Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually before measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize well-being and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to well-being science.

Many believe that an upward-sloping life is better than a downward-sloping life because of its shape. This is a common way of formulating the shape of a life hypothesis. We argue that the hypothesis is mistaken. We need not assume that there is something intrinsically valuable in the shape of one’s life to justify the tendency to judge an upward-sloping life as better than a downward sloping one. Instead, we can appeal to more fundamental and less controversial claims to justify (...) such a judgment. What one might justifiably judge to be better are features of lives which are often (though not necessarily) correlated with, rather than constituted by, an upward slope. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss a prevailing view by which logical terms determine forms of sentences and arguments and therefore the logical validity of arguments. This view is common to those who hold that there is a principled distinction between logical and nonlogical terms and those holding relativistic accounts. I adopt the Tarskian tradition by which logical validity is determined by form, but reject the centrality of logical terms. I propose an alternative framework for logic where logical terms no longer (...) play a distinctive role. This account employs a new notion of semantic. (shrink)

Policy-makers sometimes aim to improve well-being as a policy goal, but to do this they need some way to measure well-being. Instead of relying on potentially problematic theories of well-being to justify their choice of well-being measure, Daniel Hausman proposes that policy-makers can sometimes rely on preference-based measures as evidence for well-being. I claim that Hausman’s evidential account does not justify the use of any one measure more than it justifies the use of any other measure. This leaves us at (...) a loss as to which policy should be chosen in the non-trivial cases for which there is substantial disagreement between the different measures in their assessment of policy. (shrink)

How should we make distributive decisions when there is not enough of the good to go around, or at least not enough of it right now? What does fairness require in such cases? In what follows, we distinguish between cases of scarcity and bottleneck cases, and we argue that both arguments for lotteries and arguments for queues have merit, albeit for different distributive scenarios. When dealing with scarcity not everyone can get the good. A secondary good that can be distributed (...) fairly is the chances of obtaining the good. In cases of scarcity, lotteries are the best way of allocating chances of obtaining the good fairly. When dealing with bottlenecks, the secondary good that can and ought to be distributed fairly is waiting time. Queues are best suited to distribute the good of waiting time fairly. (shrink)

Many philosophers reject the view that well-being over a lifetime is simply an aggregation of well-being at every moment of one's life, and thus they reject theories of well-being like hedonism and concurrentist desire satisfactionism. They raise concerns that such a view misses the importance of the relationships between moments in a person's life or the role narratives play in a person's well-being. In this article, we develop an atomist meta-theory of well-being, according to which the prudential value of a (...) life depends solely on the prudential value of each moment of that life. This is a general account of momentary well-being that can capture different features of well-being that standard atomistic accounts fail to capture, thus allowing for the possibility of an atomism that is compatible with a variety of well-being theories. Contrary to many criticisms leveled against momentary well-being, this well-being atomism captures all of the important features of well-being. (shrink)

Spoofing is the act of placing orders to buy or sell a financial contract without the intention to have those orders fulfilled in order to create the impression that there is a large demand for that contract at that price. In this article, I deny the view that spoofing in financial markets should be viewed as morally permissible analogously to the way bluffing is permissible in poker. I argue for the pro tanto moral impermissibility of spoofing and make the case (...) that spoofing is disanalogous from bluffing in at least one important regard—speculative trading serves an important economic role, whereas poker does not. (shrink)

It is an open question whether well-being ought to primarily be understood as a temporal concept or whether it only makes sense to talk about a person’s well-being over their whole lifetime. In this article, I argue that how this principled philosophical disagreement is settled does not have substantive practical implications for well-being science and well-being policy. Trying to measure lifetime well-being directly is extremely challenging as well as unhelpful for guiding well-being public policy, while temporal well-being is both an (...) adequate indirect measure of lifetime well-being, and an adequate focus for the purposes of improving well-being through public policy. Consequently, even if what we ought to care about is lifetime well-being, we should use temporal measures of well-being and focus on temporal well-being policies. (shrink)

Generating an account that can sidestep the disagreement among substantive theories of well-being, while at the same time still providing useful guidance for well-being public policy, would be a significant achievement. Unfortunately, the various attempts to remain agnostic regarding what constitutes well-being fail to either be an account of well-being, provide useful guidance for well-being policy, or avoid relying on a substantive well-being theory. There are no theory-free lunches in well-being policy. Instead, I propose an intermediate account, according to which (...) well-being is constituted by endorsed veridical experiences. This account refers back to theories of well-being but does so as agnostically as possible. An intermediate account of well-being is meant as a policy guiding compromise between the different theories of well-being that make claims regarding what constitutes well-being. An intermediate account does as well as can be hoped for in providing a basis for well-being policy. (shrink)

