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  1. Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-contravening Commitments.Michael J. Shaffer - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):73-82.
    Defenders of doxastic voluntarism accept that we can voluntarily commit ourselves to propositions, including belief-contravening propositions. Thus, defenders of doxastic voluntarism allow that we can choose to believe propositions that are negatively implicated by our evidence. In this paper it is argued that the conjunction of epistemic deontology and doxastic voluntarism as it applies to ordinary cases of belief-contravening propositional commitments is incompatible with evidentialism. In this paper ED and DV will be assumed and this negative result will be used (...)
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  • New operators for theory change.Svenove Hansson - 1989 - Theoria 55 (2):114-132.
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  • What's new isn't always best.Sven Ove Hansson - 1997 - Theoria 63 (1-2):1-13.
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  • On the logic of theory change: Contraction functions and their associated revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón - 1982 - Theoria 48 (1):14-37.
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  • Reversing the Levi identity.Sven Ove Hansson - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):637 - 669.
    The AGM (Alchourrón-Gärdenfors-Makinson) model of belief change is extended to cover changes on sets of beliefs that are not closed under logical consequence (belief bases). Three major types of change operations, namely contraction, internal revision, and external revision are axiomatically characterized, and their interrelations are studied. In external revision, the Levi identity is reversed in the sense that one first adds the new belief to the belief base, and afterwards contracts its negation. It is argued that external revision represents an (...)
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  • Laws, ceteris paribus conditions, and the dynamics of belief.Wolfgang Spohn - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):373-394.
    The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Likewise, the issue about ceteris paribus conditions is essentially about how we epistemically deal with exceptions. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of defeasible reasoning seems ideally suited to explicate these points in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will turn (...)
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  • Four Approaches to Supposition.Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (26):58-98.
    Suppositions can be introduced in either the indicative or subjunctive mood. The introduction of either type of supposition initiates judgments that may be either qualitative, binary judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable or quantitative, numerical ones about how acceptable it is. As such, accounts of qualitative/quantitative judgment under indicative/subjunctive supposition have been developed in the literature. We explore these four different types of theories by systematically explicating the relationships canonical representatives of each. Our representative qualitative accounts of indicative (...)
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  • Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
    KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily (...)
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  • What If Bizet and Verdi Had Been Compatriots?Michael J. Shaffer - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):55-73.
    Stalnaker argued that conditional excluded middle should be included in the principles that govern counterfactuals on the basis that intuitions support that principle. This is because there are pairs of competing counterfactuals that appear to be equally acceptable. In doing so, he was forced to introduced semantic vagueness into his system of counterfactuals. In this paper it is argued that there is a simpler and purely epistemic explanation of these cases that avoids the need for introducing semantic vagueness into the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Formalizing falsification: Three delete operations.Rüdiger Schätz - 1990 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 36 (5):455-470.
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  • Changing minds about climate change: Belief revision, coherence, and emotion.Paul Thagard & Scott Findlay - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 329--345.
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  • (1 other version)Laws Are Persistent Inductives Schemes.Wolfgang Spohn - 2004 - In Friedrich Stadler (ed.), Induction and Deduction in the Sciences. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 11--135.
    The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of formalizing defeasible reasoning or inductive schemes seems ideally suited to explicate the idea in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will turn out that a law is simply the deterministic analogue of a sequence (...)
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  • Ranking Functions, AGM Style.Wolfgang Spohn - 1999 - Internet Festschrift for Peter Gärdenfors.
    First, ranking functions are argued to be superior to AGM belief revision theory in two crucial respects. Second, it is shown how ranking functions are uniquely reflected in iterated belief change. More precisely, conditions on threefold contractions are specified which suffice for representing contractions by a ranking function uniquely up to multiplication by a positive integer. Thus, an important advantage AGM theory seemed to have over ranking functions proves to be spurious.
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  • The dynamics of belief as a basis for logic.Peter Gärdenfors - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (1):1-10.
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  • A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.
    Conditionals somehow express conditional beliefs. However, conditional belief is a bi-propositional attitude that is generally not truth-evaluable, in contrast to unconditional belief. Therefore, this article opts for an expressivistic semantics for conditionals, grounds this semantics in the arguably most adequate account of conditional belief, that is, ranking theory, and dismisses probability theory for that purpose, because probabilities cannot represent belief. Various expressive options are then explained in terms of ranking theory, with the intention to set out a general interpretive scheme (...)
