The phenomenon of globalization of markets has been accompanied by calls for a globalization of ethical norms. One principle often referred to in such calls is the so-called Golden Rule. The rule, often stated as Do unto others as you would have others do unto you, has long been used and referenced in the business literature. But those who use it often do so without full realization of the rule itself and what it stands for. This paper examines the history, (...) meaning, and problems of the rule and attempts to show, through a case analysis, how these problems surface when using the rule in a business context. In so doing it attempts to clarify exactly what the rule means and how it can fit into a universal code of morality. (shrink)

Suppose that a sign at the entrance of a hotel reads: “Don’t enter these premises unless you are accompanied by a registered guest”. You see someone who is about to enter, and you tell her: “Don’t enter these premises if you are an unaccompanied registered guest”. She asks why, and you reply: “It follows from what the sign says”. It seems that you made a valid inference from an imperative premise to an imperative conclusion. But it also seems that imperatives (...) cannot be true or false, so what does it mean to say that your inference is valid? It cannot mean that the truth of its premise guarantees the truth of its conclusion. One is thus faced with what is known as “Jørgensen’s dilemma” (Ross 1941: 55-6): it seems that imperative logic cannot exist because logic deals only with entities that, unlike imperatives, can be true or false, but it also seems that imperative logic must exist. It must exist not only because inferences with imperatives can be valid, but also because imperatives (like “Enter” and “Don’t enter”) can be inconsistent with each other, and also because one can apply logical operations to imperatives: “Don’t enter” is the negation of “Enter”, and “Sing or dance” is the disjunction of “Sing” and “Dance”. A standard reaction to this dilemma consists in basing imperative logic on analogues of truth and falsity. For example, the imperative “Don’t enter” is satisfied if you don’t enter and is violated if you enter, and one might say that an inference from an imperative premise to an imperative conclusion is valid exactly if the satisfaction (rather than the truth) of the premise guarantees the satisfaction of the conclusion. But before getting into the details, more needs to be said on what exactly imperatives are. (shrink)

It is worthy to mention that this book is entitled "Metaethics of Golden Rule" which is an academic Persian book of Philosophy and it stems from my M.A. dissertation: Lotfi Yazdi, Mohammad Reza (2015), Survey of Meta-ethical Foundation of Golden Rule, Tehran: Payame Noor University, M.A. in Ethics (Moral Philosophy). --- I have been working on Golden Rule since ten years ago, directly and indirectly. It has included an introduction to Metaphilosophy and generalities of Ethics. In addition, I have presented (...) the following here: 1) My interpretation of Golden Rule; 2) Presenting three arguments for selecting Golden Rule as a deontological normative theory; 3) Arguing that respect is a moral value and then combining respect as a valued content at three human nature's levels with Golden Rule to resolve ethical dilemmas and improve Golden Rule: One should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself, respectably; 4) Understanding Metaethics of Golden Rule with root in universalizability by 1. Conceptual analysis of Golden Rule and universalizability, then finding and revealing law of non-contradiction in both of them through a deduction 2. Arguing that moral reasoning is their connection 3. Normative universalizability is the same as Golden rule, and so, Golden Rule has been connected to metaethical universalizability by normative universalizability; 5) Presenting an argument which contradicts Relativism and Nihilism with Golden Rule and its metaethical foundation: universalizability; 6) Studying and comparing theories of Moral Metaphysics with Golden Rule and understanding their consistency or inconsistency or neutralization with Golden Rule and its root in universalizability; 7) Studying and presenting an argument that Skepticism is in challenge with universalizability or Golden Rule. --- I have published this book owing to two reasons. First and foremost, Iran is one of the most ancient countries for Golden rule and its root in universalizability. Secondly, this book has been written due to my constant moral worries and considerations. --- Pouya Lotfi Yazdi --- Spring 2017. (shrink)

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, (...) I argue. "If you love me, kiss me", a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent ("you love me") with an imperative consequent ("kiss me"); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three -valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic. (shrink)

