This book suggests that to know how Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian philosophy could have developed from the work of Kant is to know how they relate to each other. The development from the latter to the former is invoked heuristically as a means of interpretation, rather than a historical process or direct influence of Kant on Wittgenstein. Ritter provides a detailed treatment of transcendentalism, idealism, and the concept of illusion in Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s criticism of metaphysics. Notably, it is through the conceptions (...) of transcendentalism and idealism that Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be viewed as a transformation of Kantianism. This transformation involves a deflationary conception of transcendental idealism along with the abandonment of both the idea that there can be a priori 'conditions of possibility' logically detachable from what they condition, and the appeal to an original ‘constitution’ of experience. -/- The closeness of Kant and post-Tractarian Wittgenstein does not exist between their arguments or the views they upheld, but rather in their affiliation against forms of transcendental realism and empirical idealism. Ritter skilfully challenges several dominant views on the relationship of Kant and Wittgenstein, especially concerning the cogency of Wittgenstein-inspired criticism focusing on the role of language in the first Critique, and Kant's alleged commitment to a representationalist conception of empirical intuition. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is an important continuity between Wittgenstein's early remarks on religion and his later treatment of the theme as it appears in his lectures in the 1930s and in his personal diary notes at that time. This continuity pertains to 3 features. First, the early and later Wittgenstein share a critical stance on methodological naturalism, that is, the view that the method of philosophy is relevantly similar to that of the natural sciences. Importantly, religion figures as (...) one of Wittgenstein's examples of the limits of the factual language of natural sciences. Second, both the early and the later Wittgenstein connect religion to the problem of seeing one's life as meaningful while denying the possibility of establishing any objectively understood meaning of life. Third, both evoke the idea of different types of judgments, the conditions of which are independent of each other. Although religious faith is not grounded in factual knowledge and cannot be justified by appeal to empirical evidence or conceptual argumentation, it is not groundless either. Rather, in accordance with Kant who claims that faith may have a nontheoretical justification, Wittgenstein shows that religious faith may result from a personal experience of one's life as a meaningful whole. (shrink)

This article first surveys the established views on Wittgenstein's relation to analytic philosophy. Next it distinguishes among different ways of defining analytic philosophy—topical, doctrinal, methodological, stylistic, historical, and the idea that it is a family‐resemblance concept. It argues that while certain stylistic features are important, the historical and the family‐resemblance conceptions are the most auspicious, especially in combination. The answer to the title question is given in section 3. Contrary to currently popular “irrationalist” interpretations, Wittgenstein was an analytic philosopher in (...) all phases of his career, albeit an exceedingly exotic one whose style transcends the limits of academic philosophy in general. On the historical understanding he qualifies because he was influenced by and in turn influenced mainly analytic philosophers. On the family‐resemblance conception he qualifies both because he developed and employed logico‐linguistic analysis and because he initiated the linguistic turn and the distinction between philosophy and science that characterizes one important strand in analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Although at present analytic philosophy is practiced mainly in the English-speaking world, it is to a considerable part the invention of German speakers. Its emergence owes much to Russell, Moore, and American Pragmatism, but even more to Frege, Wittgenstein, and the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle. No one would think of analytic philosophy as a specifically Anglophone phenomenon, if the Nazis had not driven many of its pioneers out of central Europe.

One of the most striking features of twentieth-century philosophy has been its obsession with language. For the most part, this phenomenon is greeted with hostile incredulity by external observers. Surely, they say, if philosophy is the profound and fundamental discipline which it has purported to be for more than two millennia, it must deal with something more serious than mere words, namely the things they stand for, and ultimately the essence of reality or of the human mind.

Bu çalışmada Kant’ın ve Wittgenstein’ın felsefeleri metafiziğin olanağı bağlamında karşılaştırılmıştır. Her ikisinin felsefelerinin transcendental olup olmadığı ele alınmış ve metafizik anlayışları ortaya konmuştur. Metafiziğe karşı tutumları benzer olan iki düşünürün metafizik konusunda neden farklı sonuçlara vardıkları sorgulanmıştır. Dolayısıyla burada Kant’ın sentetik apriori önermelerin olanağı ile metafiziğin olanağı arasında kurduğu ilişki ifade edilmelidir. Kant’a göre bilgi olmanın ölçütü sentetik apriori yargıların olanaklı olmasıyla ilişkilidir. Wittgenstein’ın birinci dönemindeki felsefe anlayışında da benzer yönler bulunmaktadır. Bu benzerlik de, burada, onun dil ile dünya arasında (...) kurduğu ilişki bağlamında ortaya konulmuştur. Buna göre düşünülebilir olan ile düşünülebilir olmayan arasında çizdiği sınır dilin sınırlarıyla belirlenmektedir. Ne var ki, dilin sınırlarının dışına ise çıkılamaz. Sonuç olarak Kant’ın ve Wittgenstein’ın felsefeleri transcendental öğeler içermekle birlikte iki düşünürün de, metafiziğin olanağı konusunda farklı düşünceleri vardır. Önemli olan bunun sebebidir. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn 1931 Wittgenstein wrote: ‘the limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing the fact that corresponds to a sentence without simply repeating the sentence’. Here, Wittgenstein claims, ‘we are involved … with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy’. This paper shows how this remark fits with Wittgenstein's early account of the substance of the world, his account of logic, and ultimately his view of philosophy. By contrast to the currently influential resolute reading of the Tractatus, (...) the paper argues that the early Wittgenstein did not aim at destroying the idea of a limit of language, but that the notion lies at the very heart of Wittgenstein's early view. In doing so, the paper employs and defends the Kantian interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy. (shrink)

It is proved that the basic framework of the premises and reasoning of Wittgenstein's “Tractatus Logico-philosophicus” corresponds quite well to the transcendental method (as formulated by H. Cohen). Whereas Kant’s philosophy proceeds from the fact of existence of mathematics and mathematised natural science and investigates their conditions of possibility, Wittgenstein proceeds from the fact that propositions of language describe reality and reveals the conditions of possibility of such descriptions. Kant, answering the question about the conditions of possibility of the named (...) sciences, comes to the idea of the transcendental subject and the distinction between the world of phenomena and the thing in itself. Wittgenstein's investigation of the conditions of possibility that the world is described by propositions leads to the assertion that both the world and language are together in logical space. The latter constitutes the a priori and transcendental condition of the possibility that language “reaches out” to reality. For both the theories - in the “Critique of Pure Reason” and in the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” - the idea of the boundary is important. In the “Critique of Pure Reason” it is the boundary of possible experience and cognition, while in the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” it is the boundary of what can be thought and expressed by meaningful propositions. Related to the different definitions of the boundary is the difference in the treatment of mathematised natural science. For “The Critique of Pure Reason” was created in the era of unconditional acceptance of Newtonian mechanics. And the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” was created at the time of the crisis of the Newtonian paradigm and its replacement by other notions of time and space. However, the idea of boundary, which is present in both doctrines, determines closeness in the attitude towards metaphysics between the author of “The Critique of Pure Reason” and the author of “The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”. The study also shows that Wittgenstein did not follow logicism in his philosophy of mathematics. For him, both mathematical objects and propositions of logic are constructions. The conviction about the constructive character of mathematical and logical objects shows an affinity with the Kantian tradition in the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)