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  1. Cognitive Metascience: A New Approach to the Study of Theories.Miłkowski Marcin - 2023 - Przeglad Psychologiczny 66 (1):185-207.
    In light of the recent credibility crisis in psychology, this paper argues for a greater emphasis on theorizing in scientific research. Although reliable experimental evidence, preregistration, methodological rigor, and new computational frameworks for modeling are important, scientific progress also relies on properly functioning theories. However, the current understanding of the role of theorizing in psychology is lacking, which may lead to future crises. Theories should not be viewed as mere speculations or simple inductive generalizations. To address this issue, the author (...)
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  • Critique of pure Bayesian cognitive science: A view from the philosophy of science.Vincenzo Crupi & Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (3):1-17.
    Bayesian approaches to human cognition have been extensively advocated in the last decades, but sharp objections have been raised too within cognitive science. In this paper, we outline a diagnosis of what has gone wrong with the prevalent strand of Bayesian cognitive science (here labelled pure Bayesian cognitive science), relying on selected illustrations from the psychology of reasoning and tools from the philosophy of science. Bayesians’ reliance on so-called method of rational analysis is a key point of our discussion. We (...)
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  • Arbitrating norms for reasoning tasks.Aliya R. Dewey - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-26.
    The psychology of reasoning uses norms to categorize responses to reasoning tasks as correct or incorrect in order to interpret the responses and compare them across reasoning tasks. This raises the arbitration problem: any number of norms can be used to evaluate the responses to any reasoning task and there doesn’t seem to be a principled way to arbitrate among them. Elqayam and Evans have argued that this problem is insoluble, so they call for the psychology of reasoning to dispense (...)
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  • Testable or bust: theoretical lessons for predictive processing.Marcin Miłkowski & Piotr Litwin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-18.
    The predictive processing account of action, cognition, and perception is one of the most influential approaches to unifying research in cognitive science. However, its promises of grand unification will remain unfulfilled unless the account becomes theoretically robust. In this paper, we focus on empirical commitments of PP, since they are necessary both for its theoretical status to be established and for explanations of individual phenomena to be falsifiable. First, we argue that PP is a varied research tradition, which may employ (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Life, mind, agency: Why Markov blankets fail the test of evolution.Walter Veit & Heather Browning - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e214.
    There has been much criticism of the idea that Friston's free-energy principle can unite the life and mind sciences. Here, we argue that perhaps the greatest problem for the totalizing ambitions of its proponents is a failure to recognize the importance of evolutionary dynamics and to provide a convincing adaptive story relating free-energy minimization to organismal fitness.
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  • The emergence of objectivity: Fleck, Foucault, Kuhn and Hacking.Luca Sciortino - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 88 (1):128-137.
    The analytical notions of ‘thought style’, ‘paradigm’, ‘episteme’ and ‘style of reasoning’ are some of the most popular frameworks in the history and philosophy of science. Although their proponents, Ludwik Fleck, Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, and Ian Hacking, are all part of the same philosophical tradition that closely connects history and philosophy, the extent to which they share similar assumptions and objectives is still under debate. In the first part of the paper, I shall argue that, despite the fact that (...)
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  • Values in Psychometrics.Lisa D. Wijsen, Denny Borsboom & Anna Alexandrova - forthcoming - Perspectives on Psychological Science.
    When it originated in the late 19th century, psychometrics was a field with both a scientific and a social mission: psychometrics provided new methods for research into individual differences, and at the same time, these psychometric instruments were considered a means to create a new social order. In contrast, contemporary psychometrics - due to its highly technical nature and its limited involvement in substantive psychological research - has created the impression of being a value-free discipline. In this article, we develop (...)
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  • (1 other version)Methodology and ontology in microbiome research.John Huss - 2014 - Biological Theory 9 (4):392-400.
    Research on the human microbiome has gen- erated a staggering amount of sequence data, revealing variation in microbial diversity at the community, species (or phylotype), and genomic levels. In order to make this complexity more manageable and easier to interpret, new units—the metagenome, core microbiome, and entero- type—have been introduced in the scientific literature. Here, I argue that analytical tools and exploratory statisti- cal methods, coupled with a translational imperative, are the primary drivers of this new ontology. By reducing the (...)
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  • Epistemic Challenges: Engaging Philosophically in Cognitive Science.Przemysław R. Nowakowski - 2019 - Ruch Filozoficzny 75 (2):237.