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the (...) bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

The web creates manyopportunities for encroachment on intellectualproperty including trademarks. Our principaltask in this paper is an investigation into anunusual form of such encroachment: theimproper use of metatags. A metatag is a pieceof HTML code that provides summary informationabout a web page. If used in an appropriatemanner, these metatags can play a legitimaterole in helping consumers locate information. But the ``keyword'' metatag is particularlysusceptible to manipulation. These tags can beeasily abused by web site creators anxious tobait search engines and bring (...) scores ofvisitors to their sites. The law aboutmetatags is far from settled and many legalscholars are uncomfortable with the conclusionthat the unauthorized use of a trademark in ametatag represents infringement. How should weassess this practice known as ``spamdexing'' froma normative perspective? Is it commercial fairplay or something more sinister? We make thecase here that there are salient moral problemswith spamdexing since it exploits thereputational goodwill of trademark owners andconfuses consumers. It violates basic moralduties and it flouts the golden rule principle. Hence unauthorized use of a competitor'strademark in a metatag is not morallyacceptable. (shrink)

The browser wars case is a useful springboard for considering the principle of positive competition and the proper regulation of platform technologies. There are lessons to be culled about policy, the application of antitrust law, and the parameters of fair competition. We argue that despite Microsofts opportunistic exploitation of its proprietary code, policy makers should resist the temptation to mandate an open source code model. Vigilant anti-trust enforcement is a preferable alternative. But courts must refrain from using antitrust law to (...) favor small innovators or to constrain the economic protections inherent in intellectual property rights, since those rights are still needed to encourage innovation. On the other hand, despite the exigencies of competition, platform leaders should respect the norm of fair competition and refrain from the impulse to tilt the platform in their favor. Preservation of robust intellectual property rights, deft application of antitrust statutes, and principled competition represent the best prescription for social wealth in the New Economy. (shrink)

This paper discusses the idea that investors have moral reasons to avoid investing in certain business areas based on their own moral views towards these areas. Some have referred to this as ‘conscience investing’, and it is a central part of the conception of ethical investing within the socially responsible investment (SRI) movement. The paper presents what is taken to be the main arguments for this kind of investing as they are given by those who have defended it, and discusses (...) the plausibility of these arguments from the point of view of moral philosophy. The paper argues that focusing on the moral views of individual investors is not very fruitful – there are strong reasons to think that investors do not have moral reasons to invest ‘with their consciences’, or, to the extent that such reasons are allowed, that they are very weak compared with other sorts of moral reasons pertaining to ethical investing. (shrink)

Some virtue ethicists are reluctant to consider principles and standards in business ethics. However, this is problematic. This paper argues that realistic Personalism can be integrated into virtue-based business ethics, giving it a more complete base. More specifically, two principles are proposed: the Personalist Principle (PP) and the Common Good Principle (CGP). The PP includes the Golden Rule and makes explicit the duty of respect, benevolence, and care for people, emphasizing human dignity and the innate rights of every human being. (...) The CGP entails cooperation to promote conditions which enhance the opportunity for the human flourishing of all people within a community. Both principles have practical implications for business ethics. (shrink)

In this classic text, Kant sets out to articulate and defend the Categorical Imperative - the fundamental principle that underlies moral reasoning - and to lay the foundation for a comprehensive account of justice and human virtues. This new edition and translation of Kant's work is designed especially for students. An extensive and comprehensive introduction explains the central concepts of Groundwork and looks at Kant's main lines of argument. Detailed notes aim to clarify Kant's thoughts and to correct some common (...) misunderstandings of his doctrines. (shrink)

