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Opaque Pictures

Revue Internationale de Philosophie 250 (4):381-396 (2009)

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  1. Transparency and Egocentrism.Nils-Hennes Stear - 2021 - In Sonia Sedivy (ed.), Art, Representation, and Make-Believe: Essays on the Philosophy of Kendall L. Walton. New York: Routledge. pp. 196-213.
    Kendall Walton argues that photographs are transparent; we literally see the things depicted in them, not just the depictions. This intriguing claim has endured numerous criticisms from those I call the ‘egocentrists’, according to whom seeing—literal seeing—requires the conveyance of egocentric information; to count as seeing something, a visual experience of that thing must impart some information, however spare, about its position relative to the viewer. Since photographs fail to convey such information, the egocentrists claim, Walton’s transparency thesis fails. This (...)
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  • On the Epistemic Status of Prenatal Ultrasound: Are Ultrasound Scans Photographic Pictures?Maddalena Favaretto, Danya F. Vears & Pascal Borry - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (2):231-250.
    Medical imaging is predominantly a visual field. In this context, prenatal ultrasound images assume intense social, ethical, and psychological significance by virtue of the subject they represent: the fetus. This feature, along with the sophistication introduced by three-dimensional ultrasound imaging that allows improved visualization of the fetus, has contributed to the common impression that prenatal ultrasound scans are like photographs of the fetus. In this article we discuss the consistency of such a comparison. First, we investigate the epistemic role of (...)
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  • Look a Little (Chuck) Closer: Aesthetic Attention and the Contact Phenomenon.Claire Anscomb - forthcoming - British Journal of Aesthetics.
    There is a sustained phenomenological tradition of describing the character of photographic pictorial experience to consist in part of a feeling of contact with the subject of the photograph. Philosophers disagree, however, about the exact cause of the ‘contact phenomenon’ and whether there is a difference in the phenomenal character between the pictorial experiences of photographs and handmade pictures so that, if a viewer mistakes the type that a token image belongs to, their sense of contact can alter. I argue (...)
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