Las emociones hacen referencia, tanto en el lenguaje común como en el filosófico y científico, a una dimensión de la vida subjetiva que no está suficientemente delimitada. El objetivo de este trabajo es el de aproximarnos al fenómeno emocional a través del estudio de varias problemáticas asociadas al mismo. Por un lado, se realiza un análisis etimológico y conceptual de algunas nociones habitualmente relacionadas con las emociones, como es el caso de los términos �afección�, �sentimiento�, �feeling� o �Stimmung�. Por otro (...) lado, se realiza un recorrido por aquellas disciplinas teóricas que implícita o explícitamente contienen una teoría de la emoción, desde la filosofía de Descartes hasta las ciencias cognitivas, pasando por la ética, la estética y la fenomenología. Por último se propone una fenomenología del corazón que permita dar cuenta del tipo de movilidad y de temporalidad propio del régimen emocional, permitiéndonos así tener acceso a un núcleo experiencial. (shrink)

This paper argues that early phenomenologists used the concept of empathy not only to refer to the direct perception of the other’s experiences – as underscored by contemporary proponents of the Direct Perception Theory – but also to describe – in a sense close to Lipps’s theory and contemporary Simulation Theory – how, by virtue of imagining, we “feel into” animate and inanimate objects. Focusing on this second usage of the term, two kinds of imagination-based accounts of empathy in early (...) phenomenology are identified. According to “radical imaginationists”, empathy can be explained in terms of the series of imaginative processes entailed in the idea of “feeling into”, such as projecting oneself into the target, “imitating” its feelings, and resonating with it. Voigtländer’s account of empathizing with one’s own self in Vom Selbstgefühl (1910) and Geiger’s account of empathy with atmospheres in “Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung” (1911) can in this sense be regarded as radical imaginationist theories. According to “moderate imaginationists”, empathy might (but need not) entail imagining. Stein’s account of empathy with others in On the Problem of Empathy (Zum Problem der Einfühlung) (1917/1989) as a three-step process which can involve imagination-like states is a good example of a moderate imaginationist account. (shrink)

Aunque la figura de Meinong se asocia a posiciones realistas acerca delos valores, un análisis más cuidadoso de su obra revela al menos tres concepcionesdiferentes de esta noción. El objetivo de este artículo consiste en examinar sistemáti-camente las tesis acerca de los valores sostenidas en tres de sus obras. Se analizará primero la teoría disposicionalista defendida en Psychologische ethische Untersuc-hungen zur Werttheorie (1894) según la cual los valores son posibles sentimientosde valor. Centraremos después nuestra atención a los cambios realizados en (...) “ÜberWerthaltung und Wert” (1895), obra en la que se explica el concepto de valor rela-cionándolo con los conceptos de emoción y deseo. Finalmente, nos centraremos enlas tesis realistas expuestas en Emotionale Präsentation (1917) y mostraremos la actualidad de las mismas para el debate contemporáneo. (shrink)

This paper examines the notion of aesthetic pleasure within the framework of an aesthetics of value. The topic is introduced in sect. 1, while sect. 2 presents Moritz Geiger’s distinction between two kinds of aesthetic pleasure: liking, which enables us to grasp the aesthetic values of the artwork; and enjoyment, which is understood to be an emotional response. Sect. 3 reassesses the main tenets of Geiger’s account in the light of current research. In particular, I provide arguments in favor of (...) Geiger’s distinction between liking and enjoyment, but I call into question the claim that liking reveals aesthetic values. In sect. 4, I suggest that liking is a form of feeling motivated by the cognition of aesthetic value and I distinguish it from both the grasping of values and emotional responses. I conclude in sect. 5 by briefly summarizing my main claims. (shrink)

As phenomenology rose to prominence at the beginning of the 20th century, several aestheticians tried to establish the Husserlian method of “phenomenological reduction” in the field of aesthetics. These ventures were met with resistance from psychological aesthetics, which was the predominant form of aesthetics in the German-speaking world at the time. This paper examines, first, practical attempts to apply the method of “phenomenological reduction” in aesthetics. Using Waldemar Conrad and Moritz Geiger as examples, I try to trace what aestheticians actually (...) did when they applied this method in their investigations. Secondly, I reconstruct the four central objections with which psychological aesthetics reacted to such attempts. I have identified four central counterarguments in the work of Johannes Volkelt and Oswald Külpe, who were among the most eminent critics of phenomenological aesthetics: the transcendental argument, the susceptibility-to-errors argument, the constructivism argument, and the non-normativity argument. Finally, I also discuss the refusal of psychological aesthetics to acknowledge that a genuine phenomenological method even existed and the consequences of this refusal. (shrink)

« Husserl s’est complètement disloqué... il hésite et raconte des banalités à faire pitié... il commence à pressentir que plus personne ne le suit — il pense naturellement que c’est trop difficile — naturellement, une mathématique de l’éthique, personne n’y comprend rien...et aujourd’hui, à Berlin, ça veut sauver le monde... »(Heidegger, 1923 — souligné par moi ; Heidegger & Jaspers 1990, 43]) « Notre propre agir tout comme celui de nos congénères s’accompagne de nos jugements permanents sur...

Intense aesthetic experiences are often described in terms of self-forgetfulness, where the perceiver becomes immersed in the aesthetic phenomenon to the extent of losing consciousness of being the subject of the experience. Although such experiences have been described from the early eighteenth century onwards, there is still a surprising lack of detailed investigation on the precise nature of aesthetic self-forgetfulness. What happens in this experience, and precisely what is the ‘self’ that is forgotten? Building on phenomenological theories of self-consciousness, I (...) argue that aesthetic self-forgetfulness cannot be understood as an absolute eradication of the self, as a pre-reflective self-consciousness stays intact even in deeply immersive aesthetic experiences. Thus, I argue that talk of self-forgetfulness is to some extent misleading, and the changes in the subject’s self-relation during aesthetic experience is better understood in terms of an altered sense of agency. (shrink)

G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout’s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to (...) fit what is actually given to us in perception, arguing that our epistemic practices would break down in an environment where only universals were given to us. (shrink)

Šiame straipsnyje analizuojama estetinių vertybių reikšmė Moritzo Geigerio plėtotoje fenomenologinėje estetikoje. Atsigręžimas į estetines vertybes leidžia susitelkti ties pačiu meno kūriniu – estetiniu objektu bei jame glūdinčiomis objektyviomis vertėmis. Estetinės vertybės tampa centrine ašimi, į kurią remiasi kiti svarbūs estetinės patirties dalyviai – menininkas ir žiūrovas. Apžvelgiamas kritikuotinas psichologijos bei meno istorijos požiūris į estetiką: psichologija telkia dėmesį į vidinius estetinėje patirtyje dalyvaujančių subjektų išgyvenimus, o meno istorija į estetinį objektą pirmiausia žvelgia per kintančių aplinkybių prizmę. Geigeris pabrėžia estetinių vertybių (...) objektyvumą – nors suvokiamos iš asmeninės perspektyvos, jos nėra priklausomos nei nuo istorinių laikotarpių kaitos, nei nuo subjektyvių menininko ar žiūrovo estetinę patirtį lydinčių išgyvenimų. Geigerio estetinių vertybių samprata yra palyginama su Maxo Schelerio plėtotomis pamatinėmis vertybių idėjomis bei Nicolai Hartmanno estetinių vertybių teorija. (shrink)