The May SSE Conference in Charlottesville, VA was, as I’d expected, interesting, informative, and often entertaining. Charlie Tolbert did a superb job of handling the local arrangements; the conference venue was delightful (and Charlie contributed periodic juicy nuggets of information about the campus’s rich history); the program was varied and nicely balanced; and there were many opportunities for stimulating conversation, exchange of ideas, and of course reconnecting with old friends, making new acquaintances, and meeting people I’ve known only through correspondence.

What happens to the inner light of consciousness with the death of the individual body and brain? Reductive materialism assumes it simply fades to black. Others think of consciousness as indicating a continuation of self, a transformation, an awakening or even alternatives based on the quality of life experience. In this issue, speculation drawn from theoretic research are presented. -/- Table of Contents Epigraph: From “The Immortal”, Jorge Luis Borges iii Editor’s Introduction: I Killed a Squirrel the Other Day, Gregory (...) M. Nixon iv-xi Research Essays The Tilde Fallacy and Reincarnation: Variations on a "Skeptical" Argument Teed Rockwell 862-881 Death, Consciousness, and Phenomenology, Steve Bindeman 882-899 The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death, Bernardo Kastrup 900-909 Consciousness, a Cosmic Phenomenon—A Hypothesis, Eva Déli 910-930 The Theory of a Natural Afterlife: A Newfound, Real Possibility for What Awaits Us at Death, Bryon K. Ehlmann 931-950 Near-Death Cases Desegregating Non-Locality/Disembodiment via Quantum Mediated Consciousness: An Extended Version of the Cell-Soul Pathway, Contzen Pereira & J Shashi Kiran Reddy 951-968 On the Possible Existence of Quantum Consciousness After Brain Death, Massimo Pregnolato & Alfredo Pereira Jr. 969-991 Science and Postmortem Survival, Edward F. Kelly 992-1011 Explorations ISS Theory: Cosmic Consciousness, Self, and Life Beyond Death in a Hyperdimensional Physics, Chris H. Hardy 1012-1035 Does the Consciousness End, Remain Awake, or Transform After Death? Radivoj Stankovich (with Micho Durdevich) 1036-1050 Big Bang Spirituality, Life, and Death, Ken Bausch 1051-1063 Death, Consciousness and the Quantum Paradigm, Ronald Peter Glasberg 1064-1077 Living With Limits: The Continuum of Consciousness, Donald Brackett 1078-1098 Mysticism, Consciousness, Death, Mike Sosteric 1099-1118 What Dies? Eternalism and the Afterlife in William James, Jonathan Bricklin 1119-1140 Theories of Consciousness and Death: Does Consciousness End, Continue, Awaken, or Transform When the Body Dies? Roger Cook 1141-1153 It’s the Other Way Around: Matter is a Form of Consciousness and Death is the End of the Illusion of Life in the World, James P. Kowall & Pradeep B. Deshpande 1154-1208 Statements A Feminine Vision for the World Consciousness, & a New Outrageous Ontology, Lorna Green 1209-1217 The Mask of Eternity: The Quest for Immortality and the Afterlife, Iona Miller 1218-1228 Are We Really “such stuff as dreams are made on”? Chris Nunn 1229-1225 Is the Afterlife a Non-Question? (Let's Hope Not), Deepak Chopra 1226-1230 Life After Death? An Improbable Essay, Stuart Kauffman 1231-1236. (shrink)

In one of the earlier influential papers in the field of experimental philosophy titled Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions published in 2001, Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich reported that respondents answered Gettier type questions differently depending on their ethnic background as well as socioeconomic status. There is currently a debate going on, on the significance of the results of Weinberg et al. (2001) and its implications for philosophical methodology in general and epistemology in specific. Despite the debates, however, (...) to our knowledge, there has not been a replication attempt of the experiments of the original paper. We collected data from four different sources (two on-line and two in-person) to replicate the experiments. Despite several different data sets and in various cases larger sample sizes and hence greater power to detect differences, we failed to detect significant differences between the above-mentioned ethnic and socioeconomic groups. Our results suggest that epistemic intuitions are more robust across ethnic and socioeconomic groups than Weinberg et al. (2001) indicates. Given our data, we believe that the notion of differences in epistemic intuitions among different ethnic and socioeconomic groups that follows from Weinberg et al. (2001) needs to be corrected. (shrink)

