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  1. On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions.Petar Bodlović - 2021 - Argumentation 35 (2):287-320.
    The study of presumptions has intensified in argumentation theory over the last years. Although scholars put forward different accounts, they mostly agree that presumptions can be studied in deliberative and epistemic contexts, have distinct contextual functions, and promote different kinds of goals. Accordingly, there are “practical” and “cognitive” presumptions. In this paper, I show that the differences between practical and cognitive presumptions go far beyond contextual considerations. The central aim is to explore Nicholas Rescher’s contention that both types of presumptions (...)
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  • Illocution and accommodation in the functioning of presumptions.Maciej Witek - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6207-6244.
    In this paper, I develop a speech-act based account of presumptions. Using a score-keeping model of illocutionary games, I argue that presumptions construed as speech acts can be grouped into three illocutionary act types defined by reference to how they affect the state of a conversation. The paper is organized into two parts. In the first one, I present the score-keeping model of speech act dynamics; in particular, I distinguish between two types of mechanisms—the direct mechanism of illocution and the (...)
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  • Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance.Petar Bodlović - 2019 - Argumentation 33 (4):579-604.
    By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. (...)
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  • Rethinking the Presumption of Atheism.Keith Burgess-Jackson - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (1):93-111.
    Is there—or rather, ought there to be—a presumption of atheism, as Antony Flew so famously argued nearly half a century ago? It is time to revisit this issue. After clarifying the concept of a presumption of atheism, I take up the evaluative question of whether there ought to be a presumption of atheism, focusing on Flew’s arguments for an affirmative answer. I conclude that Flew’s arguments, one of which rests on an analogy with the presumption of innocence, fail.
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  • Argumentation Theory Without Presumptions.Marcin Lewiński - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):591-613.
    In their extensive overview of various concepts of presumption Godden and Walton recognise “the heterogeneous picture of presumptions that exists in argumentation theory today”. I argue that this heterogeneity results from an epiphenomenal character of the notion of presumption. To this end, I first distinguish between three main classes of presumptions. Framework presumptions define the basic conditions of linguistic understanding and meaningful conversation. The “presumption of veracity” is their paradigm case. I argue that such presumptions are satisfactorily covered by the (...)
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  • Presumptions, Assumptions, and Presuppositions of Ordinary Arguments.Gilbert Plumer - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):469-484.
    Although in some contexts the notions of an ordinary argument’s presumption, assumption, and presupposition appear to merge into the one concept of an implicit premise, there are important differences between these three notions. It is argued that assumption and presupposition, but not presumption, are basic logical notions. A presupposition of an argument is best understood as pertaining to a propositional element (a premise or the conclusion) e of the argument, such that the presupposition is a necessary condition for the truth (...)
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  • Trust, Relevance, and Arguments.Fabio Paglieri & Cristiano Castelfranchi - 2014 - Argument and Computation 5 (2-3):216-236.
    This paper outlines an integrated approach to trust and relevance with respect to arguments: in particular, it is suggested that trust in relevance has a central role in argumentation. We first distinguish two types of argumentative relevance: internal relevance, i.e. the extent to which a premise has a bearing on its purported conclusion, and external relevance, i.e. a measure of how much a whole argument is pertinent to the matter under discussion, in the broader dialogical context where it is proposed. (...)
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  • Missing, Presumed Not Dead.Samuel Lebens - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (3):1043-1050.
    In this paper, I argue that if we have reason to believe that an immaterial soul exists, then it should be presumed to be immortal. The conclusion is weaker than Socrates’ conclusion that immaterial souls must be immortal, but the argument is stronger, I claim, for having this weaker conclusion. Moreover, a presumption of immortality is significant in its own right.
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  • Presumptions in Legal Argumentation.Douglas Walton Fabrizio Macagno - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (3):271-300.
    In this paper a theoretical definition that helps to explain how the logical structure of legal presumptions is constructed by applying the Carneades model of argumentation developed in artificial intelligence. Using this model, it is shown how presumptions work as devices used in evidentiary reasoning in law in the event of a lack of evidence to assist a chain of reasoning to move forward to prove or disprove a claim. It is shown how presumptions work as practical devices that may (...)
