- The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.details
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Consequentialism and Free Will.Maria Svedberg & Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2017 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 24:23-41.details
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Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for Libertarians.Neil Levy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.details
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Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.details
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Luck’s Extended Reach.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):191-218.details
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Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-582.details
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Rescuing PAP from Widerker's Brain-Malfunction Case.Greg Janzen - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (2):1-22.details
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Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):312-332.details
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Engaging with Pike: God, Freedom, and Time.John Martin Fischer, Patrick Todd & Neal Tognazzini - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):247-270.details
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Farewell to direct source incompatibilism.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):36 - 49.details
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Indeterminist free will.Storrs McCall & E. J. Lowe - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):681–690.details
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Trying and the arguments from total failure.Thor Grünbaum - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (1):67-86.details
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A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.details
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Causalisms Reconsidered.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):147-.details
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Omnirationality.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (1):1-21.details
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Timothy O'Connor, persons and causes (oxford: Oxford university press, 2000).Eric Hiddleston - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):541–556.details
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Actions, Reasons, and Intentions: Overcoming Davidson's Ontological Prejudice.John Michael McGuire - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (3):459-479.details
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Do Compatibilists Need Alternative Possibilities?Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):1085-1095.details
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Reasons Explanation and Agent Control.John Ross Churchill - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):241-253.details
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Intentional single and joint action.Raimo Tuomela - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (3):235 - 262.details
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Is conscious will an illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):58-70.details
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Framing Event Variables.Paul M. Pietroski - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):31-60.details
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Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.details
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Actual Causes and Free Will.Carolina Sartorio - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):147-165.details
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Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Fixity of the Past.John Martin Fischer - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):461-474.details
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The Problem of Luck and the Contradictory Nature of Moral Responsibility in the Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Aleksandr S. Mishura - 2019 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62 (10):102-120.details
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From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism.Pedro Merlussi - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (3):86-107.details
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Incompatibilism and ambiguity in the practical modalities.T. Kapitan - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):102-110.details
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The standard argument for blame incompatibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):697-726.details
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Comments on Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency – Discussion.Carl Ginet - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):261-272.details
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Reply: The free will revolution.John Martin Fischer - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):145 – 156.details
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Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refutation of the Consequence Argument.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):426-433.details
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Individualism and the metaphysics of actions.Matias Bulnes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):113-132.details
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Helping It.H. C. Steward - unknowndetails
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A Critique of Carl Ginet's Intrinsic Theory of Volition.Beverly K. Hinton - 2001 - Behavior and Philosophy 29:101 - 120.details
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Normative Functionalism about Intentional Action.Chauncey Maher - 2012 - Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.details
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