In this thesis I present a virtual laboratory which implements five different models for controlling animats: a rule-based system, a behaviour-based system, a concept-based system, a neural network, and a Braitenberg architecture. Through different experiments, I compare the performance of the models and conclude that there is no best model, since different models are better for different things in different contexts. The models I chose, although quite simple, represent different approaches for studying cognition. Using the results as an empirical philosophical (...) aid, I note that there is no best approach for studying cognition, since different approaches have all advantages and disadvantages, because they study different aspects of cognition from different contexts. This has implications for current debates on proper approaches for cognition: all approaches are a bit proper, but none will be proper enough. I draw remarks on the notion of cognition abstracting from all the approaches used to study it, and propose a simple classification for different types of cognition. (shrink)

As science, knowledge, and ideas evolve and are increased and refined, the branches of philosophy in charge of describing them should also be increased and refined. In this work we try to expand some ideas as a response to the recent approach from several sciences to complex systems. Because of their novelty, some of these ideas might require further refinement and may seem unfinished, but we need to start with something. Only with their propagation and feedback from critics they might (...) be improved. We make a brief introduction to complex systems, for then defining abstraction levels. Abstraction levels represent simplicities and regularities in nature. We make an ontological distinction of absolute being and relative being, and then discuss issues on causality, metaphysics, and determinism. (shrink)

The multidimensional logic is a paraconsistent logic modelling suitable for the human features’ simulations involving contradiction. This paper briefly present how AI (artificial intelligence) can make its logic procedures more flexible by multidimensional logic. The analysis of this logic modelling raise fundamental problems involving human mind’s models, as the evaluation of truthfulness of logic premises. In this sense, alternative ways are pointed through the establishment of motivated rather than arbitrary relations between premises used in logic and something that are represented (...) by them. We claim that motivated relations could be an interesting way toward a most satisfactory AI model of human mind, instead just a simulation of it. (shrink)

We develop on the idea that everything is related, inside, and therefore determined by a context. This stance, which at first might seem obvious, has several important consequences. This paper first presents ideas on Contextuality, for then applying them to problems in philosophy of cognitive science. Because of space limitations, for the second part we will assume that the reader is familiar with the literature of philosophy of cognitive science, but if this is not the case, it would not be (...) a limitation for understanding the main ideas of this paper. We do not argue that Contextuality is a panaceic answer for explaining everything, but we do argue that everything is inside a context. And because this is always, we sometimes ignore it, but we believe that many problems are dissolved with a contextual approach, noticing things we ignore because of their obviousity. We first give a notion of context. We present the idea that errors are just incongruencies inside a context. We also present previous ideas of absolute being, relative being, and lessincompleteness. We state that all logics, and also truth judgements, are contextdependent, and we develop a “Context-dependant Logic”. We apply ideas of Contextuality to problems in semantics, the problem of “where is the mind”, and the study of consciousness. (shrink)

Any system based on axioms is incomplete because the axioms cannot be proven from the system, just believed. But one system can be less-incomplete than other. Neutrosophy is less-incomplete than many other systems because it contains them. But this does not mean that it is finished, and it can always be improved. The comments presented here are an attempt to make Neutrosophy even less-incomplete. I argue that less-incomplete ideas are more useful, since we cannot perceive truth or falsity or indeterminacy (...) independently of a context, and are therefore relative. Absolute being and relative being are defined. Also the "silly theorem problem" is posed, and its partial solution described. The issues arising from the incompleteness of our contexts are presented. We also note the relativity and dependance of logic to a context. We propose "metacontextuality" as a paradigm for containing as many contexts as we can, in order to be less-incomplete and discuss some possible consequences. (shrink)