According to what I call the ‘argument from public bads’, if a researcher deceived subjects in the past, there is a chance that subjects will discount the information that a subsequent researcher provides, thus compromising the validity of the subsequent researcher’s experiment. While this argument is taken to justify an existing informal ban on explicit deception in experimental economics, it can also apply to implicit deception, yet implicit deception is not banned and is sometimes used in experimental economics. Thus, experimental (...) economists are being inconsistent when they appeal to the argument from public bads to justify banning explicit deception but not implicit deception. (shrink)

In a recent article, “Logical Consequence and Natural Language”, Michael Glanzberg claims that there is no relation of logical consequence in natural language (2015). The present paper counters that claim. I shall discuss Glanzberg’s arguments and show why they don’t hold. I further show how Glanzberg’s claims may be used to rather support the existence of logical consequence in natural language.

In this paper I present an interpretation of Deleuze's concept of the virtual. I argue that this concept is best understood in relation to the problematic of individuation or differentiation, which Deleuze inherits from Duns Scotus. After analysing Scotus' critique of Aristotelian or hylomorphic approaches to the problem of individuation, I turn to Deleuze's account of differentiation and his interpretation of the calculus in chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition. The paper seeks thereby to explicate Deleuze's dialectics or theory of (...) Ideas, his approach to the principle of sufficient reason, and the concept of the virtual itself. (shrink)

In his new book, Logical Form, Andrea Iacona distinguishes between two different roles that have been ascribed to the notion of logical form: the logical role and the semantic role. These two roles entail a bifurcation of the notion of logical form. Both notions of logical form, according to Iacona, are descriptive, having to do with different features of natural language sentences. I agree that the notion of logical form bifurcates, but not that the logical role is merely descriptive. In (...) this paper, I focus on formalization, a process by which logical form, on its logical role, is attributed to natural language sentences. According to some, formalization is a form of explication, and it involves normative, pragmatic, as well as creative aspects. I present a view by which formalization involves explicit commitments on behalf of a reasoner or an interpreter, which serve the normative grounds for the evaluation of a given text. In previous work, I proposed the framework of semantic constraints for the explication of logical consequence. Here, I extend the framework to include formalization constraints. The various constraints then serve the role of commitments. I discuss specific issues raised by Iacona concerning univocality, co-reference and equivocation, and I show how our views on these matters diverge as a result of our different starting assumptions. (shrink)

in recent years, policy makers have shown increasing interest in implementing policies aimed at promoting individual well-being. But how should policy makers choose their well-being policies? a seemingly reasonable first step is to settle on an agreed-upon definition of well-being. yet there currently is significant disagreement on how well-being ought to be characterized, and agreement on the correct view of well-being does not appear to be forthcoming. Nevertheless, i argue in this paper that there are several reasons to think that (...) the domain of well-being in the public policy context is narrower than that of well-being in general, which makes agreement on how to understand well-being in the public policy context more likely. (shrink)

In book II of Plato’s Republic, Socrates discusses the cities of necessity and luxury (372d-373a). Discussions of these cities have often focused on citizens desiring more than they need, which creates a demand for luxury. Yet the second part of the equation, which is not usually recognized, is that there must be sufficient supply to meet this demand. The focus of this article is on the importance of supply in the discussion of the first two cities in book II of (...) the Republic. This article argues that the way Plato models the cities makes it the case that a surplus above levels of necessity will be generated from time to time. That the unwanted surplus cannot be spontaneously disposed of entails that the first two cities are institutionally incomplete. A government is needed in order to coordinate the disposal of the surplus supply the city will produce. (shrink)

The move from open outcry to electronic trading added another responsibility to futures exchanges—that of matching orders between buyers and sellers. Matching systems can affect the level and speed of price discovery, the distribution of revenue, as well as the level of price efficiency of a given market. Whether the matching system is procedurally fair is another important consideration. I argue that while FIFO (First In First Out) is a fair procedure in principle and is perceived as the default matching (...) system, it is not a fair procedure in practice. Likewise, while pro rata is a fair procedure in principle, it is not so in practice. Nevertheless, both FIFO and pro rata are relics of an open outcry system. Instead, I propose an alternative approach to matching systems that builds on the strengths of electronic trading—the ability to randomize in real time. I introduce random selection for service (RSS) as a matching system that is procedurally fair both in principle and in practice. (shrink)

