The issues presented in this article bear on the status of bioethics as an academic discipline and research methods employed in it. With regard to the status of bioethics, I discuss problems related to the definition of bioethics, the ways of addressing bioethical issues and the choice of the discipline within which bioethics should be developed . The presented methods of bioethics have been divided into normative and non-normative. The non-normative methods are empirical, both qualitative and quantitative, whereas normative methods (...) have been divided into three groups: methods based on principles , casuistry, and alternative methods . Since alternative ways of addressing bioethical issues are not always sufficiently developed from the methodological point of view, I have introduced, apart from the concept of method, the concept of research perspective. (shrink)

Ethicists differ considerably in their reasons for using empirical data. This paper presents a brief overview of four traditional approaches to the use of empirical data: “the prescriptive applied ethicists,” “the theorists,” “the critical applied ethicists,” and “the particularists.” The main aim of this paper is to introduce a fifth approach of more recent date (i.e. “integrated empirical ethics”) and to offer some methodological directives for research in integrated empirical ethics. All five approaches are presented in a table for heuristic (...) purposes. The table consists of eight columns: “view on distinction descriptive-prescriptive sciences,” “location of moral authority,” “central goal(s),” “types of normativity,” “use of empirical data,” “method,” “interaction empirical data and moral theory,” and “cooperation with descriptive sciences.” Ethicists can use the table in order to identify their own approach. Reflection on these issues prior to starting research in empirical ethics should lead to harmonization of the different scientific disciplines and effective planning of the final research design. Integrated empirical ethics (IEE) refers to studies in which ethicists and descriptive scientists cooperate together continuously and intensively. Both disciplines try to integrate moral theory and empirical data in order to reach a normative conclusion with respect to a specific social practice. IEE is not wholly prescriptive or wholly descriptive since IEE assumes an interdepence between facts and values and between the empirical and the normative. The paper ends with three suggestions for consideration on some of the future challenges of integrated empirical ethics. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to review the recent popularity of casuistry as a model of moral inquiry. I argue that proponents of casuistry do not endorse the particularist epistemology that seems to be implied by their position, and that this is why casuistry does not seem to present something really new in comparison to 'top-down' generalist approaches. I contend that casuistry should develop itself as a (moderately) particularist position and that the challenge for the defender of casuistry is (...) to come up with ideas that strengthen the ('intuitionist') model of rationality that underlies most forms of particularism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article attempts to show a way in which social science research can contribute in a meaningful and equitable way to philosophical bioethics. It builds on the social science critique of bioethics present in the work of authors such as Renée Fox, Barry Hoffmaster and Charles Bosk, proposing the characteristics of a critical bioethics that would take social science seriously. The social science critique claims that traditional philosophical bioethics gives a dominant role to idealised, rational thought, and tends to (...) exclude social and cultural factors, relegating them to the status of irrelevancies. Another problem is the way in which bioethics assumes social reality divides down the same lines/categories as philosophical theories. Critical bioethics requires bioethicists to root their enquires in empirical research, to challenge theories using evidence, to be reflexive and to be sceptical about the claims of other bioethicists, scientists and clinicians. The aim is to produce a rigorous normative analysis of lived moral experience. (shrink)

In this article I describe the theoretical underpinnings of 20th-century British philosopher W. D. Ross's approach to linking deontological and teleological decision making. I attempt to fill in what Ross left on the whole unanswered, that is, how to use his duties to resolve dilemmas. A case study in journalism demonstrates how to apply the theory. I conclude with an analysis of what I take to be the strengths and weaknesses in Ross's theory.

This article raises the question of whether bioethics qualifies as a discipline. According to a standard definition of discipline as “a field of study following specific and well-established methodological rules” bioethics is not a specific discipline as there are no explicit “well-established methodological rules.” The article investigates whether the methodological rules can be implicit, and whether bioethics can follow specific methodological rules within subdisciplines or for specific tasks. As this does not appear to be the case, the article examines whether (...) bioethics’ adherence to specific quality criteria (instead of methodological rules) or pursuing of a common goal can make it qualify as a discipline. Unfortunately, the result is negative. Then, the article scrutinizes whether referring to bioethics institutions and professional qualifications can ascertain bioethics as a discipline. However, this makes the definition of bioethics circular. The article ends by admitting that bioethics can qualify as a discipline according to broader definitions of discipline, for example, as an “area of knowledge, research and education.” However, this would reduce bioethics’ potential for demarcation and identity-building. Thus, to consolidate the discipline of bioethics and increase its impact, we should explicate and elaborate on its methodology. (shrink)

