In 1853, the young Thomas Henry Huxley published a long review of German cell theory in which he roundly criticized the basic tenets of the Schleiden-Schwann model of the cell. Although historians of cytology have dismissed Huxley's criticism as based on an erroneous interpretation of cell physiology, the review is better understood as a contribution to embryology. "The Cell-theory" presents Huxley's "epigenetic" interpretation of histological organization emerging from changes in the protoplasm to replace the "preformationist" cell theory of Schleiden and (...) Schwann (as modified by Albert von Kölliker), which posited the nucleus as the seat of organic vitality. Huxley's views influenced a number of British biologists, who continued to oppose German cell theory well into the twentieth century. Yet Huxley was pivotal in introducing the new German program of "scientific zoology" to Britain in the early 1850s, championing its empiricist methodology as a means to enact broad disciplinary and institutional reforms in British natural history. (shrink)

discipline a general science of our "intellectual faculties, their principal phenomena, and the more remarkable circumstances of their activities" (1801, p. 4). Convinced of the sensationalist epistemology of Locke and Condillac, Destutt de Tracy believed one could resolve all ideas into the sensations that produced them and thereby test their soundness. The sensationalist assumptions of his project led him to propose that "ideology is a part of zoology" (1801, p. 1), and he consequently paid close attention to the way physiological..

Ernst Haeckel’s popular book Nat¨urliche Sch¨opfungs- geschichte (Natural history of creation, 1868) represents human species in a hierarchy, from lowest (Papuan and Hottentot) to highest (Caucasian, including the Indo-German and Semitic races). His stem-tree (see Figure 1) of human descent and the racial theories that accompany it have been the focus of several recent books—histories arguing that Haeckel had a unique position in the rise of Nazi biology during the first part of the 20th century. In 1971, Daniel Gasman brought (...) the initial bill of particulars; he portrayed Haeckel as having specific responsibility for Nazi racial programs. He argued that Darwin’s champion had a distinctive authority at the end of the 19th century, throwing into the shadows the myriads of others with similar racial attitudes.1 But it was not simply a general racism that Haeckel expressed; he was, according to Gasman (1971: 157–159), a virulent anti-Semite. Since its original publication, Gasman’s thesis has caught on with a large number of historians, so that in the present period it is usually taken as a truism, an obvious fact of the sordid history of biological thought in the first half of the 20th century.2 Perhaps the most prominent scholar—at least among historians of biology—to adopt and advance Gasman’s contention was Stephen Jay Gould. In his first book, Ontogeny and Phy- logeny (1977), Gould took as his subject Haeckel’s principle of recapitulation, the proposal that during ontogeny the developing embryo went through the same morphological stages as the phylum passed through in its evolutionary descent. So according to this conception, the human embryo begins as a one-celled creature, then takes on the form of an ancient invertebrate (e.g., a gastraea), then of a primitive vertebrate, then of an early mammal, then of a primate, and finally of a distinct.. (shrink)

WhenVestiges of the Natural History of Creation, the anonymous evolutionary work which caused such a furore in mid-Victorian England, was published towards the close of 1844, Richard Owen, by then well-entrenched as the ‘British Cuvier’, received a complementary copy and addressed a letter to the author. This letter and how it should be interpreted have recently become the subject of historical debate, and this paper is directed at resolving the controversy. The question of Owen's attitude to theVestigesargument is central to (...) the larger historical problem of the views of this leading British morphologist and palaeontologist on the contentious issue of the ‘secondary causes’ of species. Owen wrote so little directly on this subject prior to 1858, that the letter in question, together with his two letters of 1848 to the rationalist publisher John Chapman, and the controversial conclusion to hisOn the Nature of Limbs(1849), constitute the major evidence that Owen in this period subscribed to a naturalistic theory of organic change. On the basis of this evidence, historians of biology have generally concurred with Owen's biographer grandson that Owen had a ‘certain leaning towards the theories enunciated by Robert Chambers [the Vestiges' author]’, but that his ‘official’ anti-transmutationist stance of the 1840s did not permit full public expression of his own views. As Ruse most recently summed up this historical consensus: Owen in the 1840s was ‘moving down a path not completely dissimilar from that followed by Chambers’, and he ‘tried to have matters two ways, praisingVestigesto its author and condemning it to its critics’. (shrink)

