Converging data from different disciplines are showing the role of classical conditioning processes in the elaboration of human and animal behavior to be larger than previously supposed. Restricted views of classically conditioned responses as merely secretory, reflexive, or emotional are giving way to a broader conception that includes problem-solving, and other rule-governed behavior thought to be the exclusive province of either operant conditiońing or cognitive psychology. These new views have been accompanied by changes in the way conditioning is conducted and (...) evaluated. Data from a number of seemingly unrelated phenomena such as relapse to drug abuse by postaddicts, the placebo effect, and the immune response appear to involve classical conditioning processes. Classical conditioning, moreover, has been found to occur in simpler and simpler organisms and recently even demonstrated in brain slices and in utero. This target article will integrate the several research areas that have used the classical conditioning process as an explanatory model; it will challenge teleological interpretations of the classically conditioned CR and offer some basic principles for testing conditioning in diverse areas. (shrink)

Reverse engineering is a matter of inferring adaptive function from structure. The utility of reverse engineering for evolutionary biology has been a matter of controversy. I offer a simple taxonomy of the uses of engineering design in assessing adaptation, with a variety of illustrations. The plausibility of applications of engineering design reflects the specific way the models are elaborated and derived.

The rights and wrongs of adaptationism areoften discussed by appeal to what I call theartefact model. Anti-adaptationistscomplain that the use of optimality modelling,reverse engineering and other techniques areindicative of a mistaken and outmoded beliefthat organisms are like well-designedartefacts. Adaptationists (e.g. Dennett 1995)respond with the assertion that viewingorganisms as though they were well designed isa fruitful, perhaps necessary research strategyin evolutionary biology. Anti-adaptationistsare right when they say that techniques likereverse engineering are liable to mislead. This fact does not undermine the artefact (...) modelprecisely because the same techniques misleadus for the same reasons when they are appliedunreflectively to artefacts. Thoseadaptationists who hold only that it isworthwhile to investigate organisms as thoughthey were artefacts and thoseanti-adaptationists who criticise simplisticdesign models have far more in common than thelabels attached to their positions mightsuggest. (shrink)

Morgan’s Canon is a very widely endorsed methodological principle in animal psychology, believed to be vital for a rigorous, scientific approach to the study of animal cognition. In contrast I argue that Morgan’s Canon is unjustified, pernicious and unnecessary. I identify two main versions of the Canon and show that they both suffer from very serious problems. I then suggest an alternative methodological principle that captures all of the genuine methodological benefits that Morgan’s Canon can bring but suffers from none (...) of its problems. (shrink)

Daniel C. Dennett ha dedicado una parte considerable de su obra a concebir una aplicación de la ingeniería inversa y el adaptacionismo para explicar la evolución de la mente humana. Dennet considera esta perspectiva como una posibilidad prometedora en el desarrollo de una psicología científica, en contraposición al "materialismo eliminacionista" de la neurociencia. En este artículo se expone una aproximación conceptual y se examina un antecedente filosófico en las discusiones sobre el adaptacionismo en biología y psicología evolutiva: la intencionalidad o (...) teoría de los sistemas intencionales. Daniel C. Dennett has dedicated a great part of his work to the conception of an application of reverse engineering and adaptationism in order to explain the evolution of the human mind. Dennett sees this perspective as a promising possibility in the development of a scientific psychology, in contrast to the "eliminative materialism" of neuroscience. The article provides a conceptual approach and examines a philosophical precedent in the discussions regarding adaptationism in biology and evolutionary psychology: intentionality or the theory of intentional systems. Daniel C. Dennett dedicou uma parte considerável de sua obra a conceber uma aplicação da engenharia inversa e do adaptacionismo para explicar a evolução da mente humana. Dennett considera essa perspectiva como uma possibilidade prometedora no desenvolvimento de uma psicologia científica, em contraposição ao "materialismo eliminacionista" da neurociência. Neste artigo, expõe-se uma aproximação conceitual e examina-se um antecedente filosófico nas discussões sobre o adaptacionismo em biologia e psicologia evolutiva: a intencionalidade ou teoria dos sistemas intencionais. (shrink)

Daniel C. Dennett ha dedicado una parte considerable de su obra a concebir una aplicación de la ingeniería inversa y el adaptacionismo para explicar la evolución de la mente humana. Dennet considera esta perspectiva como una posibilidad prometedora en el desarrollo de una psicología científica, en contraposición al “materialismo eliminacionista” de la neurociencia. En este artículo se expone una aproximación conceptual y se examina un antecedente filosófico en las discusiones sobre el adaptacionismo en biología y psicología evolutiva: la intencionalidad o (...) teoría de los sistemas intencionales. (shrink)