Based on the results obtained from primary education students—fifth and sixth graders—the aim of this work is to check the appropriate self-perceived behaviors during and at the end of the game. The study population was made up of 698 students from fifth and sixth grade in the Autonomous Region of Castilla–La Mancha (Spain). Data were collected through a questionnaire (scale) on the social skills of primary school students linked to the adequate skills when losing, the adequate skills when winning, and (...) the adequate skills during the game. Study results revealed that analyzed behaviors vary, depending on the moment of the game, being it more frequently during the development of the game than when losing or winning. (shrink)

This work shows differences in public participation in China and Western countries, conceptually and empirically. To do so, the different philosophical and public administration traditions are outlined. Main contributions are tables and dashboards to allow general comparisons and to differentiate contexts in both political settings, besides being useful for other settings. The tables included are: 1) Main features of context in China, 2) Deliberative democracy, 3) Main features of context in the west, 4) The Gil Dashboard helping to outline the (...) endogenous foundations for change both in China and the West. -/- democracy, rule of law, public participation, China, western countries . (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre argues that moral virtues are antithetical to what is required of those who trade in financial markets to succeed. MacIntyre focuses on four virtues and argues that successful traders possess none of them: (i) self-knowledge, (ii) courage, (iii) taking a long-term perspective, and (iv) tying one’s own good with some set of common goods. By contrast, I argue that (i)–(iii) are, in fact, traits of successful traders, regardless of their normative assessment. The last trait – caring about the (...) common good – is often counterproductive in most for-profit ventures, including trading, and so singling out traders is inappropriate. (shrink)

Some advances in bioethics regarding ethical considerations that arise in the context of medical research can also be relevant when thinking about the ethical considerations that arise in the context of SoTL research. In this article, I aim to bring awareness to two potential ethical challenges SoTL researchers might face when playing a dual role of teacher and researcher that are similar to the challenges physicians face in their dual role of physician and researcher. In this article, I argue that (...) two commonly discussed concerns in bioethics---the need for clinical equipoise and the possibility of a therapeutic misconception---have analogies when conducting some types of research on students. I call these counterparts educational equipoise and the educational misconception. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss James Buchanan’s contribution in the narrow domain of understanding committee voting under majority rule. We then go on to discuss Charles Plott’s seminal experimental work on the topic that sparked a wave of public choice experimental work. However, given Plott’s claims that Buchanan influenced him significantly, it is puzzling that his work with Morris Fiorina explores a question outside of those which Buchanan and Tullock found interesting. We suggest several ways to resolve this tension. Our (...) chapter concludes by discussing a lacuna in the experimental public choice literature in which Buchanan was particularly interested—logrolling, or vote trading. (shrink)

In this work, a general framework for the analysis of governance of artificial intelligence is presented. A dashboard developed for this analysis comes from the perspective of political theory. This dashboard allows eventual comparisons between democratic and non democratic regimes, useful for countries in the global south and western countries. The dashboard allows us to assess the key features that determine the governance model for artificial intelligence at the national level, for local governments and for other participant actors. The dashboard (...) allows us to appraise aims of AI strategy and aims left aside in alternative strategies. The work shows the theoretical framework could be of use to advance case studies globally, and comparative endeavors. Applying the theoretical dashboard, the case study on China is undertaken. These are the main points the study tackles in the final discussion, conclusion and further recommendations: 1) the complex reality of AI command and control 2) uncertainties about future society and the polity against AI development and 3) particular cultural values enshrined in countries' AI development. (shrink)

In this paper I consider Althusser's concept of 'overdetermination' as a variation on the theme of a Spinozist physics of modes that attempts to incorporate the Marxist problematic of social antagonism.

This work stresses the importance of AI accountability to citizens and explores how a fourth independent government branch/institutions could be endowed to ensure that algorithms in today´s democracies convene to the principles of Constitutions. The purpose of this fourth branch of government in modern democracies could be to enshrine accountability of artificial intelligence development, including software-enabled technologies, and the implementation of policies based on big data within a wider democratic regime context. The work draws on Philosophy of Science, Political Theory (...) (Ethics and Ideas), as well as concepts derived from the study of democracy (responsibility and accountability) to make a theoretical analysis of what artificial intelligence (AI) means for the governance of society and what are the limitations of such type of AI governance. The discussion shows that human ideas, as cement of societies, make it problematic to enshrine governance of artificial intelligence into the world of devices. In ethical grounds, the work stresses an existing trade off between greater and faster advancement of technology, or innovation on the one hand, and human well being on the oher, where the later is not automatically guaranteed by default. This trade off is yet unresolved. The work contends that features of AI offer an opportunity to revise government priorities from a multilevel perspective, from the local to the upper levels. artificial intelligence, accountability, democracy, regulation, philosophy of science, ethics, political theory . (shrink)

As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called µ-additivity. We find that µ-additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, anonymity and continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by Neill (1982).