Dramatic modern advances in emergency and resuscitation medicine, starting perhaps with the development of effective mechanical ventilators in the mid-20th century, have created a large class of persons who in earlier times would almost certainly have died, but who can now go on existing, suspended at least temporarily in a state somewhere between death and the conscious life they formerly pursued. A very wide range of brain injuries lead first to coma, in which the patient shows no sign of conscious (...) awareness, or even of wakefulness, in which eye openings and closings indicate the presence of a sleep/wake cycle unconsciously mediated by structures in the brain stem. Following emergence from coma, which may take days to months or more if it happens at all, patients typically show signs of wakefulness without conscious awareness – they are then in a so-called vegetative state (VS). For many this state becomes permanent, but some go on to a more recently described condition called the minimally conscious state (MCS), in which signs of conscious awareness can be detected by careful neurological examination (see Laureys & Tononi, 2009, chapter 14). A very few such persons ultimately progress to more or less full recovery, but another and particularly horrifying possible outcome is the “locked-in” state, in which a patient is fully conscious but has extremely little or no capacity for voluntary motor action. A famous modern example is that of Jean-Dominique Bauby, author of The Diving Bell and the Butterfly, who suffered a stroke to his upper brainstem and awakened 20 days later to find himself fully conscious but capable only of blinking his left eye. A tiny fraction of surgical patients find themselves in similarly terrifying conditions caused by the combination of muscle relaxants with insufficient levels of anesthetic agents (Kelly et al., 2007, p. 387 n. 18). (shrink)

Probably, most JSE readers already have at least a rough idea of what the term “synchronicity” means. The concept of synchronicity—it hardly deserves its familiar classification as a theory—is usually credited to Carl Jung (Jung 1973), although Jung really didn’t do much actually to clarify the notion. I’ll say something shortly about the problems with Jung’s approach, but what he had in mind—again, very roughly speaking—is this. We’ve all experienced coincidences in our lives: surprising combinations of events that appear to (...) be causally unrelated. Of course, what surprises us about the events isn’t simply that they’re apparently unrelated causally. That’s true of many (if not most) pairs of events at any given time, and in fact the vast majority of events are completely unremarkable when considered in combination. The event-clusters in a coincidence attract our attention first, because something about their combination seems personally noteworthy or strange, and second because we consider that combination to be more or less improbable. In fact, the more improbable we believe the event-clusters to be, the more significant and remarkable the coincidences are likely to seem. (shrink)

Interest in telepathy during the nineteenth-century developed in the context of ideas of magnetic, nervous and psychic forces said to project from the physical body to cause various phenomena, as seen in the literatures of mesmerism, Spiritualism, and psychical research. An article about cerebral radiations authored by American electrical engineer Edwin J. Houston in 1892 is reprinted and commented. Houston speculated that cerebral waves were projected to other brains via the ether, a process involving resonance with a similarly disposed brain. (...) These ideas were affected by concepts from physics dealing with such forces as magnetism and constructs like the ether. In fact, the phenomena of thought-transference stimulated many speculations involving ideas of brain waves and radiations that were part of a tendency to reduce unexplained phenomena to physical and physiological principles, or in this case, biophysical ones. Houston's paper is one of the most detailed ideas of this sort published in the nineteenth-century. Nonetheless, Houston showed no familiarity with the literature about telepathy of his times. While his article did not originate ideas of this sort, it is a good representative of speculations of the period about what today we refer as physical transmission models of ESP. Keywords: Edwin J. Houston; Telepathy; thought-transference; history of telepathy; brain waves; cerebral radiations. (shrink)