This paper holds an evolutionary approach to musical semantics. Revolving around the nature/nurture dichotomy, it considers the role of the dispositional machinery to respond to sounding stimuli. Conceiving of music as organized sound, it stresses the dynamic tension between music as a collection of vibrational events and their potential of being structured. This structuring, however, is not gratuitous. It depends on levels of processing that rely on evolutionary older levels of reacting to the sounds as well as higher-level functions of (...) the brain, which allow listeners to emancipate themselves from mere acoustic processing of sounds to the level of epistemic interactions with the sounding music. These interactions are partly autonomous and partly constrained, but they all stress the realization of systemic cognition in the context of a living system‘s interactions with the environment. As such, listeners can be conceived as adaptive devices, which can build up new semiotic linkages with the sounding world. (shrink)

Evolutionary change is opportunistic, but its course is strongly constrained in several fundamental ways. These constraints (historical/phylogenetic, functional/adaptive, constructional/morphogenetic) and their dynamic relationships are discussed here and shown to constitute the conceptual framework of Constructional Morphology. Notwithstanding recent published opinions which claim that the discovery of constraints renders Neodarwinian selection theory obsolete, we regard the insights of Constructional Morphology as being entirely consistent with this theory. As is shown here in the case of the Hyracoidea, formal analysis of the constraints (...) which have framed the evolution of various characters extends our understanding of the evolution of a taxon. (shrink)

This article critiques theories of the civilizing process as expounded by its leading expositors: Mennell, Elias and Freud. It begins with a criticism of Stephen Mennell’s book The American Civilizing Process. This book relies on an even more famous work, Norbert Elias’s The Civilizing Process. Unfortunately, Mennell’s otherwise commendable attempt to capture American civilization in its historical scope and sociological complexity is misdirected because Eliasian theory is not applicable to America, as we will show, and, furthermore, offers a dubious account (...) of civilization in general. Elias’s approach is limited above all by its reliance on Sigmund Freud’s doubtful speculations about civilization, as presented in Civilization and its Discontents. (shrink)

Barresi & Moore do not consider information about intentional relations available within emotional engagement with others and do not see that others are perceived in the second as well as the third person. Recognising second person information forces recognition of similarities and connections not otherwise available. A developmental framework built on the assumption of the complete separateness of self and other is inevitably flawed.

This paper is an attempt to put the work of the past several decades on the problems of implicit learning and unconscious cognition into an evolutionary context. Implicit learning is an inductive process whereby knowledge of a complex environment is acquired and used largely independently of awareness of either the process of acquisition or the nature of that which has been learned. Characterized this way, implicit learning theory can be viewed as an attempt to come to grips with the classic (...) epistemological issues of knowledge acquisition, representation and use. The argument is made that the process, despite its seeming cognitive sophistication, is of considerable evolutionary antiquity and that it antedates awareness and the capacity for conscious control of mentation. Various classic heuristics from evolutionary biology are used to substantiate this claim and several specific entailments of this line of argument are outlined. (shrink)

Isochrony is crucial to the rhythm of human music. Some neural, behavioral and anatomical traits underlying rhythm perception and production are shared with a broad range of species. These may either have a common evolutionary origin, or have evolved into similar traits under different evolutionary pressures. Other traits underlying rhythm are rare across species, only found in humans and few other animals. Isochrony, or stable periodicity, is common to most human music, but isochronous behaviors are also found in many species. (...) It appears paradoxical that humans are particularly good at producing and perceiving isochronous patterns, although this ability does not conceivably confer any evolutionary advantage to modern humans. This article will attempt to solve this conundrum. To this end, we define the concept of isochrony from the present functional perspective of physiology, cognitive neuroscience, signal processing, and interactive behavior, and review available evidence on isochrony in the signals of humans and other animals. We then attempt to resolve the paradox of isochrony by expanding an evolutionary hypothesis about the function that isochronous behavior may have had in early hominids. Finally,we propose avenues for empirical research to examine this hypothesis and to understand the evolutionary origin of isochrony in general. (shrink)

The theory of Punctuated Equilibria challenges the neo‐Darwinian tenet that evolution is a uniform process. Recently, an article by Hunt1 has found that directional change during the evolution of a lineage is relatively small (occurring only in 5% of 250 analyzed traits). Of those traits that were shown to follow a trend, size was more likely to show gradual changes, whereas shape changes were more random. Here, we provide a short view of the nature of evolutionary trends, showing that directional (...) change within lineages and among clades provides valuable evolutionary information about the processes involved in their generation. BioEssays 30:521–525, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