This review article provides a new perspective on the ethics of green nudging. We advance a new model for assessing the ethical permissibility of green nudges (GNs). On this model, which provides normative guidance for policymakers, a GN is ethically permissible when the intervention is (1) efficacious, (2) cost-effective, and (3) the advantages of the GN (i.e. reducing the environmental harm) are not outweighed by countervailing costs/harms (i.e. for nudgees). While traditional ethical objections to nudges (paternalism, etc.) remain potential normative (...) costs associated with GNs, any such costs must be weighed against the injunction to reduce environmental harm to third parties. (shrink)

The members of the International Network for the Analysis of Intergenerational Relations (Generationes) proudly present the most recent issue of the jointly produced compendium “Generations, Intergenerational Relations and Generational Policy”. This new version includes seven languages (English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Polish (New) and Portuguese (New)). Its layout is designed for using it to translate the specific concepts and terminology of research into generations and intergenerational relations from one language into another.

The members of the International Network for the Analysis of Intergenerational Relations (Generationes) proudly present the most recent issue of the jointly produced compendium “Generations, Intergenerational Relations and Generational Policy”. This new version includes seven languages (English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Polish (New) and Portuguese (New)). Its layout is designed for using it to translate the specific concepts and terminology of research into generations and intergenerational relations from one language into another. -/- .

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 17 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2017, 428pp. TS - BibTeX M4 - Citavi.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

The Protein Ontology provides terms for and supports annotation of species-specific protein complexes in an ontology framework that relates them both to their components and to species-independent families of complexes. Comprehensive curation of experimentally known forms and annotations thereof is expected to expose discrepancies, differences, and gaps in our knowledge. We have annotated the early events of innate immune signaling mediated by Toll-Like Receptor 3 and 4 complexes in human, mouse, and chicken. The resulting ontology and annotation data set has (...) allowed us to identify species-specific gaps in experimental data and possible functional differences between species, and to employ inferred structural and functional relationships to suggest plausible resolutions of these discrepancies and gaps. (shrink)

O presente artigo incide sobre o conceito de expressão no âmbito do pensamento leibniziano, pretendendo, a partir da sua análise, expor a crítica que Fernando Gil lhe tece, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à ideia de “causalidade expressiva”. Passando por vários conceitos leibnizianos como “substância simples”, “força”, “apetição” ou “entre-expressão”, o que se pretende analisar é a reflexão de Fernando Gil relativamente àquilo que o autor considera “a aporia da expressão leibniziana”, e, ainda, a sua reabilitação da inteligibilidade expressiva como (...) pensamento do contínuo, onde inteligibilidade, beleza e simplicidade se implicam mutuamente. (shrink)

The concept of expression has always held an important place in Fernando Gil’s thought. The author’s reflection on the idea of expression is well reflected among his writings – either in his early essays or throughout his entire work –, attaining a special focus in the lectures that he gave at Johns Hopkins University during the years of 2002, 2003 and 2004. Actually, these lectures represent the strongest testimony of the relevancy given by Fernando Gil to this concept. However, despite (...) being a concept which crosses all his work, clearly having a central place in his thought, Fernando Gil never got to write a systematic theory on the concept of expression. Thus, closely following the author’s works, the main purpose of this study is to suggest a personal vision of what could have been Fernando Gil’s theory on expression. Combining some of the main ideas of Johns Hopkins lectures to some fundamental notions of Fernando Gil’s thought, we will try to show that Fernando Gil’s theory on expression is a theory on the ordination of thought, on cognitive construction and, above all, a theory on the elevation of thought to what shall be considered its higher modality, the aesthetical thought. In fact, our major hypothesis is that Fernando Gil’s theory on expression is not only a cognitive theory but also an aesthetical one. As such, its major guidelines shall be: to explain the adequacy of expression to its objects; to show how expression evolves according to the cognitive development of the subject; and, finally, to explain and to justify the elevation of thought to universality, harmony and beauty. (shrink)

Francisco Gil-White argues that the ubiquity of racialism—the view that so-called races have biological essences—can be explained as a by-product of a shared mental module dedicated to ethnic cognition. Gil-White’s theory has been endorsed, with some revisions, by Edouard Machery and Luc Faucher. In this skeptical response I argue that our developmental environments contain a wealth, rather than a poverty of racialist stimulus, rendering a nativist explanation of racialism redundant. I also argue that we should not theorize racialism in isolation (...) from racism, as value judgments may play a role in essentialist thinking about the ‘other’. (shrink)