It seems certain to me that I will die and stay dead. By “I”, I mean me, Greg Nixon, this person, this self-identity. I am so intertwined with the chiasmus of lives, bodies, ecosystems, symbolic intersubjectivity, and life on this particular planet that I cannot imagine this identity continuing alone without them. However, one may survive one’s life by believing in universal awareness, perfection, and the peace that passes all understanding. Perhaps, we bring this back with us to the Source (...) from which we began, changing it, enriching it. Once we have lived – if we don’t choose the eternal silence of oblivion by life denial, vanity, indifference, or simple weariness – the Source learns and we awaken within it. Awareness, consciousness, is universal – it comes with the territory – so maybe you will be one of the few prepared to become unexpectedly enlightened after the loss of body and self. You may discover your own apotheosis – something you always were, but after a lifetime of primate experience, now much more. Since you are of the Source and since you have changed from life experience and yet retained the dream of ultimate awakening, plus you have brought those chaotic emotions and memories back to the Source with you (though no longer yours), your life & memories will have mattered. Those who awaken beyond the death of self will have changed Reality. (shrink)

Throughout the debate on psi, skeptics have almost universally insisted on different standards for evaluating the evidence, claiming that psi represents a radical departure from our current scientific understanding. Thus, there is considerable ambiguity about what standard of evaluation psi must meet. Little attention has been paid to the possible harm to the integrity of scientific investigation from this resulting inconsistency in testing standards. Some have proposed using a Bayesian framework as an improvement on this dilemma in order to more (...) explicitly model beliefs, assumptions, and background scientific knowledge, especially when evaluating a controversial hypothesis. Recently, Kuhn’s notion of paradigms, which constrains scientific research within bound- aries believed to be most productive, has been incorporated into a Bayesian framework. Within this framework, I explore a likely paradigm or meta-theory used by skeptics that typically constrains research and makes it difficult for psi evidence to be accepted. It appears that such a paradigm would in many respects have difficulty accounting for consciousness, which is fundamental to an understanding of psi. I discuss why psi data are likely to play a key role in making progress in solving the problem of consciousness. Thus, applying different standards of evaluation to psi data is likely counterproductive. (shrink)

This paper explores contributions made by Jule Eisenbud pertaining to the substantive interrelationship of psi functioning to probabilistic behavior. It is argued that Eisenbud came very close to articulating a construct that may prove very useful to psi theoreticians and researchers. That construct is “smias”, which was first articulated by researchers examining the foundations of probability theory in connection with an investigation of the gambler’s fallacy. It is shown that the smias construct fits Eisenbud’s theorization very well indeed, and that (...) the construct offers psi researchers and theorists an account of the law of large numbers that can: (1) incorporate psi as a universally operative influence, or set of influences on probabilistic outcomes; (2) avoid the gambler’s fallacy while accomplishing (1), and (3) at the same time offer an account of why psi can be difficult to detect and/or replicate. (shrink)

In Persons, Souls and Death, David Lund (2009) presents a cumulative case argument for postmortem survival based on the ostensible explanatory power of survival in relation to data drawn from psychical research. In this paper I argue that the survival hypothesis does not satisfy at least two necessary explanatory criteria accepted and deployed by Lund. First, the data that the survival hypothesis ostensibly explains are not otherwise improbable, as much if not all of the data may be adequately accounted for (...) in terms of psychic functioning among living agents—the LAP hypothesis. Here I argue in considerable detail that Lund’s criticisms of the LAP hypothesis, like those leveled by many other survivalists, are significantly defective. Second, the survival hypothesis does not lead us to expect the data Lund outlines, so it fails with respect to predictive power. Since the “best explanation” is one that leads us to expect what is otherwise improbable, the survival hypothesis i. (shrink)

On a few previous occasions I’ve documented my misgivings over certain terminological fads or conventions in parapsychology. In fact, I’ve done so in this Journal (Braude 1998). I’m now writing an entry on macro-PK for a promising new handbook of parapsychology (a long-overdue update to Wolman 1977), and this exercise has reminded me about a concern I expressed many years ago (in Braude 1997), and which I hope is worth mentioning again.

