In an article in an earlier issue of this journal Vivienne Gray sought to challenge my claim that Xenophon's account of Prodicus' narrative concerning the Choice of Heracles represents ‘a very close approximation to Prodicus’ actual wording'. Since that time, Gray's article has been cited approvingly by Louis-André Dorion and David Wolfsdorf, both of whom consider that Gray has settled the matter, at least as far as the linguistic aspect of my argument is concerned. In view of this, I feel (...) it necessary to point out that Gray's argument is fundamentally flawed. In addition, I should like to take this opportunity to show that the arguments of Dorion and Wolfsdorf, which are aimed at other aspects of the case that I made for Xenophon's faithfulness to Prodicus' text, are likewise invalid. (shrink)

Among our earliest extant references to the word ‘philosophize’ is an unfamiliar one, from the mythographer Herodorus of Pontic Heraclea, whose son Bryson associated with Plato and Aristotle. A Byzantine compiler quotes Herodorus, probably from his book on Heracles, as saying that his hero ‘philosophized until death’. This is a surprising claim in light of the fifth/fourth-centuryb.c.view of Heracles as long-toiling but not intellectual. Euripides'Licymniuscharacterizes him as ‘unimpressive and unadorned, good to the greatest degree, confined from allsophiain action, unversed in (...) talking’. Heracles is thus explicitly distinguished from those who strive for dialectical understanding or theoretical knowledge. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the tale of Heracles at the Crossroads, attributed to Prodicus by Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, through the notion of antilogy. The apologue has got an antilogic structure that is immediately outlined in the description of the situation in which the young Heracles finds himself. But the text, seemingly antilogic, does not develop itself according to one of the most important rules of antilogies, i.e., the epistemic parity of two speeches, since it appears (...) to be completely in favor of just one of the theses. Prodicus would have had no interest in writing a text that did not demonstrate his rhetorical and linguistic abilities. According to this perspective, Xenophon’s version of Heracles at the Crossroads does not seem to be the original version by Prodicus, as can be seen by analyzing its structure and properties. (shrink)

La fable d’Héraklès à la croisée des chemins (Mémorables, II, 1, 21-34), que Xénophon attribue expressément à Prodicos (II, 1, 21), a dernièrement fait l’objet de plusieurs articles (Sansone, Gray, Tordesillas) qui s’efforcent de déterminer si et à quel point la version rapportée par Socrate est fidèle à la version originale de Prodicos. Or on peut aisément montrer que la plupart des thèmes exposés dans l’apologue sont également développés par Socrate ailleurs dans les Mémorables, de sorte qu’il est tentant de (...) considérer que cette version de l’apologue – celle qu’on peut lire en Mem. II, 1, 21-34 – ne doit pas grand-chose à Prodicos dans la mesure où elle a probablement été récrite de fond en comble par Xénophon. (shrink)