De modo semelhante aos rompantes etnocêntricos de uma cultura humana frente a outras, as relações entre humanos e primatas não humanos incluem um estranhamento pontuado por atração e repulsa, identificação e diferença. Ciência, arte e mitologia são a expressão viva e atualizada disso. Desde 1960, a primatologia destaca-se nesse cenário por contribuir significativamente na revisão das definições sobre o comportamento dos primatas e, consequentemente, na redefinição do humano ao apresentar a polêmica proposição de existência de "culturas" entre animais não humanos. (...) Assim, a aproximação entre humanos e primatas não humanos parece inexorável e irreversível. Isso implica, por exemplo, em cogitar se esse processo engendra, ou não, a constituição de novas alteridades a partir de um novo outro (não humano), carregado de significados. Isso incluiria, por exemplo, a reformulação de representações e de categorias de classificação, bem como o aprofundamento do debate sobre os direitos dos animais não humanos. Ao dirigir tal tipo de desafio a situações de pesquisa antropológica deve-se ter aguda consciência de que o registro etnográfico das relações entre humanos e os outros primatas será uma construção empírica, perceptual e teórica. Dado o tipo particular de relação estabelecida entre humanos e outros primatas, pautada em um universo fronteiriço de incômodas semelhanças e diferenças, constituem-se aí coletivos híbridos em que o alcance e a profundidade das interações possíveis ainda são desconhecidos. The relations between humans and non-human primates resemble the ethnocentric reaction of one human culture in relation to others, and include an estrangement marked by attraction and rejection, identification and differentiation. Art, science and myths are the vivid and updated expression of these phenomena. Since the 1960's primatology stands out in that scenario for contributing significantly to the revision of the definitions about the behavior of primates and, consequently, for the redefinition of human beings, and for making the controversial proposal of the existence of non-human animal "cultures". Then, the close connection between humans and non-human primates seems relentless and irreversible - and raises the question on whether or not these processes engender a new kind of otherness deriving from a non-human other that is full of meaning. This would include, for example, the reformulation of the representations and categories of classification, as well as deepening the debate about the rights of non-human animals. When the challenge is taken up in situations of anthropological research that address the relationships between human beings and the other primates, the ethnographic register that describes the relations between human beings and other primates will be an equally sharp empirical, perceptual and theoretical construction. Given the peculiar type of relationship established between human beings and other primates, implemented in a frontier universe of uncomfortable similarities and differences, they constituted a hybrid collective where interactions are possible but we do not know exactly how complex or how depth they are. (shrink)

The evolution of development can be made accessible to study by exploiting closely related species that exhibit distinct ontogenies. The direct‐developing sea urchin Heliocidaris erythrogramma is closely related to indirect‐developing sea urchins that develop via a feeding larval stage. Superficial consideration would suggest that simple heterochronies resulting in loss of larval features and acceleration of adult features could explain the substitution of direct for indirect development. However, our experiments show that early development has in fact been extensively remodeled, with modified (...) localization of maternal determinants coupled with dissociation of cell cleavage from axis formation resulting in novel patterns of cell lineage differentiation and fate map. Gene expression has undergone concomitant changes. (shrink)

Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.

The peripheral nervous system has classically been separated into a somatic division composed of both afferent and efferent pathways and an autonomic division containing only efferents. J. N. Langley, who codified this asymmetrical plan at the beginning of the twentieth century, considered different afferents, including visceral ones, as candidates for inclusion in his concept of the “autonomic nervous system”, but he finally excluded all candidates for lack of any distinguishing histological markers. Langley's classification has been enormously influential in shaping modern (...) ideas about both the structure and the function of the PNS. We survey recent information about the PNS and argue that many of the sensory neurons designated as “visceral” and “somatic” are in fact part of a histologically distinct group of afferents concerned primarily autonomic function. These afferents have traditionally been known as “small dark” neurons or B-neurons. In this target article we outline an association between autonomic and B-neurons based on ontogeny, cell phenotype, and functional relations, grouping them together as part of a common reflex system involved in homeostasis. This more parsimonious classification of the PNS, made possible by the identification of a group of afferents associated primarily with the ANS, avoids a number of confusions produced by the classical orientation. It may also have practical implications for an understanding of nociception, homeostatic reflexes, and the evolution of the nervous system. (shrink)

Barresi & Moore assume an equivalence between ontogenetic and evolutionaiy transformations of social understanding. The mechanisms of evolution allow for novel structures to arise, both through terminal addition and through the onset of novel pathways at time points that precede the end points of ancestral pathways. Terminal addition may not be the appropriate model for the evolution of human object-directed imitation, intermodal equivalence, or joint attention.

