Lorenzo Sacconi's recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders' conformist preferences - their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. (...) We take issue with him over this concept: we show that the assumption of conformist preferences is a moral premise, and it arguably weakens the normativity of the theory as a whole. As an alternative, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach. We draw upon recent applications of evolutionary game theory to moral philosophy , and we use a computer simulation of the trust game. According to this approach, the failure of the logic of reputation, which is the problem conformist preferences were introduced to solve, is overcome through the dynamics of interaction. (shrink)

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the direct conflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomes into a disagreement point. Adding this function to the description of a bargaining problem, a weak axiom based on individual rationality leads to a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of conflict, ASC. (...) This agreement may be construed as the limit of a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a function of the parties’ relative power in the disagreement scenario. As a result, we identify a link between the circumstances of bargaining and the bargaining powers within it. The rich get the law passed by means of force and arms or get it accepted by fear to their might, aren’t things this way? Plato, Republic. (shrink)

L'avènement de la modernité a privé la morale de ses sources traditionnelles et l'a laissée devant une dichotomie dont les termes sont également inacceptables: d'un côté l'historicisme avec son cortège de relativisme et de scepticisme et de l'autre, la raison impérative, universelle et vide de contenu moral. Entre les certitudes des Anciens, les dilemmes de la modernité et les abîmes du postmodernisme, la philosophie morale et politique contemporaine ne serait pourtant pas condamnée à l'impotence. La conviction de Charles Larmore est (...) en effet que les diverses conceptions philosophiques qui nous ont successivement menés à pareille impasse nous offrent aussi les moyens d'en sortir. Cette conviction œcumenique est elle-même ancrée dans une ethique de la pensee qui devrait, comme l'auteur s'en explique dans l'introduction de Modernité et morale, nous détourner du dogmatisme et du monisme traditionnels de la philosophie. Sur cet arrière-plan métaphilosophique, l'auteur prétend done faire, des problèmes de la morale contemporaine, l'objet d'une discussion ouverte où il convie les philosophes de toutes tendances et de tous les temps. (shrink)

In 20th century's European theory of education there was little interest in philosophy of democracy. John Dewey's Democracy and Education was translated in nearly everyEuropean language but did not become the center of discussion.Even ``radical education'' was much more child-centered thanopen to radical questions of political democracy. This articlediscusses the problem in two respects, first the tension betweenneo-liberalism's concept of individuality and public education,and second the future problems of a theory of ``democraticeducation'' after Dewey. The aim is to overcome traditionalEuropean (...) dualisms like that of ``citizen'' or ``man''i.e. to pave the way for a post-Rousseauian theory of education. (shrink)

What behavior is rational? It’s rational to act ethically, some think. Others endorse instrumentalism — it is rational to pursue one’s goals. Still others say that acting rationally always involves promoting one’s self-interest. Many philosophers have given each of these answers. But these answers don’t really conflict; they aren’t vying to describe some shared concept or to solve some mutually acknowledged problem. In so far as this is debated, it is a pseudo-debate. The different uses of ‘rational action’ differ merely (...) in meaning. I shall defend the following claims: ‘rational behavior’ is used in ethical, prudential, and instrumental ways (section 1); these uses of ‘rational behavior’ are distinct (section 2); they do not represent competing theories of rational behavior (section 3); we should stop using ‘rational behavior’ ethically and prudentially, but we may continue its instrumental use (section 4). (shrink)

David Chalmers has recently developed a novel strategy of refuting external world skepticism, one he dubs the structuralist solution. In this paper, I make three primary claims: First, structuralism does not vindicate knowledge of other minds, even if it is combined with a functionalist approach to the metaphysics of minds. Second, because structuralism does not vindicate knowledge of other minds, the structuralist solution vindicates far less worldly knowledge than we would hope for from a solution to skepticism. Third, these results (...) suggest that the problem of external world skepticism should perhaps be construed as two different problems, since the problem might turn out to require two substantively different solutions, one for knowledge of the kind that is not dependent on other minds and one for knowledge that is. (shrink)

Conventions and leaders are believed to be the two pillars of justice and order in society. This paper evaluates this proposition and draws attention to two intriguing ways in which these pillars can malfunction. The argument is constructed by creating two new games, Greta’s Dilemma and the Incarceration Game. An awareness of these problems can help us use our ‘moral intention’ to reexamine our own collective behavior and to design prior conventions, which limit the power of the leader.