    In this article, I show the role that the philosopher of cognitive science can cur-rently play in cognitive science research. I argue for the important, and not yet considered, role of the philosophy of cognitive science in cognitive science, that is, the importance of cooperation between philosophers of science with cogni-tive scientists in investigating the research methods and theoretical assump-tions of cognitive science. At the beginning of the paper I point out, how the philosopher of science, here, the philosopher of (...)
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  • Erroneous gambling-related beliefs emerge from broader beliefs during problem-solving: a critical review and classification scheme.Anastasia Ejova & Keis Ohtsuka - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 26 (2):159-187.
    Erroneous gambling-related beliefs can be defined as beliefs that imply a failure to recognise how commercial gambling activities are designed to generate a guaranteed loss to players. In t...
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  • Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):185-220.
    Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach (...)
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  • Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (4):650-669.
    Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisficing, the authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, the (...)
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  • The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Causal reasoning is one of our most central cognitive competencies, enabling us to adapt to our world. Causal knowledge allows us to predict future events, or diagnose the causes of observed facts. We plan actions and solve problems using knowledge about cause-effect relations. Without our ability to discover and empirically test causal theories, we would not have made progress in various empirical sciences. In the past decades, the important role of causal knowledge has been discovered in many areas of cognitive (...)
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  • Heuristics, Descriptions, and the Scope of Mechanistic Explanation.Carlos Zednik - 2015 - In Pierre-Alain Braillard & Christophe Malaterre (eds.), Explanation in Biology. An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 295-318.
    The philosophical conception of mechanistic explanation is grounded on a limited number of canonical examples. These examples provide an overly narrow view of contemporary scientific practice, because they do not reflect the extent to which the heuristic strategies and descriptive practices that contribute to mechanistic explanation have evolved beyond the well-known methods of decomposition, localization, and pictorial representation. Recent examples from evolutionary robotics and network approaches to biology and neuroscience demonstrate the increasingly important role played by computer simulations and mathematical (...)
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  • The Human Sciences in a Biological Age.Nikolas Rose - 2013 - Theory, Culture and Society 30 (1):3-34.
    We live, according to some, in the century of biology, where we now understand ourselves in radically new ways as the insights of genomics and neuroscience have opened up the workings of our bodies and our minds to new kinds of knowledge and intervention. Is a new figure of the human, and of the social, taking shape in the 21st century? With what consequences for the politics of life today? And with what implications, if any, for the social, cultural and (...)
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  • Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts, cheating, and perspective change.Gerd Gigerenzer & Klaus Hug - 1992 - Cognition 43 (2):127-171.
    What counts as human rationality: reasoning processes that embody content-independent formal theories, such as propositional logic, or reasoning processes that are well designed for solving important adaptive problems? Most theories of human reasoning have been based on content-independent formal rationality, whereas adaptive reasoning, ecological or evolutionary, has been little explored. We elaborate and test an evolutionary approach, Cosmides' social contract theory, using the Wason selection task. In the first part, we disentangle the theoretical concept of a “social contract” from that (...)
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  • Normative theories of categorization.James E. Corter - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):491-492.
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  • Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded Rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):528-554.
    What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of morality: (...)
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  • Gricean charity: The Gricean turn in psychology.Carole J. Lee - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (2):193-218.
    Psychologists' work on conversational pragmatics and judgment suggests a refreshing approach to charitable interpretation and theorizing. This charitable approach—what I call Gricean charity —recognizes the role of conversational assumptions and norms in subject-experimenter communication. In this paper, I outline the methodological lessons Gricean charity gleans from psychologists' work in conversational pragmatics. In particular, Gricean charity imposes specific evidential standards requiring that researchers collect empirical information about (1) the conditions of successful and unsuccessful communication for specific experimental contexts, and (2) the (...)
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  • Advancing the rationality debate.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):701-717.
    In this response, we clarify several misunderstandings of the understanding/acceptance principle and defend our specific operationalization of that principle. We reiterate the importance of addressing the problem of rational task construal and we elaborate the notion of computational limitations contained in our target article. Our concept of thinking dispositions as variable intentional-level styles of epistemic and behavioral regulation is explained, as is its relation to the rationality debate. Many of the suggestions of the commentators for elaborating two-process models are easily (...)
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  • Unification by Fiat: Arrested Development of Predictive Processing.Piotr Litwin & Marcin Miłkowski - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (7):e12867.
    Predictive processing (PP) has been repeatedly presented as a unificatory account of perception, action, and cognition. In this paper, we argue that this is premature: As a unifying theory, PP fails to deliver general, simple, homogeneous, and systematic explanations. By examining its current trajectory of development, we conclude that PP remains only loosely connected both to its computational framework and to its hypothetical biological underpinnings, which makes its fundamentals unclear. Instead of offering explanations that refer to the same set of (...)
