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  1. (1 other version)Difference-making conditionals and the relevant Ramsey test.Hans Rott - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (1):133-164.
    This article explores conditionals expressing that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. A ‘relevantised’ version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed in the context of the classical theory of belief revision. The idea of this test is that the antecedent is relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is accepted just in case the consequent is accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent and the consequent fails to be accepted if (...)
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  • Using conceptual spaces to model the dynamics of empirical theories.Peter Gärdenfors & Frank Zenker - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 137--153.
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  • An Expressivist Analysis of the Indicative Conditional with a Restrictor Semantics.John Cantwell - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic 14 (2):487-530.
    A globally expressivist analysis of the indicative conditional based on the Ramsey Test is presented. The analysis is a form of ‘global’ expressivism in that it supplies acceptance and rejection conditions for all the sentence forming connectives of propositional logic (negation, disjunction, etc.) and so allows the conditional to embed in arbitrarily complex sentences (thus avoiding the Frege–Geach problem). The expressivist framework is semantically characterized in a restrictor semantics due to Vann McGee, and is completely axiomatized in a logic dubbed (...)
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  • Abductive belief revision in science.Gerhard Schurz - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 77--104.
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  • A Structuralist Framework for the Logic of Theory Change.Sebastian Enqvist - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 105--135.
    Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be (...)
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  • Changing minds about climate change: Belief revision, coherence, and emotion.Paul Thagard & Scott Findlay - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 329--345.
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  • A Kripke-Lewis semantics for belief update and belief revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2025 - Artificial Intelligence 339 (C):104259.
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  • AGM Theory and Artificial Intelligence.Raúl Carnota & Ricardo Rodríguez - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 1--42.
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  • A Note on Theory Change and Belief Revision.Bengt Hansson - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 155--162.
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  • Idealizations, intertheory explanations and conditionals.Hans Rott - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 59–75.
    Drawing inspiration from Lakatos’s philosophy of science, the paper presents a notion of intertheory explanation that is suitable to explain, from the point of view of a successor theory, its predecessor theory’s success (where it is successful) as well as the latter’s failure (where it fails) at the same time. A variation of the Ramsey-test is used, together with a standard AGM belief revision model, to give a semantics for open and counterfactual conditionals and ’because’-sentences featuring in such intertheory explanations. (...)
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  • Knowledge as True Belief.Isaac Levi - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 269--302.
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  • Rationality in Flux–Formal Representations of Methodological Change.Jonas Nilsson & Sten Lindström - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 347--356.
    A central aim for philosophers of science has been to understand scientific theory change, or more specifically the rationality of theory change. Philosophers and historians of science have suggested that not only theories but also scientific methods and standards of rational inquiry have changed through the history of science. The topic here is methodological change, and what kind of theory of rational methodological change is appropriate. The modest ambition of this paper is to discuss in what ways results in formal (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Best of All Possible Worlds.Emmanuel J. Genot - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 225--252.
    Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision representation of an epistemic state is defective. In order to adequately model an epistemic state one needs, in addition to a belief set K and an entrenchment relation E, a research agenda A, i.e. a set of questions satisfying certain corpus-relative preconditions the agent would like to have answers to. Informally, the preconditions guarantee that the set of potential answers represent a partition of possible expansions of (...)
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  • Theorem proving for conditional logics: CondLean and GOALD U CK.Nicola Olivetti & Gian Luca Pozzato - 2008 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 18 (4):427-473.
    In this paper we focus on theorem proving for conditional logics. First, we give a detailed description of CondLean, a theorem prover for some standard conditional logics. CondLean is a SICStus Prolog implementation of some labeled sequent calculi for conditional logics recently introduced. It is inspired to the so called “lean” methodology, even if it does not fit this style in a rigorous manner. CondLean also comprises a graphical interface written in Java. Furthermore, we introduce a goal-directed proof search mechanism, (...)
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  • Functional vs. Relational Approaches to Belief Revision.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 253--268.
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  • Reasoning About Belief Revision.Caroline Semmling & Heinrich Wansing - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 303--328.
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  • Rational Belief Changes for Collective Agents.David Westlund - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist, Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 213--224.
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