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  • AGM Theory and Artificial Intelligence.Raúl Carnota & Ricardo Rodríguez - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 1--42.
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  • Logic of belief revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Epistemic importance and minimal changes of belief.Peter Gärdenfors - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):136 – 157.
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  • On the logic of theory change: Contraction functions and their associated revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourron & David Makinson - 1982 - Theoria 48 (1):14-37.
    A study in the logic of theory change, examining the properties of maxichoice contraction and revision operations.
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  • Bivalence and subjunctive conditionals.Timothy Williamson - 1988 - Synthese 75 (3):405 - 421.
    Writers such as Stalnaker and Dummett have argued that specific features of subjunctive conditional statements undermine the principle of bivalence. This, paper is concerned with rebutting such claims. 1. It is shown how subjective conditionals pose a prima facie threat to bivalence, and how this threat can be dissolved by a distinction between the results of negating a subjective conditional and of negating its consequent. To make this distinction is to side with Lewis against Stalnaker in a dispute about possible (...)
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  • Iteration of conditionals and the Ramsey test.Isaac Levi - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):49 - 81.
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  • Evidential Support and Contraposition.Hans Rott - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (6):2253-2271.
    The concept of an evidential conditional _If A then C_ that can be defined by the conjunction of \(A>C\) and \(\lnot C > \lnot A\), where > is a conditional of the kind introduced by Stalnaker and Lewis, has recently been studied in a series of papers by Vincenzo Crupi and Andrea Iacona. In this paper I argue that Crupi and Iacona’s central idea that contraposition captures the idea of evidential support cannot be maintained. I give examples showing that contraposition (...)
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  • Abductive belief revision in science.Gerhard Schurz - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 77--104.
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  • Causation, Coherence and Concepts : a Collection of Essays.Wolfgang Spohn - unknown
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  • Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - London and Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
    This book is a sustained defense of the compatibility of the presence of idealizations in the sciences and scientific realism. So, the book is essentially a detailed response to the infamous arguments raised by Nancy Cartwright to the effect that idealization and scientific realism are incompatible.
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  • An epistemic analysis of explanations and causal beliefs.Peter Gärdenfors - 1990 - Topoi 9 (2):109-124.
    The analyses of explanation and causal beliefs are heavily dependent on using probability functions as models of epistemic states. There are, however, several aspects of beliefs that are not captured by such a representation and which affect the outcome of the analyses. One dimension that has been neglected in this article is the temporal aspect of the beliefs. The description of a single event naturally involves the time it occurred. Some analyses of causation postulate that the cause must not occur (...)
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  • The Ramsey test and conditional semantics.Frank Döring - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):359-376.
    Proponents of the projection strategy take an epistemic rule for the evaluation of English conditionals, the Ramsey test, as clue to the truth-conditional semantics of conditionals. They also construe English conditionals as stronger than the material conditional. Given plausible assumptions, however, the Ramsey test induces the semantics of the material conditional. The alleged link between Ramsey test and truth conditions stronger than those of the material conditional can be saved by construing conditionals as ternary, rather than binary, propositional functions with (...)
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  • Belief Revision and Computational Argumentation: A Critical Comparison.Pietro Baroni, Eduardo Fermé, Massimiliano Giacomin & Guillermo Ricardo Simari - 2022 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 31 (4):555-589.
    This paper aims at comparing and relating belief revision and argumentation as approaches to model reasoning processes. Referring to some prominent literature references in both fields, we will discuss their (implicit or explicit) assumptions on the modeled processes and hence commonalities and differences in the forms of reasoning they are suitable to deal with. The intended contribution is on one hand assessing the (not fully explored yet) relationships between two lively research fields in the broad area of defeasible reasoning and (...)
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  • The epistemic account of ceteris paribus conditions.Wolfgang Spohn - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (3):385-408.
    The paper focuses on interpreting ceteris paribus conditions as normal conditions. After discussing six basic problems for the explication of normal conditions and seven interpretations that do not well solve those problems I turn to what I call the epistemic account. According to it the normal is, roughly, the not unexpected. This is developed into a rigorous constructive account of normal conditions, which makes essential use of ranking theory and in particular allows to explain the phenomenon of multiply exceptional conditions. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Formalizing falsification: Three delete operations.Rüdiger Schätz - 1990 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 36 (5):455-470.
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