MA Thesis. Biomedical ethics does not lend itself to easy categorisation as either a 'theoretical' or a 'practical' enterprise because inquiry into the quandaries of morality requires both situational and 'translocal' perspectives. These types of investigation bring into question the legitimacy of the theory/practice divide that has dominated intellectual thought since antiquity. This division hinders the development of bioethics by fostering internal dispute within the discipline regarding appropriate methodology and the practice of clinical ethics. In this thesis, I argue that (...) much of these disciplinary disjunctions are due to an undue labeling of bioethics as either 'applied ethics' or 'practical ethics', and a failure to recognise the intricate way in which theory and practice inform each other and are integral and interrelated parts of moral deliberation. I argue for an integration of the theory and practice of bioethics. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungMedizinethische Entscheidungsfindungsmodelle müssen nachweisen können, weshalb die mit ihnen getroffenen Entscheidungen richtig oder zumindest „belastbar“ sind. Hierfür sind theoretische Rechtfertigungsansätze aus der Ethik unverzichtbar. Der Klinischen Ethik wird aber mitunter ein Mangel an theoretischer Fundierung vorgeworfen. Um diesem Vorwurf entgegenzutreten, soll unter Bezugnahme auf ein Projekt der Klinischen Ethik („METAP“) die ethische Unterstützung in Form der ethischen Fallbesprechung und der Ethikkonsultation mittels Prinzipienethik und Diskursethik gerechtfertigt werden. Prinzipienethik und Diskursethik können einander über das Medium der ethischen Fallbesprechung oder Ethikkonsultation fruchtbar (...) ergänzen. So können einige theoretische und praktische Schwächen der beiden Ansätze durch den jeweils anderen abgefedert werden. Die Diskursethik übernimmt bspw. die Sicherung der ethischen Gültigkeit von moralischen Entscheidungen bzw. Handlungsnormen und vermindert dadurch ein Rechtfertigungsdefizit, welches bei einem rein prinzipienorientierten Verfahren auftritt. Umgekehrt antwortet die Prinzipienethik u. a. auf Fragen der ethischen Angemessenheit und dient v. a. der adäquaten Einzelfallentscheidung. Durch die Integration des einen Ansatzes in den anderen ist eine umfassendere Rechtfertigungsleistung erzielbar als bei einem alleinigen Einsatz von Prinzipienethik oder Diskursethik. Selbst wenn einige Herausforderungen bestehen bleiben und auch das integrierte Modell moralische Dissense nicht immer verhindern kann, vermag es durch seine „doppelte“ Absicherung (Prinzipien und Diskurs) ein praktisches Vertrauen in die getroffene ethische Entscheidung zu stärken und so der Klinischen Ethik mehr „Robustheit“ zu geben, als sie bisher besitzt. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: L’un des traits frappants d’une bonne partie des théories morales contemporaines est l’absence qu’on y trouve du sens moral commun. Les constructions théoriques de Rawls, Singer, Sidgwick et Smart sont caractéristiques à cet égard. Chacune échoue à rendre compte adéquatement du savoir moral que nous avons. Malgré leurs différences, leur échec commun tient à la méprise qu’elles partagent au sujet de la relation entre théorie et pratique, et à leur conception exagérée du rôle épistémique que jouent les principes moraux (...) dans la reconnaissance et la justification de la vérité de nos jugements moraux. (shrink)

In the United States, disturbing concerns pertaining to both how putative bioethicists are perceived and the potential for the abuse of their power in connection with these perceptions compel close examination. This paper addresses these caveats by examining two fundamental and interrelated components in the image-construction of the ethicist: definitional and contextual. Definitional features reveal that perceptions and images of the ethicist are especially subject to distortion due to a lack of clarity as to the nature and qualifications of the (...) ethicist. Furthermore, the clinical, professional, political, academic, and linguistic contexts in which these ethicists are engaged are contexts of disquieting degrees of power. I argue that the lack of definitional clarity as to what constitutes an ethicist combined with the above volatile contexts together set the stage for the abuse of power on the part of ethicists. Throughout, I question the extent of self-critical analyses among ethicists, and, in view of these components in image-construction and their relationship to power, I challenge the degree of integrity within the field. In conclusion, I propose some areas for further investigation. (shrink)

For nearly two decades, the process of reviewing the ethical merit of research involving human subjects has been based on the application of principles initially described in the U.S. National Commission's Belmont Report, and later articulated more fully by Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Recently, the use of ethical principles for deliberating about moral problems in medicine and research, referred to in the pejorative sense as “principlism”, has come under scrutiny. In this paper we argue that (...) these principles can provide a foundation for the source of ethical appraisal of human research, but are not themselves wholly adequate for this purpose. Therefore, we further propose that (1) principles should be understood as heuristics that can be “specified” as described by DeGrazia (1992), and (2) that the principle‐based approach should be supplemented by formally incorporating “sensitivity to context” into the evaluation of clinical trials. (shrink)

Medizinethische Entscheidungsfindungsmodelle müssen nachweisen können, weshalb die mit ihnen getroffenen Entscheidungen richtig oder zumindest „belastbar“ sind. Hierfür sind theoretische Rechtfertigungsansätze aus der Ethik unverzichtbar. Der Klinischen Ethik wird aber mitunter ein Mangel an theoretischer Fundierung vorgeworfen. Um diesem Vorwurf entgegenzutreten, soll unter Bezugnahme auf ein Projekt der Klinischen Ethik („METAP“) die ethische Unterstützung in Form der ethischen Fallbesprechung und der Ethikkonsultation mittels Prinzipienethik und Diskursethik gerechtfertigt werden. Prinzipienethik und Diskursethik können einander über das Medium der ethischen Fallbesprechung oder Ethikkonsultation fruchtbar (...) ergänzen. So können einige theoretische und praktische Schwächen der beiden Ansätze durch den jeweils anderen abgefedert werden. Die Diskursethik übernimmt bspw. die Sicherung der ethischen Gültigkeit von moralischen Entscheidungen bzw. Handlungsnormen und vermindert dadurch ein Rechtfertigungsdefizit, welches bei einem rein prinzipienorientierten Verfahren auftritt. Umgekehrt antwortet die Prinzipienethik u. a. auf Fragen der ethischen Angemessenheit und dient v. a. der adäquaten Einzelfallentscheidung. Durch die Integration des einen Ansatzes in den anderen ist eine umfassendere Rechtfertigungsleistung erzielbar als bei einem alleinigen Einsatz von Prinzipienethik oder Diskursethik. Selbst wenn einige Herausforderungen bestehen bleiben und auch das integrierte Modell moralische Dissense nicht immer verhindern kann, vermag es durch seine „doppelte“ Absicherung (Prinzipien und Diskurs) ein praktisches Vertrauen in die getroffene ethische Entscheidung zu stärken und so der Klinischen Ethik mehr „Robustheit“ zu geben, als sie bisher besitzt. (shrink)