This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between conscience and bad conscience in the Second Essay of the Genealogy of Morality (GM II). Conscience, which Nietzsche calls the “will's memory” (GM II, 1), is a faculty that enables agents to generate and sustain the motivation necessary to honor commitments, while bad conscience is that “other gloomy thing” (GM II, 4), gloomy because it is a self‐punishing faculty that produces feelings of guilt. In addition to having different functions, conscience and bad (...) conscience have distinct causal origins. Conscience originated as a memory of “I will nots” inculcated by punishment (GM II, 3), whereas bad conscience is produced by the process of “internalization” (GM II, 16)—not punishment (GM II, 14–15). It would seem to be possible, then, that an agent could have a conscience without having a bad conscience. The sovereign individual is sometimes interpreted in such terms. I argue that this separation is impossible, however. An agent would be incapable of generating and sustaining the motivation to honor commitments, thus having a conscience, without having undergone the process of internalization, necessitating the presence of bad conscience as well. (shrink)

This paper argues there are crucial points in Nietzsche’s texts where he offers a priori epistemic justification for views he believes are correct. My reading contrasts with the dominant view that Nietzsche’s philosophical naturalism is incompatible with a priori justification. My aim is to develop Nietzsche’s brand of a priori justification, show that he employs this account of justification in the texts, and suggest how it might be compatible with naturalism.

Reading Nietzsche’s many remarks on freedom and free will, we face a dilemma. On the one hand, Nietzsche levels vehement attacks against the idea of the freedom of the will in several places throughout his writing. On the other hand, he frequently describes the sorts of people he admires as ‘free’ in various respects, as ‘free spirits’, or as in possession of a ‘free will’. So does Nietzsche think that we are or perhaps could be free, or not? I argue (...) that we ought to read these seemingly conflicting claims as part of one unified project, which is to try to understand what true freedom would look like. Nietzsche’s attacks on ‘free will’, I suggest, are not intended to establish that we are not free, but rather to show that a certain tempting picture of freedom is confused and totally inadequate for purpose. The positive half of Nietzsche’s project, then, should be read as his attempt to do a better job – to provide an account of freedom that better articulates what we were trying, via the confused picture, to get at. (shrink)

The notion of sublimation is essential to Nietzsche and Freud. However, Freud's writings fail to provide a persuasive notion of sublimation. In particular, Freud's writings are confused on the distinction between pathological symptoms and sublimation and on the relation between sublimation and repression. After rehearsing these problems in some detail, it is proposed that a return to Nietzsche allows for a more coherent account of sublimation, its difference from pathological symptoms, and its relation to repression. In summary, on Nietzsche's account, (...) while repression and pathological symptoms involve a disintegration , sublimation involves integration. The article concludes with a brief consideration of some post-Freudian accounts of sublimation that represent a return to a more Nietzschean approach. (shrink)

The notion of sublimation is essential to Nietzsche and Freud. However, Freud's writings fail to provide a persuasive notion of sublimation. In particular, Freud's writings are confused on the distinction between pathological symptoms and sublimation and on the relation between sublimation and repression. After rehearsing these problems in some detail, it is proposed that a return to Nietzsche allows for a more coherent account of sublimation, its difference from pathological symptoms, and its relation to repression. In summary, on Nietzsche's account, (...) while repression and pathological symptoms involve a disintegration (of the self), sublimation involves integration. The article concludes with a brief consideration of some post-Freudian accounts of sublimation that represent a return to a more Nietzschean approach. (shrink)