The concepts of 'ethical' and 'socially responsible' investment (SRI) have become increasingly popular in recent years and funds which offer this kind of investment have attracted many individual inve... merstors. The present book addresses the issue of 'How ought one to invest?' by critically engaging with the ideas of the proponents of this movement about what makes 'ethical' investing ethical. The standard suggestion that ethical investing simply consists in refraining from investing in certain 'morally unacceptable companies' is criticised for being (...) both too rigid (often resting on absolute moral rules which lead to an austere conclusion) and too ineffective for individual investors (investors who after all control only a small part of the investment universe). Furthermore, the idea that ethical investing could consist in engaging more actively with the companies one invests in, in order to make them change their ways and become more socially responsible, is criticised for being just as ineffective for individual investors. Some more radical alternatives are elaborated on and defended - for instance, the suggestion that investors should make as much money from their investments as possible and then donate the proceeds to socially worthwhile charities. From similar suggestions, the common idea that there is no conflict between morality and profitability, or that genuinely ethical investing can be just as profitable as mainstream investing, is criticised for being too naïve. Making a difference may indeed require personal sacrifice of investors, but it is argued that the needs of the possible recipients of philanthropy are morally more important than the luxury of investment returns. (shrink)

It is possible and thereby feasible to develop and implement a pragmatic methodology for a preemptive evidentiary system of ‘Paraphysical Jurisprudence’ for mediating the occurrence of massacres. A required comprehensive completion and formalizing of the tools of epistemology (theory of knowledge) already exists and has been tested both ecumenically and scientifically. The evolution of epistemology has followed the historical progression from myth and superstition to logic and reason to empiricism and now finally to the utility of ‘transcendence’ as a tool (...) in knowledge acquisition. An inspiring example from popular culture is illustrated in the 2002 Hollywood film noir “Minority Report” designed by its director to present a ‘plausible future world’ for the year 2054 wherein an elaborate ‘Precrime Unit’ is tested to prevent murder by utilizing a trio of ‘precogs’ bathed in a ‘photonic milk’ able to presciently predetermine impending occurrences of homicide for which the Precrime Police Unit then intervenes to prevent. Disdain for a putative so-called scientific metaphysics by natural philosophers is deeply rooted in modern pragmatic societies; perhaps rightly so as consistency, credibility and lack of a comprehensive theory has been heretofore emphatically lacking. In addition to the major problem of repeatability is the perceived distinction between domains of the physical and so-called ‘spiritual’ as mutually exclusive. In this work a strong case is made for the rigorous viability and near term putative implementation of a system of paraphysical jurisprudence drawing on the utility of a panoply of concepts. The remaining question is when does feasible become practical in the face of a steady increase in the heinous massacre of innocents? (shrink)

: This paper is about the nature of practical reasons. More specifically, my primary goal is to explore when an agent has a justifying reason for action¾that is, a reason that can be used for justifying an action that has been done or that the agent is planning to do. This concept of reason is central to ethics and to practical philosophy in general. I defend an account of reason according to which a piece of practical reasoning gives an agent (...) a reason for action if he has a reason for its premises and a warrant for holding that these premises logically support the conclusion. That is roughly to say that justifying reasons are closed under logical entailment. To achieve this aim, I shall discuss the components of such reasons. Section 2 presents a principle of closure for justifying reasons and clarifies two important clauses of this principle. In the last section, I show how my account can sidestep the regress problem in practical reasoning. (shrink)

This article offers an analysis of normative practical reasoning. Reasoning of this type includes at least one normative belief and it has a practical conclusion (roughly, a conclusion about what to do). The principal question I am interested in is whether this type of practical reasoning can be logically conclusive. This issue has received remarkably little philosophical discussion despite the central role this reasoning plays in our everyday discourse about action and in the resolution of ethical problems. I distinguish three (...) kinds of normative reasons. Quasi -normative reasoning, I maintain in Section 1, can only be valid if it is in fact theoretical reasoning, despite appearance to the contrary. In Section 2, I argue that there are two kinds of genuine normative reasoning (purely normative reasoning and hybrid reasoning) that can be logically conclusive. This article also shows that practical arguments are non-trivially ambiguous (which has been largely ignored in the literature) because they can at the same time express different pieces of practical reasoning that have a different logical status. (shrink)