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  • Presumptions in Legal Argumentation.Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (3):271-300.
    In this paper a theoretical definition that helps to explain how the logical structure of legal presumptions is constructed by applying the Carneades model of argumentation developed in artificial intelligence. Using this model, it is shown how presumptions work as devices used in evidentiary reasoning in law in the event of a lack of evidence to assist a chain of reasoning to move forward to prove or disprove a claim. It is shown how presumptions work as practical devices that may (...)
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  • The Nature and the Place of Presumptions in Law and Legal Argumentation.Raymundo Gama - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):555-572.
    This paper explores two persistent questions in the literature on presumptions: the place and the nature of presumptions in law and legal argumentation. These questions were originally raised by James Bradley Thayer, one of the masters of the Law of Evidence and the author of the classic chapter devoted this subject in A preliminary treatise on Evidence. Like Thayer, I believe that these questions deserve attention. First the paper shows that the connection between presumptions and argumentation is a constant feature (...)
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  • Dialogical Features of Presumptions: Difficulties for Walton’s New Dialogical Theory.Petar Bodlović - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):513-534.
    According to Douglas Walton, the concept of presumption relates to both logical and dialogical components. Logically, a presumption is the conclusion of a presumptive defeasible inference. Dialogically, the function of a presumptions to shift the burden of proof to the respondent in order to move the dialogue forward when the proponent, due to an objective lack of evidence, cannot present a sufficiently persuasive proposition. Presumptive status, assigned only at the argumentation stage of dialogue, is provisional: a particular presumption stands until (...)
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  • Introduction for a Special Volume of Argumentation on Presumptions, Presumptive Inferences and Burdens of Proof.Cristina Corredor & Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):463-467.
    From 26th to 28th of April 2016, it took place in the University of Granada a conference on presumptions, presumptive inferences and burdens of proof that, joint with other ongoing initiatives, has contributed to renew the interest of the argumentation community in analysing these notions and the relationships between them. This special volume of Argumentation consists of a selection of papers presented at this conference.
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  • Presumptions in Speech Acts.Cristina Corredor - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):573-589.
    The aim of this paper is to explore the viability of accounting for presumptions as a subtype of verdictives, within the framework of the Austinian approach to speech acts. The available set of felicity conditions is examined and worked out, in order to try and account in particular for a main feature of presumptions, namely, their function in shifting the burden of proof. In order to extend the Austinian framework as required, the notion of pragmatic presupposition accommodation is shown to (...)
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  • Presumption as a Modal Qualifier: Presumption, Inference, and Managing Epistemic Risk.David Godden - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):485-511.
    Standards and norms for reasoning function, in part, to manage epistemic risk. Properly used, modal qualifiers like presumably have a role in systematically managing epistemic risk by flagging and tracking type-specific epistemic merits and risks of the claims they modify. Yet, argumentation-theoretic accounts of presumption often define it in terms of modalities of other kinds, thereby failing to recognize the unique risk profile of each. This paper offers a stipulative account of presumption, inspired by Ullmann-Margalit, as an inferentially generated modal (...)
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  • Recognizing Argument Types and Adding Missing Reasons.Christoph Lumer - 2019 - In Bart J. Garssen, David Godden, Gordon Mitchell & Jean Wagemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). [Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2018.]. Amsterdam (Netherlands): pp. 769-777.
    The article develops and justifies, on the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory, two central pieces of the theory of evaluative argumentation interpretation: 1. criteria for recognizing argument types and 2. rules for adding reasons to create ideal arguments. Ad 1: The criteria for identifying argument types are a selection of essential elements from the definitions of the respective argument types. Ad 2: After presenting the general principles for adding reasons (benevolence, authenticity, immanence, optimization), heuristics are proposed for finding missing (...)
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  • Burdens of Proof and the Case for Unevenness.Imran Aijaz, Jonathan McKeown-Green & Aness Webster - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (3):259-282.