The field of experimental philosophy has received considerable attention, essentially for producing results that seem highly counter-intuitive and at the same time question some of the fundamental methods used in philosophy. A substantial part of this attention has focused on the role of intuitions in philosophical methodology. One of the major contributions of experimental philosophy on this topic has been concrete evidence in support of intuitional diversity; the idea that intuitions vary systematically depending on variables such as ethnicity, socioeconomic background, (...) or gender. Because of the important implications, these findings have been the subject of extensive debate. Despite the seeming significance of the findings and despite all the debates that the experimental philosophy movement has prompted, what has not been examined systematically is the reproducibility of the results. Instead, the reported findings have been simply accepted as established facts. We set out to replicate a wide range of experiments and surprisingly failed to reproduce many of the reported findings, some of which are from the most cited and attention grabbing papers of the field. We draw two conclusions from our findings. The first is that the instability of intuitions has been exaggerated by experimental philosophers. Intuitions appear to be more uniform across different demographic groups. The argument that intuitions need to be discarded because they depend on arbitrary factors such as ethnicity, socioeconomic background, or gender does not seem tenable anymore. The second conclusion is that experimental philosophy needs a better system to ensure the reproducibility of published findings. The current research-publication system of various empirical fields, especially those employing statistical methods, leads to an overproduction of false-positive findings in the published literature. Unless changes are made to the current research-publication system, this overproduction is likely to continue, in experimental philosophy as well as other disciplines. (shrink)

Replicability is usually considered to be one of the cornerstones of science; however, the growing recognition of nonreplicable experiments and studies in scientific journals—a phenomenon that has been called ‘replicability crisis’—has spurred a debate on the meaning, function, and significance of replicability in science. Amid this discussion, it has become clear that replicability is not a monolithic concept; what is still controversial is exactly how the distinction between different kinds of replicability should be laid out terminologically and conceptually, and to (...) what extent it bears on the more general debate on the centrality of replicability in science. This paper’s goals are to clarify the different uses of the terms related to replicability and, more importantly, to conceptually specify the kinds of replicability and their respective epistemic functions. (shrink)

Composer and musicologist Nicolas Slonimsky published a fascinating and delightful book entitled Lexicon of Musical Invective: Critical Assaults on Composers Since Beethoven’s Time (Slonimsky 1965). The book is a collection of what Slonimsky called “biased, unfair, ill-tempered, and singularly unprophetic judgments” (p. 3) about famous composers and their works. We find, for example, the Gazette Musicale de Paris on August 1, 1847, saying of Verdi, “there has not yet been an Italian composer more incapable of producing what is commonly called (...) a melody.” And this publication stuck to its guns. On May 22, 1853, it said of Rigoletto that it “lacks melody. This opera has hardly any chance to be kept in the repertoire.” The May 1804 issue of Zeitung für die Elegente Welt proclaimed Beethoven’s Second Symphony is a crass monster, a hideously writhing wounded dragon, that refuses to expire, and though bleeding in the Finale, furiously beats about with its tail erect................ (shrink)

It is generally supposed by psychical researchers that evidence suggestive of consciousness surviving bodily death would always be compatible with the so-called 'super-psi hypothesis', according to which living-agent psi is wholly responsible for the evidence. In this paper, I argue that, granted how super-psi is supposed to work, a case can be made for certain near-death experience cases to be incompatible with the super-psi hypothesis. From such a base, the explanatory impasse between the super-psi hypothesis and the survival hypothesis can (...) be broken. Keywords: near-death experiences, NDEs, super-psi, mind-body dualism, survival, consciousness. (shrink)

Periodicals of various sorts have long recognized the need to address certain topics on a regular basis. That’s why computer magazines routinely offer articles such as “Windows Tips and Tricks,” and “How to Protect Your Data.” Similarly, photography magazines return again and again to articles explaining how to get the most out of wide-angle lenses, how to shoot portraits in natural light, or how to photograph dramatic landscapes. It seems to me that JSE editorials might also need to recycle certain (...) topics from time to time, in part because readership changes, and in part because researchers in areas of frontier science can have conveniently short memories (like everyone else), perhaps especially when it comes to matters that are intellectually or professionally challenging or uncomfortable. The continuing debate over Daryl Bem’s recent precognition experiments (see Bem 2011, and the Editorial in JSE 25:1) and the similar controversy still dogging work on LENR or “cold fusion” suggests that perhaps it’s time to review certain salient facts about the nature of experimental replication in science. What follows is not new. Harry Collins has done outstanding work on this topic (Collins 1992), and I also addressed the issue at length (Braude 2002). For more recent commentary, see also Stefan Schmidt (2009). Apparently, however, what’s both obvious and commonsensical is very easy to overlook. (shrink)

