If we read the Tractatus logico-philosophicus according to the decimal numbering of its propositions, we may understand, finally, the section about the self and the limits of language and world. Proposition 5.64 follows 5.63 (not 5.634); 5.634 follows 5.633 (not 5.6331); and so on. Thus, it becomes clear that the picture of the visual field (TLP 5.6331) cannot be what scholars have always quoted and discussed, i.e. a draft of an eye inside its field of sight. Actually, Wittgenstein’s original drafts (...) depict (to criticise it) the ordinary way of representing the visual field. Following him, the field of vision is ‘without limits’; it does not have a form that implies the existence of an eye, as far as the phenomenological experience does not have a form that implies the existence of an ‘I’. As a result, the current reproductions of the 5.6331 image must be rectified, and all references to this similitude should be radically amended. (shrink)

In the wake of the crisis of representation, the qualitative approaches have gained momentum within the social sciences. This crisis has lead to a widespread awareness about the need to incorporate the subject's understanding in the research design. Yet, the validity of qualitative accounts is still regarded as a function of its representative accuracy. This, and not its meaningfulness, remains the qualifying property to judge its value. I argue that this can only be overcome by a retreat from realist ontology. (...) The challenge that emerges is how to build an understanding of qualitative research, which is not referential but retains its ?worldly involvement?. This can be achieved by reversing the logical order: the value of the researcher's reconstruction does not reside in its representational accuracy of reality, but in the value, it has for our comprehension of reality. Thus, a place can be found for the active role of the researcher and the reader in the actualisation of meaning. (shrink)

The paper examines the ethical standpoint of the Tractatus as it has been reconstructed by Cora Diamond (“the austere view”) and gives an account of some of the criticism this reconstruction has received in the work of P. M. S. Hacker and Meredith Williams (“the standard view”). The second half of the paper tries to argue that the austere and the standard views rather complement each other if we recognize “two I ’-s” in the Tractatus and if it is supposed (...) that there is a “3rd person” and “1st person” perspective which are both voiced on its pages. (shrink)