This paper attempts to reconcile two apparently opposed ways of thinking about the imagination and its relationship to literature, one which casts it as essentially concerned with fiction-making and the other with culture-making. The literary imagination’s power to create fictions is what gives it its most obvious claim to “autonomy”, as Kant would have it: its freedom to venture out in often wild and spectacular excess of reality. The argument of this paper is that we can locate the literary imagination’s (...) complementary power of cultural articulation in this fictional activity. The suggestion is that we should conceive of the literary imagination as expressing its interests in culture not mimetically but by producing a certain kind of meaning. This meaning is irreducibly narratological, and understanding it helps us to see the role of narrative in bringing into harmony the literary imagination’s interests in both the imaginary and the real. (shrink)

The paper examines Schiller’s argument concerning the subjective experience of adopting a morality based on Kantian principles. On Schiller’s view, such experience must be marked by a continuous struggle to suppress nature, because the moral law is a purely rational and categorically commanding law that addresses beings who are natural as well as rational. Essential for Schiller’s conclusion is the account he has of what it takes to follow the law, that is, the mental states and functions that encapsulate the (...) idea of moral self contained in Kant’s ethics. Focusing on the fundamental psychological elements and processes to which Kant’s theory appeals and on which it depends to have application, the paper defends an alternative idea of moral self to the one Schiller attributes to Kant. (shrink)

In this article, I defend moral aesthetic cognitivism, the view that literature is a valuable source of insights related to morally relevant aspects of our world and that it can significantly contribute to our moral education. I am in particular concerned with counterarguments to this view voiced by Greg Currie, who trashes epistemological foundations of literature and emphasizes the lack of empirical corroboration of cognitivism, and by Peter Lamarque, who dismisses educative potential of literature on the account of readers' incapacity (...) to extract morally relevant judgements about the world from literary works. I rely on examples from literary tradition to rebuild the epistemological framework underlying cognitivism and on contemporary insights from moral psychology to show that our engagements with literature are permeated with moral reflections that are valuable for our moral education. (shrink)