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  • Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases.Klaus Fiedler - 2000 - Psychological Review 107 (4):659-676.
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  • The nonoptimality of Anderson's memory fits.Gordon M. Becker - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):487-488.
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  • Adaptivity and rational analysis.Bradley W. Dickinson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):492-493.
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  • Comorbidity: A network perspective.Angélique Oj Cramer, Lourens J. Waldorp, Han Lj van der Maas & Denny Borsboom - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):137-150.
    The pivotal problem of comorbidity research lies in the psychometric foundation it rests on, that is, latent variable theory, in which a mental disorder is viewed as a latent variable that causes a constellation of symptoms. From this perspective, comorbidity is a (bi)directional relationship between multiple latent variables. We argue that such a latent variable perspective encounters serious problems in the study of comorbidity, and offer a radically different conceptualization in terms of a network approach, where comorbidity is hypothesized to (...)
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  • Why It Is Time To Move Beyond Nagelian Reduction.Marie I. Kaiser - 2012 - In D. Dieks, S. Hartmann, T. Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structure. Springer. pp. 255-272.
    In this paper I argue that it is finally time to move beyond the Nagelian framework and to break new ground in thinking about epistemic reduction in biology. I will do so, not by simply repeating all the old objections that have been raised against Ernest Nagel’s classical model of theory reduction. Rather, I grant that a proponent of Nagel’s approach can handle several of these problems but that, nevertheless, Nagel’s general way of thinking about epistemic reduction in terms of (...)
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  • The intuitive conceptualization and perception of variance.Elizaveta Konovalova & Thorsten Pachur - 2021 - Cognition 217 (C):104906.
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  • Computational Cognitive Neuroscience.Carlos Zednik - 2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Routledge.
    This chapter provides an overview of the basic research strategies and analytic techniques deployed in computational cognitive neuroscience. On the one hand, “top-down” strategies are used to infer, from formal characterizations of behavior and cognition, the computational properties of underlying neural mechanisms. On the other hand, “bottom-up” research strategies are used to identify neural mechanisms and to reconstruct their computational capacities. Both of these strategies rely on experimental techniques familiar from other branches of neuroscience, including functional magnetic resonance imaging, single-cell (...)
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  • (1 other version)Bayesian Cognitive Science, Monopoly, and Neglected Frameworks.Matteo Colombo & Stephan Hartmann - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):451–484.
    A widely shared view in the cognitive sciences is that discovering and assessing explanations of cognitive phenomena whose production involves uncertainty should be done in a Bayesian framework. One assumption supporting this modelling choice is that Bayes provides the best approach for representing uncertainty. However, it is unclear that Bayes possesses special epistemic virtues over alternative modelling frameworks, since a systematic comparison has yet to be attempted. Currently, it is then premature to assert that cognitive phenomena involving uncertainty are best (...)
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  • How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (4):684-704.
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  • (1 other version)Methodology and Ontology in Microbiome Research.John Huss - 2014 - Biological Theory 9 (4):1-11.
    Research on the human microbiome has generated a staggering amount of sequence data, revealing variation in microbial diversity at the community, species (or phylotype), and genomic levels. In order to make this complexity more manageable and easier to interpret, new units—the metagenome, core microbiome, and enterotype—have been introduced in the scientific literature. Here, I argue that analytical tools and exploratory statistical methods, coupled with a translational imperative, are the primary drivers of this new ontology. By reducing the dimensionality of variation (...)
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  • A Bayesian theory of thought.Howard Smokler - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):505-505.
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  • (1 other version)Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences.Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (1):107-143.
    Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: the discovery of less-is-more effects; the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; the (...)
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  • A Generative View of Rationality and Growing Awareness†.Teppo Felin & Jan Koenderink - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    In this paper we contrast bounded and ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Ecological approaches to rationality build on the idea of humans as “intuitive statisticians” while we argue for a more generative conception of humans as “probing organisms.” We first highlight how ecological rationality’s focus on cues and statistics is problematic for two reasons: the problem of cue salience, and the problem of cue uncertainty. We highlight these problems by revisiting the statistical and cue-based logic that underlies (...)
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  • On the accuracy of personality judgment: A realistic approach.David C. Funder - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (4):652-670.
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  • The consistency and ecological rationality approaches to normative bounded rationality.Nathan Berg - 2014 - Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (4):375-395.
