Gilbert’s four modes of communication include the logical, the emotional, the visceral and the kisceral, which last has not received much attention at all. This mode covers the forms of argument that rely on intuition and undefended basal assumptions. These forms range from the scientific and mathematical to the religious and mystical. In this paper these forms will be examined, and suggestions made for ways in which intuitive frameworks can be compared and valued.

If arguments are to generate public knowledge, as in the sciences, then they must travel, finding acceptance across a range of local contexts. But not all good arguments travel, whereas some bad arguments do. Under what conditions may we regard the capacity of an argument to travel as a sign of its cogency or public merits? This question is especially interesting for a contextualist approach that wants to remain critically robust: if standards of cogency are bound to local contexts of (...) evaluation, then how may arguments legitimately travel at all? The key to a contextualist conception of cogent travel, I argue, lies in the way local contexts are linked to broader contexts of evaluation by relations of relevance. The burden of the article is to elaborate the different forms these relations can take in the travel of scientific arguments. (shrink)

The question of emotion in argumentation has received considerable attention in recent years. But there is a tension between the traditional normative role of informal logic, and the inclusion of emotion which is viewed as notoriously unstable. Here I argue that that, a] there is always emotion in an argument; b] that the presence of emotion is a good thing; and c] that we can and ought model and teach the use of emotion in Argumentation Theory.

This volume focuses on dialogue and argumentation in contexts which are marked by truculence and discord. The contributors include well known argumentation scholars who discuss the issues this raises from the point of view of a variety of disciplines and points of view. The authors seek to address theoretically challenging issues in a way that is relevant to both the theory and the practice of argument. The collection brings together selected essays from the 2006 11th Wake Forest University Biennial Argumentation (...) Conference held at Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton, Florida and the 2012 14th Wake Forest University Biennial Argumentation Conference held at Casa Artom in Venice, Italy. (shrink)

Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, according to which arguers should take proponent and opponent roles and argue against one another. The model is deficient because it creates disadvantages for feminine gendered persons in a way that causes significant epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue that the problem that these critics have pointed out can be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the argument the associated tasks and norms of (...) which she cannot fulfill, she is liable to suffer morally significant harms. One way to react to this problem is by requiring arguers to set up argument structures and allocate roles so that the argument will be reasons-reflective in as balanced a way as possible. However, I argue that this would create to heavy a burden. Arguers would then habitually have to take on roles that require them to divert time and energy away from the goals that they started arguing for and instead serve the goal of ideal reasons-reflectiveness. At least prima facie arguers should be able to legitimately devote their time and energy towards their own goals. This creates a problem: On the one hand, structures that create morally significant harms for some arguers should be avoided—on the other hand, arguers should be able to take argument-roles that allow them to devote themselves to their own argumentative goals. Fulfilling the second requirement for some arguers will often create the morally significant harms for their interlocutors. There are two possible solutions for this problem: first, arguers might be required to reach free, consensual agreements on the structure they will adopt for their argument and the way they will distribute argumentative roles. I reject this option as both fundamentally unfeasible and practically unrealistic, based on arguments developed by theorists like Krabbe and Jacobs. I argue that instead, we should take a liberal view on argument ethics. Arguers should abide by moral side constraints to their role taking. They should feel free to take roles that will allow them to concentrate on their argumentative goals, but only if this does not create a situation in which their interlocutors are pushed into a role that that they cannot effectively play. (shrink)

In this paper the theoretical power of the concept of robustness is discussed in order to characterize the argumentative competence of a speaker. This notion is countered with the extended use of the idea complexity. As a general background some empirical results are used to support the theoretical discussion. The paper mainly relies on the theory of cultural cognition to situate the category of robustness and offers particular criteria to specify the possible operationalization of the notion. These criteria could later (...) be applied, and even tested, in the analysis of other social behaviours that involve collective intentionality, cooperation and recursivity. En este trabajo se discute el alcance teórico del concepto robustez para caracterizar la competencia argumentativa de un hablante. Se contrapone la categoría al uso extendido de la idea de complejidad. Como referencia se utilizan algunos resultados empíricos para apoyar la discusión. El trabajo se apoya principalmente en el anclaje conceptual proveniente de la cognición cultural para situar la categoría robustez y ofrece criterios particulares que especifican la posible operacionalización de la noción, criterios que podrán luego ser aplicados, e incluso testeados, en el análisis de otros comportamientos sociales que involucran intencionalidad colectiva, cooperación y recursividad. (shrink)

In this paper, I review and compare major literature on goals in argumentation scholarship, aiming to answer the question of how to take the different goals of arguers into account when analysing and evaluating public political arguments. On the basis of the review, I suggest to differentiate between the different goals along two important distinctions: first, distinguish between goals which are intrinsic to argumentation and goals which are extrinsic to it and second distinguish between goals of the act of arguing (...) and goals of argumentative interactions. Furthermore, I propose to analyse public political arguments as multi-purposive activity types and reconstruct the argumentative exchanges as a series of simultaneous discussions. This enables us to examine public political arguments from a perspective in which the intrinsic goals of argumentation are in principle instrumental for the achievement of the socio-political purposes of argumentation, and consequently, it makes our assessment of the argumentative quality of the argument also indicative of the quality of the socio-political processes to which the arguments contribute. (shrink)

It is not uncommon, in argumentation and in various professions, to diagnose a gap between theory and practice; and in the next step argue that they should be brought into line with each other. But what does this mean? I shall argue that some version of a gap is sound, as it leaves theory with a critical, independent role in relation to practice—something that an equilibrium view does not.

Se ofrece una respuesta inicial a la pregunta sobre el recorrido evolutivo de la competencia argumentativa. Se asume decididamente la hipótesis de la intencionalidad colectiva y la cooperación como rasgos estructurales que permiten entender la argumentación como un fenómeno normativo. Se concluye que la argumentación fue producto de una presión selectiva para la multiplicación de representaciones alternativas provenientes de una mayor cantidad de agentes de un mismo o diferente grupo. La presión evolutiva seleccionó la comunicación de buenas razones a través (...) del conflicto verbal y permitió, al agente individual, generar reputación, lo que va en su directo beneficio reproductivo. (shrink)