Cet article développe un argument destiné à montrer que la conception des lois de nature chez Hobbes, ainsi que la conception de leurs relations avec les raisons de l’action, l’obligation et la rationalité individuelle, sont des repères importants pour les débats contemporains sur les limites de la conception de la rationalité individuelle en termes de maximisation unilatérale de l’avantage personnel. Les vues de Hobbes ont un intérêt permanent à la fois pour les théoriciens de la décision et pour les philosophes (...) moralistes ou politologues, puisque de nombreux théoriciens moraux ou politiques estiment que la moralité et la rationalité individuelle devraient coïncider à un certain niveau au moins. On essaie ici de montrer que certains problèmes intrigants qui demeurent peuvent être abordés d’une manière satisfaisante, dans des cas limités, dans un modèle cognitiviste unifié de la rationalité pratique individuelle, selon une direction hobbesienne.In this article, it is argued that Hobbes’s conception of the laws of nature is a truly important focal point for contemporary debates on the limits of unilateral advantage-maximizing views of individual rationality. The Hobbesian views have permanent interest both for decision theorists and for moral and political philosophers, since many moral and political thinkers hold that morality and individual rationality should coincide at some level at least. It is argued that some of the remaining, puzzling problems in reconciling individual rationality and morality can be dealt with satisfactorily in some limited cases in a unified cognitive model of individual practical rationality, following a Hobbesian direction. (shrink)

Squeezed between increasing entitlement expenditures and static or declining real revenues, state‐funded urban development is increasingly perceived as an unaffordable luxury. At the same time, the power and significance of the banking sector is giving way to new kinds of financial institutions that have little or no interest in community development. Not surprisingly, it is often argued that pension funds ought to be more sensitive to community needs. However, some analysts argue that pension funds are properly only the agents of (...) plan beneficiaries; any investment that took into account community needs would be, in effect, an unjustified tax on individuals’ future welfare. Furthermore, analysts are very doubtful about the integrity of public pension plan investment decision‐making. In this paper, I set out a morally informed justification of public pension plan investment in community development. In doing so, I develop a model of community development that stresses the reciprocal nature of the obligations embedded in the relationship between the community and pension plan beneficiaries. This approach also has significant implications for a wide variety of private sponsored plans. The paper begins with an assessment of pension fund decision‐making and the practices of the investment management industry, drawing upon related research on pension fund capitalism. It goes on to issues of social obligation, referencing recent research on the nature of social contracts. To give the analysis empirical relevance I refer to the much disputed decision of the West Virginia legislature to require their public pension funds’ Investment Management Board to invest in the state government's corrections authority. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente artigo é discutir os vínculos existentes entre a teoria humeana e o Utilitarismo. Nesse contexto, mencionando a divergência existente entre os comentadores de Hume a respeito de seu lugar diante do Utilitarismo, conclui-se que, embora o caráter descritivo de fato predomine na teoria humeana, ela não é inteiramente desprovida de pretensão prescritiva. Será ainda necessário discutir em que consiste essa pretensão, isto é, o que ela busca prescrever.

Game theorists assume that rational defensibility is a necessary condition for moral, social, or political justification. By itself, this is a fairly uncontroversial claim; most moral or political philosophers would agree. And yet game theorists tend to be advocates of the free market. External critics of game theory usually claim this is because game theorists assume that individuals are atomistic and self-interested. Game theorists themselves deny this, however, for what strike us as good reasons. In principle, game theory has no (...) necessary ties to right-wing distribution schemes. Why, then, is game theory almost exclusively the province of conservative philosophers, political scientists, and economists? The problem, we believe, lies in the theory of rational choice standardly employed by game theory. Even if we accept, for the purposes of argument, game theory's account of the justification of moral dispositions — that a disposition is morally justified if and only if, in its absence, it would be game theoretically rational to acquire it — we need not be led to right-wing solutions. If we expand the kinds of choices facing individuals to include choices about what we will call ‘institutional roles,’ then we can explain the game theoretic rationality of the kinds of emotions and behavior exemplified by duty, loyalty, and love. (shrink)

