This article argues that Ludwik Fleck’s understanding of scientific observation as a social and cultural process stemmed not only from his practical experience as a bacteriologist and serologist, but also from a confrontation with ideas developed by other Polish thinkers. It discusses ideas of three such thinkers: the ophthalmologist and philosopher of medicine Zygmunt Kramsztyk, the mathematician and painter Leon Chwistek, and the playwright, painter and photographer Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz. Kramsztyk was interested in the way the observer’s preconceived idea shaped (...) observations through selection of specific visual elements and the rejection of others. Chwistek developed a theory of ‘multiple realities’ which proposed several divergent and equally valid patterns of grasping reality. In his plays, photographs, drawings and paintings Witkiewicz experimented restlessly with destabilization and transformation of the notion of a stable external reality. It links, then, debates on ‘reality’ in Poland between 1900 and 1939 to intersections of ideas derived from modern physics, psychology of perception, and avant-garde art.Keywords: Ludwik Fleck; Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz ; Leon Chwistek; Poland; Perception; Avant-garde art. (shrink)

I explore heterogeneous constructionism, my term for the perspective that science in the making is a process of agents building by combining a diversity of components. Issues addressed include causality and explanation; transcending both realism and relativism; scientists as acting, intervening, and imaginative agents; explanations that span many levels of social practice; counterfactuals in the analysis of causal claims; and practical reflexivity. An analogy from research on the social origins of depression and a sketch from my own experience in socioeconomic (...) modeling are used to motivate and render more concrete the form of heterogeneous constructionism I am advocating. (shrink)

This article sheds new light on Bruno Latour’s sociology of science and technology by looking at his early study of the French writer, philosopher and editor Charles Péguy (1873–1914). In the early 1970s, Latour engaged in a comparative study of Péguy’s Clio and the four gospels of the New Testament. His 1973 contribution to a Péguy colloquium (published in 1977) offers rich insights into his interest in questions of time, history, tradition and translation. Inspired by Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, (...) Latour reads Clio as spelling out and illustrating the following argument: ‘Repetition is a machine to produce differences with identity’. However, in contrast to Deleuze’s work (together with Félix Guattari) on the materiality of machines, or assemblages [agencements], Latour emphasizes the semiotic aspects of the repetition/difference process. As in Péguy, the main model for this process is the Roman Catholic tradition of religious events. The article argues that it is this reading of Péguy and Latour’s early interest in biblical exegesis that inspired much of Latour’s later work. In Laboratory Life (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) and The Pasteurization of France (1988) in particular, problems of exegesis and tradition provide important stimuli for the analysis of scientific texts. In this context, Latour gradually transforms the question of tradition into the problem of reference. In a first step, he shifts the event that is transmitted and translated from the temporal dimension (i.e. the past) to the spatial (i.e. from one part of the laboratory to another). It is only in a second step that Latour resituates scientific events in time. As facts they are ‘constructed’ but nevertheless ‘irreducible’. They result, according to Latour, from the tradition of the future. As a consequence, the Latourian approach to science distances itself from the materialism of Deleuze and other innovative theoreticians. (shrink)

Ludwik Fleck is known mainly for his pioneering studies of science as a social activity. This text investigates a different aspect of Fleck’s epistemological thought—his engagement with normative aspects of medicine and public health and their political underpinnings. In his sinuous professional trajectory, Fleck navigated between two distinct thought styles: fundamental microbiological research and practice-oriented investigations of infectious diseases. Fleck’s awareness of tensions between these two approaches favored the genesis of his theoretical reflections. At the same time, his close observation (...) of medical and epidemiological practices led him to the conclusion that collectively produced scientific facts are situated and fragile. Thought collectives, Fleck explained, can err or yield to external pressures, with potentially disastrous consequences. While Fleck the reflexive experimental scientist has been creatively translated into the science studies idiom, Fleck the reflexive practical microbiologist and public health expert still awaits inspired translation. (shrink)

During the first two decades of the Cold War, a new kind of academic figure became prominent in American public life: the credentialed social scientist or expert in the sciences of administration who was also, to use the parlance of the time, a “man of affairs.” Some were academic high-fliers conscripted into government roles in which their intellectual and organizational talents could be exploited. McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, and Robert McNamara are the archetypes of such persons. An overlapping group of (...) scholars became policymakers and political advisers on issues ranging from social welfare provision to nation-building in emerging postcolonial states. Many of these men—and almost without exception they were men—were also consummate operators within the patronage system that grew up around American universities after World War II. Postwar leaders of the social and administrative sciences such as Talcott Parsons and Herbert Simon were skilled scientific brokers of just this sort: good “committee men,” grant-getters, proponents of interdisciplinary inquiry, and institution-builders. This hard-nosed, suit-wearing, business-like persona was connected to new, technologically refined forms of social science. No longer sage-like social philosophers or hardscrabble, number-crunching empiricists, academic human scientists portrayed themselves as possessors of tools and programs designed for precision social engineering. Antediluvian “social science” was eschewed in favour of mathematical, behavioural, and systems-based approaches to “human relations” such as operations research, behavioral science, game theory, systems theory, and cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the role of regulation in the shaping new scientific facts. Fleck chose to study the origins of a diagnostic test for a disease seen as a major public health problem, that is, a ‘scientific fact’ that had a direct and immediate influence outside the closed universe of fundamental scientific research. In 1935, when Fleck wrote his book, Genesis and development of a scientific fact, he believed that the tumultuous early history of the Wassermann reaction had come (...) to an end, and that this reaction was successfully stabilized through the standardization of laboratory practices and thanks to the rise of a specific professional segment—the serologists. He could not have predicted that in the 15 years that followed the publication of his book, regulatory measures—barely metioned in his historical narrative—would play a key role in the destabilization of the original meaning of this reaction. The introduction of mass screening for syphilis—mainly via legislation that introduced obligatory premarital tests and promoted the testing of pregnant women—weakened in fine the link between Wassermann serology and infection by the etiological agent of syphilis, the bacterium Treponema pallidum. Fleck elected to study the Wassermann reaction because of its novelty, its complexity, and because it became the focus of a controversy regarding its origins. However, the Wassermann reaction was also one the first examples of a medical technology regulated by the state and incorporated into legal dispositions. It may therefore be seen as an exemplary case of the close intertwining of scientific investigations, their practical applications and regulatory practices. (shrink)

The new field of the history of knowledge is often presented as a mere expansion of the history of science. We argue that it has a greater ambition. The re‐definition of the historiographical domain of the history of knowledge urges us to ask new questions about the boundaries, hierarchies, and mutual constitution of different types of knowledge as well as the role and assessment of failure and ignorance in making knowledge. These issues have pertinence in the current climate where expertise (...) is increasingly questioned and authority seems to lose its ground. Illustrated with examples from recent historiography of the sixteenth to twentieth centuries, we indicate some fruitful new avenues for research in the history of knowledge. Taken together, we hope that they will show that the history of knowledge could build the expertise required by the challenges of twenty‐first century knowledge societies, just like the history of science, throughout its development as a discipline in the twentieth century, responded to the demands posed by science and society. (shrink)