ITA: L’elaborato ha come obiettivo una ricostruzione storica del dibattito tra Immanuel Kant e Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi nel contesto del cosiddetto _Pantheismusstreit_ degli anni Ottanta del Settecento. In particolare, si andranno ad evidenziare le fonti dei due autori, i quali propongono due interpretazioni uguali e contrarie rispetto alle possibilità della fede, nonché del rapporto che questa intercorre con la ragione. Nello specifico, si andrà esponendo la posizione kantiana oltre al mito del Kant «alles Zermalmender», rimarcando le radici profonde della sua (...) riflessione tanto nelle letture di autori quali Christian Wolff, Christian August Crusius o Georg Friedrich Meier, quanto nella sua stessa produzione, come testimoniato già dalla _Principiorum primorum cognitionis methapysicae nova dilucidatio_ all’inizio del suo percorso intellettuale, culminando quindi nel breve saggio _Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren?_ e nella seconda edizione della _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ del 1787. Inoltre, si fornirà anche una ricostruzione della posizione jacobiana, delle sue fonti, quali, ad esempio, Johann Georg Hamann o Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, e della sua originale riflessione all’interno del contesto tedesco dell’epoca evocando soprattutto due opere, ovvero _Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn_, vero e proprio _casus belli_ del _Pantheismusstreit_, e _David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus_. Dunque, obiettivi dello scritto sono tanto il dissolvere il mito di uno spietato Kant come «la lama che in Germania ha tagliato la testa al deismo», quanto quello dello Jacobi irrazionalista ed indegno del titolo di filosofo. ENG: The subject of this work is an historical reconstruction of the debate between Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi in the context of the so-called _Pantheismusstreit_ that happened in the '80s of the Eighteenth Century. Specifically, the sources of the two authors are going to be stressed to highlight the equal and opposite interpretations given about the possibilities of the faith, as well as its relationship with reason. In particular, the kantian position is going to be displayed over the myth of Kant as «alles Zermalmender», drawing attention to his thought’s roots as much as in his lectures of Christian Wolff, Christian August Crusius or Georg Friedrich Meier, as in his own works, as the _Principiorum primorum cognitionis methapysicae nova dilucidatio_ already testimonies at the beginning of his career, climaxing in the short essay _Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren?_ as well in the second edition of the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ in 1787. Also, it is going to be proposed a reconstruction of the jacobian standpoint, careful to remark his sources, like Johann Georg Hamann or Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and his original thought in the German context of the era, summoning two works of his, _Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn_, the very _casus belli_ of the _Pantheismusstreit_, and the _David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus_. Therefore, goals of this works are the dispel of the myth of a ruthless Kant as «the sword that cut deism’s head in Germany», as well as the one on Jacobi as an irrationalist unworthy of being granted the title of philosopher. ​. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse conceptions of induction and certainty in Wolff and Crusius, highlighting their competing conceptions of physics. We discuss (i) the perspective of Wolff, who assigned induction an important role in physics, but argued that physics should be an axiomatic science containing certain statements, and (ii) the perspective of Crusius, who adopted parts of the ideal of axiomatic physics but criticized the scope of Wolff’s ideal of certain science. Against interpretations that take Wolff’s proofs in physics to (...) be based on empirical statements that are probable, we show how inductively established statements, coupled with assumptions concerning the uniformity of nature, can be certain according to Wolff. We examine Crusius’ little known work on physics and show that he attacked Wolff, arguing that many statements of physics are probable. We provide a discussion of the reception of methodological rules similar to Newton’s Regulae Philosophandi, discussing different interpretations of such rules. We conclude by briefly hinting at how the debate between Wolff and Crusius provides historical context for understanding Kant’s philosophy of natural science. (shrink)

Our doxastic states are our belief-like states, and these include outright doxastic states and degreed doxastic states. The former include believing that p, having the opinion that p, thinking that p, being sure that p, being certain that p, and doubting that p. The latter include degrees of confidence, credences, and perhaps some phenomenal states. But we also have conviction (being convinced simpliciter that p) and degrees of conviction (being more or less convinced that p). This volume shows: how and (...) why all of the outright doxastic states mentioned above can be reduced to conviction thresholds; what degrees of conviction fundamentally are (degreed reliance-dispositions); why degrees of conviction are not credences; when suspending a belief is compatible with continuing to believe; and the surprising extent to which Kant endorsed the theory of conviction that emerges in this volume. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show the unity and consistency of Kant’s reflections throughout all three sections of the Canon of Pure Reason. More specifically, I argue that Section 3, which is devoted to the issue of Fürwahrhalten, or taking-to-be-true, is crucial to achieving the methodological goal of the Canon, which is to justify the legitimacy of the speculative assumptions of pure reason. After examining the historical roots of Kant’s notion of a transcendental doctrine of method, I focus (...) on the methodological role that the practical element plays in the first two sections of the Canon. I then show how the limitations of Kant’s argument necessitate the introduction of a third crucial section, which serves both an analytic and an orientative function. (shrink)