Squeezed between increasing entitlement expenditures and static or declining real revenues, state-funded urban development is increasingly perceived as an unaffordable luxury. At the same time, the power and significance of the banking sector is giving way to new kinds of financial institutions that have little or no interest in community development. Not surprisingly, it is often argued that pension funds ought to be more sensitive to community needs. However, some analysts argue that pension funds are properly only the agents of (...) plan beneficiaries; any investment that took into account community needs would be, in effect, an unjustified tax on individuals' future welfare. Furthermore, analysts are very doubtful about the integrity of public pension plan investment decision-making. In this paper, I set out a morally informed justification of public pension plan investment in community development. In doing so, I develop a model of community development that stresses the reciprocal nature of the obligations embedded in the relationship between the community and pension plan beneficiaries. This approach also has significant implications for a wide variety of private sponsored plans. The paper begins with an assessment of pension fund decision-making and the practices of the investment management industry, drawing upon related research on pension fund capitalism. It goes on to issues of social obligation, referencing recent research on the nature of social contracts. To give the analysis empirical relevance I refer to the much disputed decision of the West Virginia legislature to require their public pension funds' Investment Management Board to invest in the state government's corrections authority. (shrink)

Un argumento incontestable contra el egoísmo ha sido considerado como el santo grial de la filosofía moral, es decir, una meta muy valiosa pero de muy difícil realización. Convencido de que sería como mínimo quijotesco volver a intentar una vez más refutar el egoísmo sobre la base de sus propios supuestos, persigo la meta más modesta de desacreditar el egoísmo de forma contundente. Para mostrar hasta qué punto esta teoría es inverosímil, expongo una combinación de argumentos que apelan a juicios (...) normativos y rasgos de nuestra fenomenología moral casi universales. (shrink)

David Gauthier a dit un jour que le contrat social constitue la seule option permettant de parvenir à une morale rationnelle. Je soutiens qu’il a raison. La morale se compose de règles notionnelles visant tout le monde, partout. Seuls les individus sont rationnels, et ils ont des intérêts divers. Le contrat social propose des principes auxquels chacun, compte tenu de sa situation sociale et environnementale, consent bien qu’ils limitent les activités par lesquelles chacun poursuit ses buts. Il n’existe aucun autre (...) moyen rationnel de comprendre la morale; c’est donc bien la seule option possible. (shrink)

If there is one aspect of David Gauthier's program for a contractualist morality that has been most sceptically received, it is his view that instrumentally rational agents would choose to adopt a disposition that would in turn constrain their future choices. Instead of remaining “straightforward maximizers” caught in a suboptimal state of nature, they would become “constrained maximizers” who could avoid prisoner's dilemmas by engaging in conditional co-operation. Apart from the fact that Gauthier's entirely prescriptive orientation leads him to omit (...) any specification of the mechanism through which this might be accomplished, serious doubts have been raised about the adequacy of the argument that he offers in support of adopting constrained maximization. (shrink)

Aggregation in moral philosophy calls for the summing or averaging of values or utilities as a guide to individual behavior. But morality, it is argued, needs to be individualistic, in view of the evident separateness of persons, especially given the great disparities among individuals who nevertheless interact with each other in social life. The most plausible general moral program is the classical liberal (or “libertarian”) one calling for mutual noninterference rather than treating others as equal to oneself in point of (...) demands on our action. Why, then, would we ever aggregate? The reason is that we are affected by behavior that has general effects, especially unintended side effects, on all sorts of people among whom we ourselves are often to be found. When we are randomly situated among such groups—as we sometimes are and often are not—minimizing aggregate harm is the plausible strategy, and sometimes promoting aggregate benefit as well. (shrink)