The theory of concepts advanced in the dissertation aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. Traditional accounts in the philosophy of science have usually studied concepts in terms only of their reference; their concern is to establish a stability of reference in order to address the incommensurability problem. My discussion, in contrast, suggests that each scientific concept consists of (...) three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept's use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these three components, and that change in one component—including change of reference—can be accounted for as being rational relative to other components, in particular a concept's epistemic goal.This semantic framework is applied to two cases from the history of biology: the homology concept as used in 19th and 20th century biology, and the gene concept as used in different parts of the 20th century. The homology case study argues that the advent of Darwinian evolutionary theory, despite introducing a new definition of homology, did not bring about a new homology concept (distinct from the pre-Darwinian concept) in the 19th century. Nowadays, however, distinct homology concepts are used in systematics/evolutionary biology, in evolutionary developmental biology, and in molecular biology. The emergence of these different homology concepts is explained as occurring in a rational fashion. The gene case study argues that conceptual progress occurred with the transition from the classical to the molecular gene concept, despite a change in reference. In the last two decades, change occurred internal to the molecular gene concept, so that nowadays this concept's usage and reference varies from context to context. I argue that this situation emerged rationally and that the current variation in usage and reference is conducive to biological practice.The dissertation uses ideas and methodological tools from the philosophy of mind and language, the philosophy of science, the history of science, and the psychology of concepts. (shrink)

The traditional practice of establishing morphological types and investigating morphological organization has found new support from evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo), especially with respect to the notion of body plans. Despite recurring claims that typology is at odds with evolutionary thinking, evo-devo offers mechanistic explanations of the evolutionary origin, transformation, and evolvability of morphological organization. In parallel, philosophers have developed non-essentialist conceptions of natural kinds that permit kinds to exhibit variation and undergo change. This not only facilitates a construal of species (...) and higher taxa as natural kinds, but also broadens our perspective on the diversity of kinds found in biology. There are many different natural kinds relevant to the investigative and explanatory aims of evo-devo, including homologues and developmental modules. (shrink)

Homology is a fundamental concept in biology. However, the metaphysical status of homology, especially whether a homolog is a part of an individual or a member of a natural kind, is still a matter of intense debate. The proponents of the individuality view of homology criticize the natural kind view of homology by pointing out that homologs are subject to evolutionary transformation, and natural kinds do not change in the evolutionary process. Conversely, some proponents of the natural kind view of (...) homology argue that a homolog can be construed both as a part of an individual and a member of a natural kind. They adopt the Homeostatic Property Cluster theory of natural kinds, and the theory seems to strongly support their construal. Note that this construal implies the acceptance of essentialism. However, looking back on the history of the concept of homology, we should not overlook the fact that the individuality view was proposed to reject the essentialist interpretation of homology. Moreover, the essentialist notions of natural kinds can, in our view, mislead biologists about the phenomena of homology. Consequently, we need a non-essentialist view of homology, which we name the “persistently reproducible module” view. This view highlights both the individual-like and kind-like aspects of homologs while stripping down both essentialist and anti-essentialist interpretations of homology. In this article, we articulate the PRM view of homology and explain why it is recommended over the other two views. (shrink)

Current phylogenies show that paired fins and limbs are unique to jawed vertebrates and their immediate ancestry. Such fins evolved first as a single pair extending from an anterior location, and later stabilized as two pairs at pectoral and pelvic levels. Fin number, identity, and position are therefore key issues in vertebrate developmental evolution. Localization of the AP levels at which developmental signals initiate outgrowth from the body wall may be determined by Hox gene expression patterns along the lateral plate (...) mesoderm. This regionalization appears to be regulated independently of that in the paraxial mesoderm and axial skeleton. When combined with current hypotheses of Hox gene phylogenetic and functional diversity, these data suggest a new model of fin/limb developmental evolution. This coordinates body wall regions of outgrowth with primitive boundaries established in the gut, as well as the fundamental nonequivalence of pectoral and pelvic structures. BioEssays 20:371–381, 1998. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons Inc. (shrink)

This paper throws light on the development of experimental zoology in Britain by focusing on the establishment of the British Journal of Experimental Biology and the Society for Experimental Biology in 1923. The key actors in this story were Lancelot T. Hogben, Julian S. Huxley and Francis A.E. Crew, who started exploring the possibility of establishing an experimentally oriented zoological journal in 1922. In order to support the BJEB and further the cause of the experimental approach, Hogben, Crew, Huxley and (...) their colleagues decided to found a society, which led to the formation of the SEB. From its inception the journal was plagued with difficulties that led to the merger of the BJEB and the Biological Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society in the autumn of 1925. Also discussed are the views that the leading proponents of experimental zoology in Britain in the 1920s expressed towards morphology and how their views further complicate the already much modified ‘revolt from morphology’ thesis. (shrink)

This paper examines the middle ear of fossil living animals in terms of the homologies which have been drawn between its parts in different vertebrate groups. Seven homologies are considered: 1, the middle ear cavity/spiracular pouch; 2, the stapes/hyomandibula; 3, the stapedial/hyomandibular processes; 4 the tympanic membrane; 5, the otic notch; 6, the fenestra ovalis; 7, and the stapedial/hyomandibular foramen. The reasons leading to assessments of homology are reviewed. Homologies 1 and 2, based largely on embryological evidence, are fairly robust, (...) though there are arguments about the details. Homologies 3, 4 and 5 stem from ideas about early tetrapod evolution, and were influenced by contingent factors including the order and time of discovery of early fossil taxa, and perceptions of their phylogeny which resulted from this. They were also influenced by ideas of the evolution of terrestriality among tetrapods. Most of the conceptions have been overturned in recent years by new fossil discoveries and new ways of looking at old data. Homology 6 has been little considered. One possible hypothesis, placed in a strictly archetypal theoretical framework has been ignored but deserves consideration on other grounds. Homology 7 depends on how tetrapods are characterised, not a question which has posed difficulties until recently, but which is likely to with the discovery of intermediate fossil forms. (shrink)

In gonad‐bearing animals gametogenesis can be divided into three main phases. During embryonic development the primordial gem cells move towards the gonadal primordia. A long, intra‐gonadal phase follows during which the germ cells grow and differentiate. Mature germ cells are finally released from the gonads and brought to the exterior. Thus, germ cells are successively motile, non‐motile and motile again. This complex life history is given here a simple evolutionary interpretation. The basic assumption is that primitive Metazoa already had germ (...) cells, but no gonads to harbour them. Higher animals acquired gonads, which sequestered the germ cells, thus creating the temporary confinement experienced by germ cells in most present‐day Metazoa. This evolutionalry scheme may explain why several steps of germ cell differentation are totally or partially independent of the gonads. These steps presumably existed in primitive, gonad‐free Metazoa, and conserved their autonomy in higher animals. (shrink)

Many recent gene knockout experiments cause anatomical changes to the jaw region of mice that several investigators claim are evolutionary reversals. Here we evaluate these mutant phenotypes and the assertions of atavism. We argue that following the knockout of Hoxa-2, Dlx-2, MHox, Otx2, and RAR genes, ectopic cartilages arise as secondary consequences of disruptions in normal processes of cell specification, migration, or differentiation. These disruptions cause an excess of mesenchyme to accumulate in a region through which skeletal progenitor cells usually (...) migrate, and at a site of condensation that is normally present in mammals but that is too small to chondrify. We find little evidence that these genes, when disrupted, cause a reversion to any primitive condition and although changes in their expression may have played a role in the evolution of the mammalian jaw, their function during morphogenesis is not sufficiently understood to confirm such hypotheses. BioEssays 20:245–255, 1998.© 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)