philosophy of democracy. John Dewey's Democracy and Education was translated in nearly everyEuropean language but did not become the center of discussion.Even ``radical education'' was much more child-centered thanopen to radical questions of political democracy. This articlediscusses the problem in two respects, first the tension betweenneo-liberalism's concept of individuality and public education,and second the future problems of a theory of ``democraticeducation'' after Dewey. The aim is to overcome traditionalEuropean (...)
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  • A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict: The Genesis of Bargaining Power. [REVIEW]Joan Esteban & József Sákovics - 2008 - Theory and Decision 65 (3):227-252.
    We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the direct conflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomes into a disagreement point. Adding this function to the description of a bargaining problem, a weak axiom based on individual rationality leads to a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of conflict, ASC. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Stakeholder’s Preference and Rational Compliance: A Comment on Sacconi’s “CSR as a Model for Extended Corporate Governance II: Compliance, Reputation and Reciprocity”.Pedro Francés-Gómez & Ariel del Rio - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 82 (1):59-76.
    Lorenzo Sacconi's recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders' conformist preferences - their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. (...)
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  • As relações entre David Hume e o Utilitarismo/Relations between David Hume and Utilitarianism.Gabriel Bertin de Almeida - 2013 - Natureza Humana 15 (1).
    O objetivo do presente artigo é discutir os vínculos existentes entre a teoria humeana e o Utilitarismo. Nesse contexto, mencionando a divergência existente entre os comentadores de Hume a respeito de seu lugar diante do Utilitarismo, conclui-se que, embora o caráter descritivo de fato predomine na teoria humeana, ela não é inteiramente desprovida de pretensão prescritiva. Será ainda necessário discutir em que consiste essa pretensão, isto é, o que ela busca prescrever.
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  • A Multi-stage Game Model Of Morals By Agreement.Joseph Heath - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (3):529-552.
    If there is one aspect of David Gauthier's program for a contractualist morality that has been most sceptically received, it is his view that instrumentally rational agents would choose to adopt a disposition that would in turn constrain their future choices. Instead of remaining “straightforward maximizers” caught in a suboptimal state of nature, they would become “constrained maximizers” who could avoid prisoner's dilemmas by engaging in conditional co-operation. Apart from the fact that Gauthier's entirely prescriptive orientation leads him to omit (...)
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  • Identifying Moral Perplexity in Reproductive Medicine. A Discourse Ethics Rationale.Matthias Kettner & Dieter Schäfer - 1998 - Human Reproduction and Genetic Ethics 4 (1):8-17.
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  • Discrediting Egoism.Jawara Sanford - 2021 - Revista de Filosofía 46 (1):173-189.
    Un argumento incontestable contra el egoísmo ha sido considerado como el santo grial de la filosofía moral, es decir, una meta muy valiosa pero de muy difícil realización. Convencido de que sería como mínimo quijotesco volver a intentar una vez más refutar el egoísmo sobre la base de sus propios supuestos, persigo la meta más modesta de desacreditar el egoísmo de forma contundente. Para mostrar hasta qué punto esta teoría es inverosímil, expongo una combinación de argumentos que apelan a juicios (...)
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  • (1 other version)When, If Ever, Do We Aggregate? And Why?Jan Narveson - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):48-75.
    Aggregation in moral philosophy calls for the summing or averaging of values or utilities as a guide to individual behavior. But morality, it is argued, needs to be individualistic, in view of the evident separateness of persons, especially given the great disparities among individuals who nevertheless interact with each other in social life. The most plausible general moral program is the classical liberal (or “libertarian”) one calling for mutual noninterference rather than treating others as equal to oneself in point of (...)
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  • La philosophie morale depuis la mort de Dieu.Jocelyne Couture - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (2):381-.
    L'avènement de la modernité a privé la morale de ses sources traditionnelles et l'a laissée devant une dichotomie dont les termes sont également inacceptables: d'un côté l'historicisme avec son cortège de relativisme et de scepticisme et de l'autre, la raison impérative, universelle et vide de contenu moral. Entre les certitudes des Anciens, les dilemmes de la modernité et les abîmes du postmodernisme, la philosophie morale et politique contemporaine ne serait pourtant pas condamnée à l'impotence. La conviction de Charles Larmore est (...)
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  • Moral sentiments and reciprocal obligations: The case for pension fund investment in community development.Gordon L. Clark - 2000 - Philosophy and Geography 3 (1):7-24.
    Squeezed between increasing entitlement expenditures and static or declining real revenues, state‐funded urban development is increasingly perceived as an unaffordable luxury. At the same time, the power and significance of the banking sector is giving way to new kinds of financial institutions that have little or no interest in community development. Not surprisingly, it is often argued that pension funds ought to be more sensitive to community needs. However, some analysts argue that pension funds are properly only the agents of (...)
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  • Collective Rationality and Simple Utilitarian Theories.Michael J. Almeida - 1994 - Dialogue 33 (3):363-.
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