In this paper, I consider the implications of grief for philosophical theorising about absence experience. I argue that whilst some absence experiences that occur in grief might be explained by extant philosophical accounts of absence experience, others need different treatment. I propose that grieving subjects' descriptions of feeling as if the world seems empty or a part of them seems missing can be understood as referring to a distinctive type of absence experience. In these profound absence experiences, I will argue, (...) the absence of a person as a condition on various possibilities is made manifest in the structure of experience over time. Thus, by paying close attention to grief, we can see that even accounts of absence experience that are presented as in competition with one another may not be so, and that to explain all kinds of absence experience we sometimes need to appeal to something overlooked in other accounts, and which is neither straightforwardly perceptual or cognitive. I also suggest that we would have good reason to take such experiences to be part of and not merely psychological effects of grief. (shrink)

A growing body of literature about the phenomenological and epistemic role of structural features of experience, as well as on the topic of absence experience itself, point toward the view that absence experience is non-veridical. Here I challenge that result.

Can we really perceive absences, i.e., missing things? Sartre tells us that when he arrived late for his appointment at the café, he saw the absence of his friend Pierre. Is that really what he saw? Where was it, exactly? Why didn’t Sartre see the absence of other people who were not there? Why did other people who were there not see the absence of Pierre? The perception of absences gives rise to a host of conundrums and is constantly on (...) the verge of conceptual confusion. Here I focus on the need to be clear about four sorts of distinctions: (i) the difference between perceiving an absence and perceiving something that is absent; (ii) the difference between perceiving an absence and an absence of perceiving; (iii) the difference between perceiving an absence and perceiving something as an absence; and (iv) the difference between perceiving an absence and perceiving that something is absent. (shrink)

The idea that we can perceive absences is becoming increasingly popular in contemporary philosophy of mind, and seeing empty space and hearing silence are alleged to be two paradigmatic examples. In this paper, I remain neutral over the question of whether empty space experiences and experiences of silence are genuinely perceptual phenomena, however, I argue that these experiences do not qualify as absence experiences. Consequently, our experiences of empty space and silence cannot be appealed to as proof of the perceptual (...) view of absence experience. (shrink)

According to Tom Roberts and Joel Krueger's frustrated pro-attitude account of loneliness, loneliness is primarily characterized as an affective state in which individuals perceive certain social goods as unattainable. The frustration of pro-attitudes, or the desire for social connections, plays a significant role in understanding the nature of loneliness. However, in this article, I argue that the frustrated pro-attitude account falls short in explaining a specific type of loneliness known as clueless loneliness, wherein a person feels lonely without experiencing a (...) salient frustration of pro-attitude. By analyzing five cases of clueless loneliness—the case of desiring the wrong thing, the case of failing to form concrete desires, the case of having an illusion of desire fulfillment, the case of holding self-deceptive beliefs about need fulfillment, and the case of lacking a desire for social goods—I propose a revised account that acknowledges the complexity of loneliness and the potential disconnect between perceived social goods and the actual fulfillment of one's need for connection. My objective in this article is to demonstrate that this revised understanding of loneliness provides a more comprehensive framework for examining the nature of loneliness and its impact on different groups of people within society. (shrink)