Biometric technologies are at the forefront of organizational innovation, surveillance, and control. In many instances, the use of physiological and behavioral biometrics enhances individual and organizational performance. However, they also have the potential to hinder human wellbeing. In particular, recent generations of biometrics are capable of extracting deeper insights into human behavior, enabling organizational surveillance practices, but may also constrain individual rights and freedoms. While biometric technologies have been evidenced to infringe upon privacy and lead to discriminatory practices, little research (...) has examined the impact of biometrics on dignity, an important ethical construct related to human wellbeing. In this conceptual paper, we draw from the theory of affordances to identify and delineate six affordances of biometric technologies, categorized into inhibiting and augmenting biometric affordances. We propose a framework in which inhibiting and augmenting biometric affordances may simultaneously support and humiliate dignity. This separation offers a theoretical base for future empirical research to explore the increasingly pervasive relationship between biometric adoption and human dignity. Moreover, we explain six paradoxical tensions across three forms of dignity—inherent, behavioral, and meritocratic—in the proposed framework. Finally, we discuss why firms should be responsible for addressing the tensions across dignity forms when they adopt biometric technologies to balance the trade-off between wealth creation and human wellbeing. This offers guidance for practitioners on how to integrate biometric technologies without hindering human dignity. (shrink)

Automation is inherently tied to ethical challenges because of its potential involvement in morally loaded decisions. In the present research, participants (n = 34) took part in a moral multi-trial dilemma-based task where the agent (human vs. machine) and the behavior (action vs. inaction) factors were randomized. Self-report measures, in terms of morality, consciousness, responsibility, intentionality, and emotional impact evaluation were gathered, together with electroencephalography (delta, theta, beta, upper and lower alpha, and gamma powers) and peripheral autonomic (electrodermal activity, heart (...) rate variability) data. Data showed that moral schemata vary as a function of the involved decider, and when the agent and behavior factors are crossed. Subjects did not consider machines full moral deciders to the same degree as humans and tend to morally better accept human active behavior and machine inaction. Moreover, the autonomic physiological activity might support the a-posteriori moral evaluation. In the evaluation of the agent’s consciousness, a beta ventrolateral prefrontal synchronization was detected for human action and machine inaction, while a generalized gamma synchronization occurred in artificial agent trials while rating the emotional impact of the decider’s behavior. The detected differences might point to a potential explicit and implicit asymmetry in moral reasoning toward artificial and human agents. (shrink)