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  1. Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
    This thesis develops a novel framework for explaining delusions. In Chapter 1, I introduce the two fundamental challenges posed by delusions: the evidence challenge lies in explaining the flagrant ways delusions flout evidence; and the specificity challenge lies in explaining the fact that patients’ delusions are often about a few specific themes, and patients rarely have a wide range of delusional or odd beliefs. In Chapter 2, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of current theories of delusions, which typically appeal (...)
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  • Delusions as Herero-Dynamic Property Clusters.Shelby Clipp - 2020 - ScholarWorks.
    The standard position in psychiatry maintains that delusions are beliefs. However, the features of delusions often diverge from those typically associated with belief. This discrepancy has given rise to what I refer to as the doxastic status debate, which concerns whether delusions are best characterized as “beliefs.” Despite efforts, there has been little progress in settling this debate. I argue that the debate has been stymied because it’s largely a verbal dispute (Chalmers, 2011). I then attempt to advance the debate (...)
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  • When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):1-18.
    People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras, Fregoli, or Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren't beliefs because they don't guide behaviour and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from five studies that folk (...)
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  • Delusion and double bookkeeping.José Eduardo Porcher - 2024 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge. pp. 202-214.
    This chapter connects the phenomenon of double bookkeeping to two critical debates in the philosophy of delusion: one from the analytic tradition and one from the phenomenological tradition. First, I will show how the failure of action guidance on the part of some delusions suggests an argument to the standard view that delusions are beliefs (doxasticism about delusion) and how its proponents have countered it by ascribing behavioral inertia to avolition, emotional disturbances, or a failure of the surrounding environment in (...)
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  • Rationalism.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2024 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge.
    This chapter introduces the rationalist model of delusions. It begins by presenting John Campbell’s seminal proposal that delusions are caused top-down by pathological Wittgensteinian framework or hinge beliefs. After presenting Campbell’s rationalist account of delusions, the chapter raises and examines prominent objections by Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie as well as by Tim Thornton. The former make an important distinction between the aetiological top-down cognitive part and the epistemological rationalist framework part of Campbell’s account. The thesis that delusions are caused (...)
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  • Phenomenal consciousness in dreams and in mind wandering.Miranda Occhionero & Piercarla Cicogna - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):958-966.
    Dreaming can be explained as the product of an interaction among memory processes, elaborative processes, and phenomenal awareness. A feedback circuit is activated by this interaction according to the associative links and the requirements of the dream scene. Recently, it has been hypothesized that a partial similarity exists between dreaming and mind wandering and that these two processes may involve the same neural default network. This commentary discusses the differences and similarities between phenomenal consciousness during dreaming and phenomenal consciousness during (...)
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  • Abnormal Certainty: Examining the Epistemological Status of Delusional Beliefs.Svetlana Bardina - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (4):546-560.
    ABSTRACTThis article intends to reconsider the epistemological status of delusional beliefs on the basis of Wittgenstein’s conception of certainty. Several works over the last two decades have compared delusional beliefs with so-called hinge propositions, which – according to Wittgenstein – function as expressions of objective certainty. This gives rise to a paradox. On the one hand, delusions are compatible to Wittgensteinian certainties in some respects; on the other hand, they contradict beliefs shared by other members of the community, which makes (...)
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  • Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on Delusions.
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  • The Spectra of Soundless Voices and Audible Thoughts: Towards an Integrative Model of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Thought Insertion.Clara S. Humpston & Matthew R. Broome - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):611-629.
    Patients with psychotic disorders experience a range of reality distortions. These often include auditory-verbal hallucinations, and thought insertion to a lesser degree; however, their mechanisms and relationships between each other remain largely elusive. Here we attempt to establish a integrative model drawing from the phenomenology of both AVHs and TI and argue that they in fact can be seen as ‘spectra’ of experiences with varying degrees of agency and ownership, with ‘silent and internal own thoughts’ on one extreme and ‘fully (...)
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  • How to be a conformist, part II. simulation and rule following.Philip Gerrans - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):566 – 586.
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  • A Neuropsychological Approach to Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Thought Insertion - Grounded in Normal Voice Perception.Johanna C. Badcock - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):631-652.
    A neuropsychological perspective on auditory verbal hallucinations links key phenomenological features of the experience, such as voice location and identity, to functionally separable pathways in normal human audition. Although this auditory processing stream framework has proven valuable for integrating research on phenomenology with cognitive and neural accounts of hallucinatory experiences, it has not yet been applied to other symptoms presumed to be closely related to AVH – such as thought insertion. In this paper, I propose that an APS framework offers (...)
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  • Intentional content in psychopathologies requires an expanded interpretivism.Marc Slors, Jolien C. Francken & Derek Strijbos - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e26.
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