Neurobiological models of language need a level of analysis that can account for the typical range of language phenomena. Because linguistically motivated models have been successful in explaining numerous language properties, it is premature to dismiss them as biologically irrelevant. Models attempting to unify neurobiology and linguistics need to be sensitive to both sources of evidence.

Many of the commentaries cohere around two major points of criticism. The first is that we have omitted discussion of the mechanisms that are assumed to operate at levels 2, 3, and 4.Campbell, Cloak, Dewsbury, Eckberg, Mundinger, Pulliam, Richerson & Boyd, Slobodkin, Simon, Williams, andWahlstenall make comments that bear on this point. The second point is that we have omitted discussion of the fact that "organisms change the environment by their activities" and thereby modify the selection pressures that act on (...) them. Apart from Lewontin, this point has been raised in different forms byBarkow, Chase, Hull, Perzigian, Ruyle, and less directly bySlobodkin. Stemming from these two basic omissions there is a third general criticism. Numerous commentators have pointed out that we have failed to discuss sufficiently either the extent or nature of the constraints that may or may not be operating on supraordinate evolutionary processes as a function of their nested relationships to subordinate evolutionary processes within our scheme. We start by acknowledging these three basic omissions. We agree that they exist and that they are serious. (shrink)

The fundamental tenet of contemporary sociobiology, namely the assumption of a single process of evolution involving the selection of genes, is critically examined. An alternative multiple-level, multiple-process model of evolution is presented which posits that the primary process that operates via selection upon the genes cannot account for certain kinds of biological phenomena, especially complex, learned, social behaviours. The primary process has evolved subsidiary evolutionary levels and processes that act to bridge the gap between genes and these complex behaviours. The (...) subsidiary levels are development, individual animal learning, and socioculture itself. It is argued that individual learning is pivotal to the derivation and biological analysis of culture. The differences between cultural and noncultural societies are stressed. It is concluded that such a multiple-level model of evolution can form the basis for reconciling opposing sides in the sociobiology debate. (shrink)

During the last two decades the role of quantitative genetics in evolutionary theory has expanded considerably. Quantitative genetic-based models addressing long term phenotypic evolution, evolution in multiple environments (phenotypic plasticity) and evolution of ontogenies (developmental trajectories) have been proposed. Yet, the mathematical foundations of quantitative genetics were laid with a very different set of problems in mind (mostly the prediction of short term responses to artificial selection), and at a time in which any details of the genetic machinery were virtually (...) unknown. In this paper we discuss what a model is in population biology, and what kind of model we need in order to address the complexities of phenotypic evolution. We review the assumptions of quantitative genetics and its most recent accomplishments, together with the limitations that such assumptions impose on the modelling of some aspects of phenotypic evolution. We also discuss three alternative appr oaches to the theoretical description of evolutionary trajectories (nonlinear dynamics, complexity theory and optimization theory), and their respective advantages and limitations. We conclude by calling for a new theoretical synthesis, including quantitative genetics and not necessarily limited to the other approaches here discussed. (shrink)

This article retrieves Freud’s Paul as a forgotten predecessor and untapped critic of the “return to Paul” in contemporary political theology and continental philosophy. Given that Sigmund Freud published Moses and Monotheism in 1939 having barely escaped from Vienna, the text’s reception has justly been dominated by the question of Freud’s identification with Moses and the relationship between psychoanalysis and Judaism. However, I argue that this narrow focus has obscured the more fundamental problem of the connection between religion and Freud’s (...) enigmatic notion of “historical truth,” which he works out not through Moses but through Saint Paul. To do so, I first show how Freud’s genealogy of monotheism is modeled on the pathogenesis of hysterical symptoms. I then trace how Freud deepens his investigation into the etiology of symptom-formation until he arrives at the notion of historical truth and the archaic heritage that transmits it. Lastly, I demonstrate that Freud presents himself less as a Pauline figure than he does Paul as a proto-analyst. Through this staging, I contend that Freud parochializes the claims of Christianity as symptomatic of a more archaic historical truth that psychoanalysis alone is able to access. Freud’s Paul demonstrates that it is not a question of whether but how ostensibly modern secular discourses inherit the theological traditions in which they are imbedded. Reading Freud as a philosopher of religion ultimately offers an indictment of any philosophy or emancipatory politics naively modeled on theological universalism. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have often favoured reductive approaches to how-possibly explanation. This article identifies three alternative conceptions making how-possibly explanation an interesting phenomenon in its own right. The first variety approaches “how possibly X?” by showing that X is not epistemically impossible. This can sometimes be achieved by removing misunderstandings concerning the implications of one’s current belief system but involves characteristically a modification of this belief system so that acceptance of X does not result in contradiction. The second variety offers (...) a potential how-explanation of X. It is usually followed by a range of further potential how-explanations of the same phenomenon. In recent literature the factual claims implied by the second variety have been downplayed whereas the heuristic role of mapping the space of conceptual possibilities has been emphasized. I will focus especially on this truth-bracketing sense of potentiality when looking closer at the second variety in the paper. The third variety has attracted less interest. It presents a partial how-explanation of X. Typically it aims to establish the existence of a mechanism by which X could be and was generated. The third conception stands out as the natural alternative for the advocate of ontic how-possibly explanations. This article transfers Salmon’s view that explanation-concepts can be broadly divided into epistemic, modal, and ontic to the context of how-possibly explanations. Moreover, it is argued that each of the three above-mentioned varieties of how-possibly explanation occurs in science. To recognize this may be especially relevant for philosophers. We are often misled by the promises of various why-explanation accounts, and seem to have forgotten nearly everything about the diversity of how-possibly explanations. (shrink)

