ABSTRACT As has long been recognized, Arthur Schopenhauer’s intellectual encounter with the Orient represents a departure from previous Western philosophers’ approaches to it. What has been less appreciated, however, is that this encounter also marks a pivotal moment in the modern critique of systematic philosophies of history. Since Schopenhauer doubted that there was any logic in history, either in the form of a providential plan or a rationally intelligible structure, he impugned both history’s scientific status and its significance for an (...) understanding of the human condition. Rejecting both Christian eschatology and the modern theory of progress, he opted instead for a transhistorical perspective. This denigration of history, which had far-reaching repercussions in the latter half of the nineteenth century, must be understood in light of Schopenhauer’s engagement with non-Western philosophy. Schopenhauer’s devaluation of the significance of historical difference, in stark opposition to the philosophers of history who preceded him, contributed to his receptivity to non-Western thought; and his belief in the affinity between his own transhistorical perspective and the teachings of Hinduism and Buddhism informed his antagonism to contemporary historical narratives and theories. (shrink)

Karl Löwith is heralded by Richard Wolin in his work, Heidegger's Children, as being “one of the most significant figures of twentieth century German philosophy” and was praised by Hans-Georg Gadamer as being the best German writer of his time. Löwith’s philosophy has, however, not received due attention since his death in 1973. The current project attempts to show Löwith’s continued importance for modern philosophy by pulling his various critiques together and showing their proper role in his work as a (...) whole. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como propósito poner de relieve el contraste trágico entre la afirmación de una teleología natural y la ausencia de teleología moral en el pensamiento de Schopenhauer. Se comprenderá su gesto filosófico como el vaciamiento de la finalidad. Concretamente, se examinará cómo el absurdo que tiene lugar en virtud del contraste mencionado, sumado a la concepción de vida que late en el proyecto schopenhaueriano, conduce a una consideración necesariamente irracionalista y pesimista de la existencia. Desde la perspectiva (...) del autor, ante la ausencia de una finalidad racional del mundo no existe otra vía más que el pesimismo. En esta dirección, quisiera centrarme en una de las consecuencias más profundas de las premisas mencionadas (a saber, la carencia de finalidad final, apariencia de ajuste teleológico, pesimismo, irracionalidad, concepción de vida, etc). Me refiero a la imposibilidad de la historia y, con ella, a la imposibilidad de cualquier clase de cambio o transformación. Por último, intentaré despejar dos posibles suspicacias en relación con la irracionalidad y ausencia de fin final en la filosofía de Schopenhauer. (shrink)