    How is the burden of proof to be distributed among individuals who are involved in resolving a particular issue? Under what conditions should the burden of proof be distributed unevenly? We distinguish attitudinal from dialectical burdens and argue that these questions should be answered differently, depending on which is in play. One has an attitudinal burden with respect to some proposition when one is required to possess sufficient evidence for it. One has a dialectical burden with respect to some proposition (...)
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  • On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations.Petar Bodlović - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (2):255-294.
    On the standard view, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. But what, exactly, does this function amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the most general burden of reasoning on their opponents? In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and argue that the standard accounts of deontic function are at least ambiguous, and likely implausible. (...)
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  • Analogical Reasoning in Public Health.Louise Cummings - 2014 - Journal of Argumentation in Context 3 (2):169-197.
    Analogical reasoning is a valuable logical resource in a public health context. It is used extensively by public health scientists in risk assessments of new technologies, environmental hazards and infectious diseases. For its part, the public also avails of analogical reasoning when it assesses a range of public health problems. In this article, some of these uses of analogical reasoning in public health are examined. Analogical arguments have courted approval and disapproval in roughly equal measure by a long succession of (...)
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  • Presuming and Presumption in Everyday Argumentation: A Response to Godden and Walton.Fred J. Kauffeld - unknown
    In response to critique by Godden and Walton, this essay delineates the role of moral motivation in the commitment structure of ordinary presumptive inferences. It defends the capacity of ordinary presumptions to support discursive structures within which everyday argumentation can address defeasible claims and enable alignments and realignments in probative obligations, i.e., burdens of proof.
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  • The Epistemic Relevance of Social Considerations in Ordinary Day-to-Day Presumptions.Fred J. Kauffeld - unknown
    The involvement of social considerations in our ordinary conception of presumption and corresponding plain practice of presuming things raises doubts as to whether they afford epistemically satisfying bases for rational argumentation. To some this involvement illuminates important modes of discursive inquiry; to others it points to the need for theoretically based reform or regulation of our ordinary practices. This paper attempts to clarify and defend the epistemic value of ordinary presumptions.
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  • A Bibliography of Douglas Walton's Published Works, 1971-2007.Douglas Walton - 2007 - Informal Logic 27 (1):135-147.
    A Bibliography of Douglas Walton’s Published Works, 1971-20.
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  • Presumptions in Argument: Epistemic Versus Social Approaches.David Godden & Harvey Siegel - unknown
    This paper responds to Kauffeld’s 2009 OSSA paper, considering the adequacy of his “commitment-based” approach to “ordinary presumptive practices” to sup-ply an account of presumption fit for general application in normative theories of argument. The central issue here is whether socially-grounded presumptions are defeasible in the right sorts of ways so as to pro-duce “truth-tropic” presumptive inferences.
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  • Being a Correct Presumption Vs. Being Presumably the Case.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2016 - Informal Logic 36 (1):1-25.
    I argue for the distinction between presuming that p and maintaining that presumably p. In order to make sense of this distinction, I defend a non-inferentialist conception of presumptions and offer an account of the correctness conditions for both presumptions and presumptive inferences. I characterize presumptions as a type of constative speech-act having certain semantic correctness conditions. In turn, regarding presumptive inferences, my strategy is to provide the correctness conditions for the use of an epistemic modal such as “presumably.” This (...)
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  • Commentary on Kauffeld.Douglas Walton - unknown
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  • Rhetorical Figures as Argument Schemes – The Proleptic Suite.Ashley Rose Mehlenbacher - 2017 - Argument and Computation 8 (3):233-252.
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  • Assessing Presumptions in Argumentation: Being a Sound Presumption Vs. Being Presumably the Case.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - unknown
    This paper is an attempt to identify and provide the normative conditions for presumptions and for presumptive inferences. Basically, the idea is adopting the distinction between epistemic and ontological qualifiers proposed in Bermejo-Luque in order to explain the difference between something being a correct presumption and something being presumably the case.
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