- We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency.Deborah Tollefsen & Shaun Gallagher - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2):95-110.details
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How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Dissociation in self-narrative.Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Cole - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):149-155.details
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Can “I” prevent you from entering my mind?Marc Champagne - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.details
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Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.details
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The mind’s best trick: How we experience conscious will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69.details
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Delusional beliefs and reason giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew R. Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.details
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Fuzzy fault lines: Selves in multiple personality disorder.George Graham - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):159-174.details
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Self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2004 - The Monist 87 (2):219-236.details
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A Cognitive-Semiotic Approach to Agency: Assessing Ideas from Cognitive Science and Neuroscience.Juan Mendoza-Collazos & Jordan Zlatev - 2022 - Biosemiotics 15 (1):141-170.details
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Mapping the Psychotic Mind: a Review on the Subjective Structure of Thought Insertion.Pablo López-Silva - 2018 - The Psychiatry Quarterly 89 (4):957-968.details
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Bodily Ownership, Psychological Ownership, and Psychopathology.José Luis Bermúdez - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):263-280.details
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Difficulties for extending Wegner and colleagues’ model of the sense of agency to deficits in delusions of alien control.Glenn Carruthers - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (3):126-141.details
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Authorship of thoughts in thought insertion: What is it for a thought to be one's own?Max Seeger - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):837-855.details
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(1 other version)The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 2003 - In A.S. David & T. T. J. Kircher (eds.), The Self and Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Cambridge University Press. pp. 107-120.details
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First-Person Perspective and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 245-272.details
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On agency and body-ownership: Phenomenological and neurocognitive reflections.Manos Tsakiris, Simone Schütz-Bosbach & Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):645-660.details
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Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen.Glenn Carruthers - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):515 - 520.details
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Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership.Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.details
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Self-agency and mental causality.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.details
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Advancing the ‘We’ Through Narrative.Shaun Gallagher & Deborah Tollefsen - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):211-219.details
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In search of the “mechanisms” of persistence of subjectivity: Minimal self and agency.Ivana Anton Mlinar - 2019 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 8 (2):502-515.details
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The Unmaking and Making of Self: Embodied Suffering and Mind–Body Healing in Brazilian Candomblé.Rebecca Seligman - 2010 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 38 (3):297-320.details
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Experimenting with phenomenology.Shaun Gallagher & Jesper Brøsted Sørensen - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):119-134.details
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Schizophrenia and the Place of Egodystonic States in the Aetiology of Thought Insertion.Pablo López-Silva - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):577-594.details
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Experimenting with phenomenology.Shaun Gallagher & Jesper B. Sorensen - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):119-134.details
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Agency and Anxiety: Delusions of Control and Loss of Control in Schizophrenia and Agoraphobia.Shaun Gallagher & Dylan Trigg - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10:181864.details
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The self in action: Lessons from delusions of control.Chris Frith - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):752-770.details
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