Kant’s accounts of the Highest Good and the moral argument for God and immortality are central features of his philosophy. But both involve lingering puzzles. In this entry, we first explore what the Highest Good is for Kant and the role it plays in a complete account of ethical life. We then focus on whether the Highest Good involves individuals only, or whether it also connects with Kant’s doctrines about the moral progress of the species. In conclusion, we look into (...) three ways of articulating the moral argument for God and immorality that take our commitment to the Highest Good as their point of departure. (shrink)

Kant’s third question (“What may I hope?”) is underdiscussed in comparison to the other two, even though he himself took it to be the question that united his efforts in theoretical and practical philosophy. This is largely his own fault: in his discussion of the question he moves quickly from talking about rational hope to discussing the kind of Belief or faith (Glaube) that grounds it. Moreover, the canonical statements of his own moral proof do not seem to give hope (...) any essential role to play. In this chapter I first consider the ways in which pre-Kantian authors muddied the distinction between what we would call “hope” and “expectation.” I then look at how Kant’s views about hope evolve to the point where, by the time of the “End of All Things” essay of 1794, he seems to endorse a kind of hopeful pessimism about our this-worldly situation, at least. I then examine a version of Kant’s moral proof that succeeds in locating a role for hope that is distinct from that of Belief, expectation, optimism, and so on. Finally, I turn to some contemporary work in two very different arenas – Anthropocene scholarship and Christian eschatology – in order to look at how the concepts of hope and optimism are deployed in those contexts. We will see that although some of the recent discourses about the “Good Anthropocene” slip beyond hope into full-blown optimism, most authors working on ecological and environmental topics are careful to keep the attitudes distinct. By contrast, there is a tendency among contemporary theologians to follow earlier Christian authors in slipping beyond mere hope to optimistic faith, and even to full-blown certainty. (shrink)

This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant’s account of belief draws on the views of his contemporaries. Situating the non-evidentialist features of Crusius’s account of belief within his broader account, I argue that they include antecedents to both Kant’s distinction between pragmatic and moral belief and his conception of a postulate of pure practical reason. While moving us closer to Kant’s arguments for the first postulate, however, both Crusius’s and Meier’s arguments for the immortality of the soul (...) fail to anticipate the most important aspect of their Kantian counterparts. Developing the non-evidentialist features of Basedow’s account of belief, I distinguish it from its Pascalian and Jamesian relatives and argue that it is the clearest antecedent to Kant’s arguments for the first and second postulates. Finally, I consider the development of Kant’s account of belief after the first Critique in light of the foregoing, and discuss the broader implications of my analysis. (shrink)

There are two main meanings in Kant’s concept of moral certainty (moralische Gewissheit, certitudo moralis): first, it applies to the kind of certainty embodied in rational faith in the existence of God and a future life; second, it applies to the conscientiousness (Gewissenhaftigkeit) required of an agent in the practice of moral judgement. Despite the growing attention to Kant’s theory of conscience and his concept of conscientiousness, this article is the first to discuss ‘moral certainty’ as the aim of ‘conscientiousness’ (...) and to highlight the relevance of both notions in regard to moral education and the purposes of Kant’s ethical doctrines of method. (shrink)

In his new book, Rossi emphasizes the prominent role of enlightened religion in the political project of establishing perpetual peace. My paper discusses Rossi’s stance on the question as to whether Kant, in his later years, moved to an immanentist conception of the highest good. Kant’s own position in this regard can arguably be better described as comprehensive, according to which an immanent and a transcendent conception of the highest good are upheld as realizable side by side. Rossi’s account looks (...) perfectly consistent with such a view. One of the reasons for such a comprehensive reading is that “immanent” and “secular” do not coincide in Kant in the first place. Seen in this comprehensive way, and while a version of the highest good ought to be realized immanently, we cannot be certain that this will indeed happen. If it does indeed happen, the immortality postulate, which Kant never abandoned, renders it rational to believe that the immanent version of the highest good is merely a step towards its transcendent realization. Affinities of Rossi’s approach to the suggestion that Kant subscribes to a political theology based on what has been called “Molinism minimally defined” will also be explored. (shrink)

It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, called the highest good. In this article, I outline Kant's argument for why we ought to have faith in God and hope for the highest good, and argue that the Kantian argument can be extended in such a way as to show the unity of the theological virtues. This feature of the Kantian account can then have ramifications in further questions regarding the (...) relationship of faith and moral action. (shrink)