This paper has three main aims. The first is to provide a critical assessment of two rival concepts of suffering, that proposed by Cassell and that proposed in this journal by van Hooft. The second aim of the paper is to sketch a more plausible concept of suffering, one which derives from a Wittgensteinian view of linguistic meaning. This more plausible concept is labeled an ‘intuitive concept’. The third aim is to assess the prospects for scientific understanding of suffering.

Abstract.This paper critiques particular aspects of the published UK government Department of Health’s proposal to promote ‘The Expert Patient’ as a way of enhancing patient autonomy and reducing reliance on limited health care resources. Although the broad aims of the report are supported the detail is criticised on the basis that lack of clarity over key terms, including ‘expert’ ‘illness’ and ‘disease’, means that there is no clear focus for action and threatens to undermine the effectiveness of the proposals.

In recent years so-called Complementary and Alternative Medicine practices have made significant political and professional advances particularly in the United Kingdom : osteopathy and chiropractic were granted statutory self-regulation in the 1990s effectively giving them more professional autonomy and independence than health care professions supplementary to medicine ; the practice of acupuncture is widespread within the National Health Service for pain control; and homoeopathy is offered to patients by a few General Practitioners alongside conventional treatments. These developments have had a (...) number of consequences: one is that both CAM and Conventional and Orthodox Medical professions have had to reappraise their professional identity. In manual therapy for example, questions have been asked about the differences between physiotherapy, osteopathy and chiropractic, and what the justification is for having separate professions. A wider question concerns the relationship between CAM and COM; are CAM distinct professions or should they, as has happened to a limited extent in the UK, be absorbed into the broader field of ‘ Medicine ’ or ‘Health Care’ as adjunctive therapies. CAM professions have also had to develop, implement and enforce codes of practice for practitioners and clarify the scope of practice within a profession. At the heart of these issues lies the need to identify and clarify professional values. A key claim of CAM professions is that their practice is distinct and the outcome of treatment at least as effective and in many cases more effective than with conventional therapies. In addition, what counts as effective outcome is often different from conventional medical understanding, involving more subtle humanitarian considerations, for example. Three values are identified as being commonly held across CAM professions. These are: offering ‘natural’ treatment; being patient rather than disease focussed; and being holistic. However, these may not be as distinctive of CAM as is claimed either because the meaning is unclear or because COM professions claim similar values. The paper argues that the values that inform ‘good practice’ and ‘effective outcome’ should be seen as distinct components of professional competence. This has implications for establishing professional identity and codes of practice. (shrink)

Since the nineteenth century the theory and practice of mainstream Western medicine has been grounded in the biomedical model. In the later years of the twentieth century, however, it has faced a range of serious problems, which when viewed collectively, remain unresolved despite a variety of responses. The question we now face is whether these problems can be dealt with by modifying and extending the principles underlying the biomedical model, or whether a more radical solution is required. Recent critiques of (...) Western medicine have focused mainly on the biopsychosocial model in relation to the former approach, but it will be contended that this cannot deal adequately with the challenges that medicine currently faces, because although it addresses both the scientific and humanistic aspects of medicine it fails to harmonise them. I shall therefore argue for the necessity of a more radical approach, and suggest that what is required to accomplish this is the development of a new medical cosmology, rooted in an older and more global framework. Such a fundamental change would inevitably involve a long term process which it is not yet possible to fully comprehend let alone specify in detail. Some of the necessary features of such a new medical cosmology can, however, already be distinguished and the outline of these is described. (shrink)