Variation or rearrangement of regulatory genes is responsible for cellular malignant change. These types of chromosomal variations also produce heterochrony or paedomorphic evolution at the organismal level. Analogously, neoplasia represents a cellular macroevolutionary event, and a tumour can be said to be an evolved population of cells. To understand this cellular evolution to malignancy, it may be necessary to go beyond a clonal selection (adaptationist) explanation of neoplastic alteration. In the pericellular environment natural selection consists of the organizational restraints of (...) surrounding cells as well as the host's immunological surveillance and non-specific monocyte-macrophage systems. Indirect evidence suggests that success for the neoplasm depends not upon clonal selection, but solely upon a genetic methodology—the function of which is to elude selection.The author has coined the term cellular heterochrony to illustrate analogic similarities in the molecular modes of speciation between anaplastic cancer cells and the heterochronic evolution of organisms. By reverting to a juvenile (embryonic) repertoire of cellular behaviour a tumour secures its own tenure or niche by usurping the host's armamentarium of selection forces, employing many of the same or similar methods by which implanting and invading tissues of the mammalian embryo forestall maternal detection and rejection. A number of ways by which the tumour blocks, subverts or evades selection are discussed. (shrink)

Regeneration in arthropods and amphibians follows an analogous principle making comparisons between the two phyla possible.Larval arthropods and amphibians possess powers of epimorphic regeneration which wane for many species of these phyla with the completion of metamorphosis or the cessation of moulting. In those species which retain, post-maturationally, the ability to form a regenerative blastema, larval characteristics are carried into the adult and reproductive stages of these organisms. These include many species of: urodeles, ametabolous insects, crustaceans, myriapods and arachnids. The (...) long-standing distinction between embryonic regulation and true epimorphosis would thus appear to be a difference of degree rather than kind. (shrink)

It is posited that the initiating event of amphibian regeneration of a limb, is retrodifferentiation* of what are to become the developing cells of the blastema. These cells reiterate a larval or premetamorphic ontogenic repertoire, induced by elevated levels of prolactin with adequate innervation. Subsequent redifferentiation of the blastema cells occurs, controlled by thyroxine and innervation.This temporal displacement of cellular morphologic characters in regeneration should be looked upon as a function of the ability to reiterate larval characters and subsequently metamorphose. (...) If correct, this would explain why amphibians which metamorphose only once, lose the ability to postmetamorphically regenerate. An exception to this,Xenopus laevis, an anuran which can epimorphically regenerate, to some extent, will be discussed.[/p]. (shrink)

This paper discusses how growth and aging became interrelated phenomena with the creation of gerontology in the United States. I first show that the relation of growth to senescence, which had hardly attracted scientific attention before the twentieth century, started to be investigated by several experimental scientists around the 1900s. Subsequently, research on the connection between the two phenomena entered a new domain through the birth of gerontology as a scientific field comprised of various disciplines, many of which addressed growth. (...) Due to gerontologists’ efforts, the association between aging and growth became stronger and more multifaceted within the discursive and organizational matrix constituting the new science, leading to a broader definition of senescence with an ambiguous connection to chronological age. Furthermore, as gerontologists borrowed the cultural agendas as well as research methods from studies of growth, aging began to be defined as a phenomenon that could be actively controlled and managed in both social arenas and laboratory environments. (shrink)