The argument of Julian Savulescu’s 2001 paper, “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children” is flawed in a number of respects. Savulescu confuses reasons with obligations and equivocates between the claim that parents have some reason to want the best for their children and the more radical claim that they are morally obligated to attempt to produce the best child possible. Savulescu offers a prima facie implausible account of parental obligation, as even the best parents typically fail to (...) do everything they think would be best for their children let alone everything that is in fact best for their children. The profound philosophical difficulties which beset the attempt to formulate a plausible account of the best human life constitute a further independent reason to resile from Savulescu’s conclusion. Savulescu’s argument also requires parents to become complicit with racist and homophobic oppression, which is yet another reason to reject it. Removing the equivocation from Savulescu’s argument allows us to see that the assertion of an obligation to choose the “best child” has much more in common with the “old” eugenics than Savulescu acknowledges. (shrink)

Ever since the publication of Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons, bioethicists have tended to distinguish between two different ways in which reproductive technologies may have implications for the...

The living fetus has become object of study of medicine only recently, i.e., since the 1960s. The development of prenatal testing and diagnosis has allowed couples and pregnant women to be offered tests that are designed to identify serious in utero conditions, that is, conditions that are considered as incurable at the time of diagnosis. The scientific advances in prenatal diagnosis have also given rise to serious ethical reflections. Jonathan Glover makes a major contribution to this reflection by emphasising the (...) importance of taking into account both the direct consequences and the ‘side-effects’ of a particular practice. This paper first discusses Glover’s perspective on the development of prenatal diagnosis, which he developed over the course of several decades, and focuses then on our current context which is characterized by a so-called “non-invasive” prenatal testing and the development of genomics. Using Glover’s approach, which pays particular attention to the effects of a decision, this paper identifies ethical issues that are particular to our time. The paper concludes that prenatal testing, despite being “non-invasive” from a biological point of view, still raises many ethical issues. (shrink)

Some philosophers and disability advocates argue that disability is not bad for you. Rather than treated as a harm, it should be considered and even celebrated as just another manifestation of human diversity. Disability is mere difference. To most of us, these are extraordinary claims. Can they be defended?

The principle of procreative beneficence, first suggested by Julian Savulescu, argues that: If couples have decided to have a child, and selection is possible, then they have a significant moral reason to select the child, of the possible children they could have, whose life is expected, in light of the relevant available information, to go best or at least not worse than any of the others. While the validity of this moral principle has been widely contested, in this paper we (...) move away from these issues and grant, for the sake of argument, that PB is a valid moral principle, and that the justification for PB provided by Savulescu and co-authors is sound. We do this in order to explore the implications and consequences of accepting PB and show that even if we put aside questions about the validity and theoretical foundations of this principle, PB has many interesting, astonishing and highly problematic implications that have not been made explicit in the writing of Savulescu and others who support the notion of an obligation to bring to birth the best child possible :204, 2002). We suggest that these implications should be taken into account when considering both the soundness and strength of PB. (shrink)

This article is written from within the Catholic, and more particularly the Augustinian/Thomist tradition of moral theology. It analyses the response of the Catholic Magisterium to the prospect of germline-genetic engineering (GGE). This is a very new issue and the Church has little definitive teaching on it. The statements of Popes and Vatican congregations or commissions have not settled the key questions. An analysis of theological themes drawn from secular writers points beyond pragmatic safety considerations toward intrinsic ethical limits to (...) GGE. Given the impossibility of identifying would-have-been-created persons who would be “treated” by this intervention, altering the human genome for the sake of future generations cannot be regarded as “therapy.” Further theological considerations suggest that GGE may not be morally permissible, even in the case of identifiable genetic diseases. This is an area where more theological reflection is needed. (shrink)

An objection often is raised against the use of reproductive technology to create "nontraditional families," as in ovum donation for postmenopausal women or postmortem artificial insemination. The objection states that conceiving children in such circumstances is harmful to them because of adverse features of these nontraditional families. A similar objection is raised when parents, through negligence or willful disregard of risks, create children with serious genetic diseases or other developmental handicaps. It is claimed that such reproduction harms the children who (...) are created. In reply to this Harm to the Child Argument, it has been pointed out that the procreative acts that supposedly harm the child are the very acts that create the child. This reply has been developed into an argument that, in most of the types of cases under consideration, creating the child does not harm her. This reply, the No Harm Argument, has been stated in three main ways, and it is one of the most misunderstood arguments in bioethics. This paper examines the main rebuttals that have been made to the No Harm Argument and argues that none of them is successful. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungWie ist die Auswahl zukünftiger Kinder in moralischer Hinsicht zu beurteilen? Der Beitrag untersucht diese Frage auf der Basis eines liberalen Prinzips der reproduktiven Freiheit, welches Handlungsspielräume und Privatsphäre in Fragen der Fortpflanzung verteidigt, wenn nicht gewichtige moralische Gründe aufgezeigt werden können, welche den Handlungen der beteiligten Personen Grenzen setzen. Er beschränkt sich auf die negative Auswahl, d. h. die Auswahl von gesunden Kindern anstelle von zukünftigen Kindern mit Behinderung oder gesundheitlicher Beeinträchtigung. Erörtert werden selektionsbefürwortende Überlegungen, welche das Wohlergehen des (...) zukünftigen Kindes in den Fokus rücken, und zwei grundsätzlich selektionskritische Argumente. Das erste verweist auf parentale Tugenden, welche mit der Auswahl zukünftiger Kinder unvereinbar wären. Bei dem zweiten handelt es sich um den Einwand der Diskriminierung von Menschen mit Behinderung. Das Ergebnis der Diskussion ist, dass es zukünftigen Eltern in den meisten Fällen freisteht, die Entscheidung über die Auswahl ihrer Kinder im Licht ihrer Ziele und Werte zu treffen. (shrink)

The non-identity problem arises when an intervention or behavior changes the identity of those affected. Delaying pregnancy is an example of such a behavior. The problem is whether and in what ways such changes in identity affect moral considerations. While a great deal has been written about the non-identity problem, relatively little has been written about the implications for physicians and how they should understand their duties. We argue that the non-identity problem can make a crucial moral difference in some (...) circumstances, and that it has some interesting implications for when it is or is not right for a physician to refuse to accede to a patient's request. If a physician is asked to provide an intervention (identity preserving) that makes a person worse off, then such harm provides a good reason for the physician to refuse to provide the intervention. However, in cases where different (identity-altering) interventions result in different people having a better or worse life, physicians should normally respect patient choice. (shrink)

According to theories of wrongful life (WL), the imposition upon a child of an existence of poor quality can constitute an act of harming, and a violation of the child’s rights. The idea that there can be WLs may seem intuitively compelling. But, as this paper argues, liberals who commit themselves to WL theories may have to compromise some of their other beliefs. For they will thereby become committed to the claim that some women are under a stringent moral duty (...) to have an abortion: a duty that could, without injustice, at least sometimes be enforced by the state. WL theories in other words imply that some women will lack a right to choose, under which both the decision to abort, and the decision to carry the fetus to term, are protected against interference. The paper exposes a dilemma, then, for liberals who are committed both to (a) the rights of future people not to be subjected to a harmful existence, and (b) the rights of women to refuse an abortion. (shrink)