When I first dipped my toe tentatively into the frigid waters of psi research, back in the late 1970s, one of the big issues of the time was whether the ability to replicate experiments distinguishes—or as philosophers often say, demarcates—science from non-science (or pseudoscience). This was a big issue because all too often parapsychological skeptics glibly used that demarcation criterion to bludgeon psi researchers and dismiss them as unscientific. Fortunately, in those days there was some very sensible writing on the (...) subject, particularly from Harry Collins, to whom I was especially indebted when I tackled the topic of replicability myself for the first time.1 The skeptical position on the issue of repeatability struck me as so lame that I even naively expected the debate to be settled rather quickly. However, because psi researchers often enter the field having little acquaintance with the work that preceded them, and because many critics of that research likewise fail to master the relevant issues, I suppose I shouldn’t be surprised that the debate over the nature and importance of replicability still rages. Indeed, little (if any) attention is given to the reasonable points that should have put that issue to rest long ago. Instead, researchers and commentators focus relentlessly—and as usual, inconclusively—on the results of meta-analyses. Some of those meta-analyses are indeed worthy of attention,2 but (I would say) only in light of the overlooked considerations I discuss below. So I’d like to review some problems with the still-widely–held view that the ability to replicate experiments is what demarcates science from non-science or pseudoscience. As I see it, that position is both shallow and confused, and the problems with it don’t even have the virtue of being subtle. First, the skeptical reliance on the demarcation criterion rests on a naïve conception of the actual importance within science of experimental repeatability. Indeed, experimental repeatability plays little if any role in disciplines (including some physical sciences) whose scientific credentials are not in dispute. Second, it seriously misconstrues how the appeal to replicability works even in those physical sciences where it plays a real role. Third, the received view rests on philosophical confusions regarding the nature of similarity—in particular, the flawed idea that there can be formal, context-independent, criteria for the similarity of two things. And fourth, it rests on confusions over the nature of human abilities generally, and in particular, the appropriate methodologies for studying them. One could also argue that a fifth problem for this received view is that psi research can in fact point to replicable results. But that last issue must be reserved for another occasion. (shrink)

The Journal of Scientific Exploration is devoted to the open-minded examination of scientific anomalies and other topics on the scientific frontier. Its articles and reviews, written by authorities in their respective fields, cover both data and theory in areas of science that are too often ignored or treated superficially by other scientific publications. This issue of the Journal features papers on a variety of subjects. The lead article is a sophisticated analysis of whether there are stable mean values, and relationships (...) between them, in quantitative parapsychological experiments. The next paper is a study of ten Tibetan Buddhist monks, in order to evaluate the hypothesis that meditation enhances performance in a precognition task. The third paper examines an oft-cited meta-analysis of PK studies purporting to show that positive results are attributable to publication bias. The author claims that this analysis is itself undermined by a large number of serious errors. The fourth paper investigates GPS network ionospheric total electron content (TEC) anomalies associated with Taiwan's Chi-Chi earthquake of September 21, 1999. The author considers whether the technique employed in this study can be used to identify earthquake-related TEC anomalies earlier than those typically observed. The fifth paper examines an autobiographical essay written by the Italian medium Eusapia Palladino. The author considers the historical context in which the essay was written, and explores discrepancies between Eusapia's account and statements of other authors who wrote about her. The final paper discusses the mental state of mediums and examines the claim that mediumistic experiences are symptoms of mental disorders. This issue of the JSE is then filled out, as usual, with a large selection of substantive book reviews. (shrink)