At the most general level, the concept of finitism is typically characterized by saying that finitistic mathematics is that part of mathematics which does not appeal to completed infinite totalities and is endowed with some epistemological property that makes it secure or privileged. This paper argues that this characterization can in fact be sharpened in various ways, giving rise to different conceptions of finitism. The paper investigates these conceptions and shows that they sanction different portions of mathematics as finitistic.

Prolegomena It is fitting to begin this book on intuitionistic type theory by putting the subject matter into perspective. The purpose of this chapter is to ...

The technical contribution of this paper is threefold.First we show how to encode functionals in a ‘flat’ applicative structure by adding oracles to untyped λ-calculus and mimicking the applicative behaviour of the functionals with an impredicatively defined reduction relation. The main achievement here is a Church-Rosser result for the extended reduction relation.Second, by combining the previous result with the model construction based on partial equivalence relations, we show how to extend a λ-closed simple type structure to a model of the (...) polymorphic λ-calculus.Third, we specialize the previous result to a counter model against a simple minimization. This minimization is realized by a bar recursive functional, which contrasts the results of Spector and Girard which imply that the bar recursive functions are exactly those that are definable in the polymorphic λ-calculus. As a spin-off, we obtain directly the non-conservativity of the extensions of Gödel's T with bar recursion, fan functional, and Luckhardt's minimization functional, respectively. For the latter two extensions these results are new. (shrink)

An approach to constructing counterparts of some fields of mathematical analysis in the frames of Pilbert's “finitary standpoint” is sketched in this paper. This approach is based on certain results of functional spaces theory development in classical mathematics.

In this paper, elementary but hitherto overlooked connections are established between Wittgenstein's remarks on mathematics, written during his transitional period, and free-variable finitism. After giving a brief description of theTractatus Logico-Philosophicus on quantifiers and generality, I present in the first section Wittgenstein's rejection of quantification theory and his account of general arithmetical propositions, to use modern jargon, as claims (as opposed to statements). As in Skolem's primitive recursive arithmetic and Goodstein's equational calculus, Wittgenstein represented generality by the use of free (...) variables. This has the effect that negation of unbounded universal and existential propositions cannot be expressed. This is claimed in the second section to be the basis for Wittgenstein's criticism of the universal validity of the law of excluded middle. In the last section, there is a brief discussion of Wittgenstein's remarks on real numbers. These show a preference, in line with finitism, for a recursive version of the continuum. (shrink)

This essay accounts for the notion of _Lebensform_ by assigning it a _logical _role in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Wittgenstein’s additions of the notion to his manuscripts of the _PI_ occurred during the initial drafting of the book 1936-7, after he abandoned his effort to revise _The Brown Book_. It is argued that this constituted a substantive step forward in his attitude toward the notion of simplicity as it figures within the notion of logical analysis. Next, a reconstruction of his later (...) remarks on _Lebensformen_ is offered which factors in his reading of Alan Turing’s “On computable numbers, with an application to the _Entscheidungsproblem_“, as well as his discussions with Turing 1937-1939. An interpretation of the five occurrences of _Lebensform_ in the PI is then given in terms of a logical “regression” to _Lebensform_ as a fundamental notion. This regression characterizes Wittgenstein’s mature answer to the question, “What is the nature of the logical?”. (shrink)

Let be the fragment of elementary Peano arithmetic in which induction is restricted to -formulas. More than three decades ago, Parsons showed that the provably total functions of are exactly the primitive recursive functions. In this paper, we observe that Parsons' result is a consequence of Herbrand's theorem concerning the -consequences of universal theories. We give a self-contained proof requiring only basic knowledge of mathematical logic.