Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-contravening Commitments

American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):73-82 (2013)
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Defenders of doxastic voluntarism accept that we can voluntarily commit ourselves to propositions, including belief-contravening propositions. Thus, defenders of doxastic voluntarism allow that we can choose to believe propositions that are negatively implicated by our evidence. In this paper it is argued that the conjunction of epistemic deontology and doxastic voluntarism as it applies to ordinary cases of belief-contravening propositional commitments is incompatible with evidentialism. In this paper ED and DV will be assumed and this negative result will be used to suggest that voluntary belief-contravening commitments are not themselves beliefs and that these sorts of commitments are not governed by evidentialism. So, the apparent incompatibility of the package views noted above can be resolved without ceding evidentialism with respect to beliefs.
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A Theory of Conditionals.Stalnaker, Robert

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Inferentialism, Degrees of Commitment, and Ampliative Donato, Rodríguez Xavier; Zamora, Bonilla Jesús & González De Prado Salas, Javier

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