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  1. Bounded Rationality in the Centipede Game.Ashton T. Sperry-Taylor - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):262-280.
    Normative game theory unsatisfactorily explains rational behavior. Real people do not behave as predicted, and what is prescribed as rational behavior is normally unattainable in real-life. The problem is that current normative analysis does not account for people's cognitive limitations – their bounded rationality. However, this paper develops an account of bounded rationality that explains the rationality of more realistic behavior. I focus on the Centipede Game, in which boundedly rational players explore and test others' immediate behavior, until they can (...)
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  • Hume's Game-Theoretic Business Ethics.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1999 - Business Ethics Quarterly 9 (1):47-67.
    In recent years, a number of authors have used gametheoretic reasoning to explain why purely self-interested agentswould ever conform their economic activities with the requirements of justice, when by doing so they forego opportunities to reapunilateral net gains by exploiting others. In this paper, I argue that Hume's justification of honest economic exchanges between self-interested agents in the Treatise foreshadows this contemporary literature. Hume analyzes the problem of explaining justice in self-interested economic exchange as a problem of agents coordinating on (...)
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  • The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):215.
    Hume is rightly credited with giving a brilliant, and perhaps the best, account of justice as convention. Hume's importance as a forerunner of modern economics has also long been recognized. However, most of Hume's readers have not fully appreciated how closely Hume's analysis of convention foreshadows a particular branch of economic theory, namely, game theory. Starting with the work of Barry, Runciman and Sen and Lewis, there has been a flowering of literature on the informal game-theoretic insights to be found (...)
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  • Feminist Philosophy of Science.Lynn Hankinson Nelson - 2002 - In Peter K. Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. pp. 312–331.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Highlights of Past Literature Current Work Future Work.
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  • Common reasoning about admissibility.Cristina Bicchieri & Oliver Schulte - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):299 - 325.
    We analyze common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic and extensive form of a game. We define a notion of sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form, and show that, in finite extensive games with perfect recall, the strategies that are consistent with common reasoning about sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form are exactly those that are consistent with common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic form representation of the game. Thus in such games the solution given by common (...)
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  • Games machines play.Wynn C. Stirling - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (3):327-352.
    Individual rationality, or doing what is best for oneself, is a standard model used to explain and predict human behavior, and von Neumann–Morgenstern game theory is the classical mathematical formalization of this theory in multiple-agent settings. Individual rationality, however, is an inadequate model for the synthesis of artificial social systems where cooperation is essential, since it does not permit the accommodation of group interests other than as aggregations of individual interests. Satisficing game theory is based upon a well-defined notion of (...)
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  • Trust among Strangers.Cristina Bicchieri, John Duffy & Gil Tolle† - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):286-319.
    The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a “trust and reciprocate” norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be identified with a single strategy. It is instead supported by several conditional strategies that vary in the frequency and intensity of sanctions.
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  • The Varieties of Instrumental Rationality.Stephen Ellis - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):199-220.
    It is a mistake to think that instrumental rationality fixes a single standard for judging or describing actions. While there is a core conception of instrumental rationality, we appeal to different elaborations of that conception for different purposes. An action can be instrumentally rational in some sense(s) but not in others. As we learn more about behavior, it is possible to add useful elaborations of the core conception of instrumental rationality. In this paper, I propose a new elaboration based on (...)
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  • Rationality and indeterminacy.Cristina Bicchieri - 2009 - In Don Ross & Harold Kincaid (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 159.
    Much of the history of game theory has been dominated by the problem of indeterminacy. The very search for better versions of rationality, as well as the long list of attempts to refine Nash equilibrium, can be seen as answers to the indeterminacy that has accompanied game theory through its history. More recently, the experimental approach to game theory has attempted a more radical solution: by directly generating a stream of behavioral observations, one hopes that behavioral hypotheses will be sharper, (...)
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  • What’s new in the new ideology critique?Kirun Sankaran - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1441-1462.
    I argue that contemporary accounts of ideology critique—paradigmatically those advanced by Haslanger, Jaeggi, Celikates, and Stanley—are either inadequate or redundant. The Marxian concept of ideology—a collective epistemic distortion or irrationality that helps maintain bad social arrangements—has recently returned to the forefront of debates in contemporary analytic social philosophy. Ideology critique has similarly emerged as a technique for combating such social ills by remedying those collective epistemic distortions. Ideologies are sets of social meanings or shared understandings. I argue in this paper (...)
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  • No Title available: Reviews.Matthias Klaes - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):389-397.
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  • Review of Cristina Bicchieri's Norms in the wild: how to diagnose, measure, and change social norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, xviii + 239 pp. [REVIEW]Francesco Guala - 2017 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 10 (1):101-111.
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  • Coordination without meta-representation.Camilla Colombo & Francesco Guala - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (5):684-717.
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  • Technological Literacy for Democracy: a Cost-Benefit Analysis.Manuel Carabantes - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):701-715.
    Proposals for the democratization of technology imply a necessary condition of universal emancipatory technological literacy. However, in the literature on the topic, people’s willingness to assume the cost in time and effort involved in acquiring that knowledge is often taken for granted. In this paper, we apply Anthony Downs’s economic theory of political action in democracy to analyze the cost-benefit ratio of this literacy from the perspective of the individual subject who should acquire it. Our conclusion is that the cost (...)
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