    This paper focuses on tacit versus explicit uses of plural performance metrics as a primary methodological characteristic. This characteristic usefully distinguishes two schools of normative analysis and their approaches to normative interpretations of bounded rationality. Both schools of thought make normative claims about bounded rationality by comparing the performance of decision procedures using more than one performance metric. The consistency school makes tacit reference to performance metrics outside its primary axiomatic framework, but lexicographically promotes internal axiomatic consistency as the primary, (...)
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  • Is human cognition adaptive?John R. Anderson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):471-485.
    Can the output of human cognition be predicted from the assumption that it is an optimal response to the information-processing demands of the environment? A methodology called rational analysis is described for deriving predictions about cognitive phenomena using optimization assumptions. The predictions flow from the statistical structure of the environment and not the assumed structure of the mind. Bayesian inference is used, assuming that people start with a weak prior model of the world which they integrate with experience to develop (...)
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  • Rational analysis and the Lens model.Reid Hastie & Kenneth R. Hammond - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):498-498.
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  • Computational resources do constrain behavior.John K. Tsotsos - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):506-507.
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  • Probabilistically Valid Inference of Covariation From a Single x,y Observation When Univariate Characteristics Are Known.Michael E. Doherty, Richard B. Anderson, Amanda M. Kelley & James H. Albert - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (2):183-205.
    Participants were asked to draw inferences about correlation from single x,y observations. In Experiment 1 statistically sophisticated participants were given the univariate characteristics of distributions of x and y and asked to infer whether a single x, y observation came from a correlated or an uncorrelated population. In Experiment 2, students with a variety of statistical backgrounds assigned posterior probabilities to five possible populations based on single x, y observations, again given knowledge of the univariate statistics. In Experiment 3, statistically (...)
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  • The reflexivity of cognitive science: the scientist as model of human nature.Jamie Cohen-Cole - 2005 - History of the Human Sciences 18 (4):107-139.
    This article examines how experimental psychology experienced a revolution as cognitive science replaced behaviorism in the mid-20th century. This transition in the scientific account of human nature involved making normal what had once been normative: borrowing ideas of democratic thinking from political culture and conceptions of good thinking from philosophy of science to describe humans as active, creatively thinking beings, rather than as organisms that simply respond to environmental conditions. Reflexive social and intellectual practices were central to this process as (...)
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  • The network perspective will help, but is comorbidity the question?Wendy Johnson & Lars Penke - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):162-163.
    Latent variable modeling has revealed important conundrums in the DSM classification system. We agree that the network perspective has potential to inspire new insights and resolve some of these conundrums. We note, however, that alone it cannot really help us understand etiology. Etiology, not comorbidity, is the fundamental question.
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  • Nothing but a useful tool? (F)utility and the free-energy principle.Matteo Colombo - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e191.
    Bruineberg and collaborators distinguish three philosophical positions about the status of Markov blankets in the context of active inference modelling, namely: literalism, realism, and instrumentalism. They criticize the first two positions and suggest that instrumentalism is “less problematic but also less interesting” (sect. 6.1.2, para. 5) Here, I sketch how literalists and realists might reply to Bruineberg et al.'s criticisms, and I explain why instrumentalism is more interesting and contentious than what Bruineberg and collaborators suggest.
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  • La Mesure en psychologie de binet à Thurstone, 1900–1930.Olivier Martin - 1997 - Revue de Synthèse 118 (4):457-493.
    Le psychologue français Alfred Binet est à l'origine du développement de tests mentaux destinés à diagnostiquer le « niveau intellectuel » des enfants. Initialement conçus comme des tests cliniques, leur importation aux États-Unis dans les années 1910 a considérablement modifié leur usage, leur portée pratique et leur interprétation. Devenus les instruments de politiques eugéniques ou héréditaristes, utilisés dans des processus de sélection de grande échelle, les tests ont transformé la conception que les psychologues se faisaient de l'intelligence: initialement conçue comme (...)
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  • The Utility- and Use–of Neurotechnology to Recover Consciousness: Technical and Neuroethical Considerations in Approaching the “Hard Question” of Neuroscience.Kathinka Evers & James J. Giordano - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11.
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  • Human cognition is an adaptive process.Gyan C. Agarwal - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):485-486.
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  • More on rational analysis.John R. Anderson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):508-517.
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  • Probing the “Achilles' heel” of rational analysis.Keith J. Holyoak - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):498-499.
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  • On the nonapplicability of a rational analysis to human cognition.Eldar Shafir - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):502-503.
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  • Does the environment have the same structure as Bayes' theorem?Gerd Gigerenzer - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):495-496.
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