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  1. (2 other versions)Confirmation and explaining how possible.Patrick Forber - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41 (1):32-40.
    Confirmation in evolutionary biology depends on what biologists take to be the genuine rivals. Investigating what constrains the scope of biological possibility provides part of the story: explaining how possible helps determine what counts as a genuine rival and thus informs confirmation. To clarify the criteria for genuine rivalry I distinguish between global and local constraints on biological possibility, and offer an account of how-possibly explanation. To sharpen the connection between confirmation and explaining how possible I discuss the view that (...)
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  • E pluribus unum?Daniel C. Dennett - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):617-618.
    W&S correctly ask if groups can be like individuals in the harmony and cooperation of their parts, but in their answer, they ignore the importance of the difference between genetically related and unrelated components, and also misconstrue the import of the Hutterites.
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  • The persistence of the R.A. Fisher-Sewall Wright controversy.Robert A. Skipper - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (3):341-367.
    This paper considers recent heated debates led by Jerry A. Coyne andMichael J. Wade on issues stemming from the 1929–1962 R.A. Fisher-Sewall Wrightcontroversy in population genetics. William B. Provine once remarked that theFisher-Wright controversy is central, fundamental, and very influential.Indeed,it is also persistent. The argumentative structure of therecent (1997–2000) debates is analyzed with the aim of eliminating a logicalconflict in them, viz., that the two sides in the debates havedifferent aims and that, as such, they are talking past each other. (...)
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  • Modeling in the museum: On the role of Remnant models in the work of Joseph Grinnell. [REVIEW]James R. Griesemer - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (1):3-36.
    Accounts of the relation between theories and models in biology concentrate on mathematical models. In this paper I consider the dual role of models as representations of natural systems and as a material basis for theorizing. In order to explicate the dual role, I develop the concept of a remnant model, a material entity made from parts of the natural system(s) under study. I present a case study of an important but neglected naturalist, Joseph Grinnell, to illustrate the extent to (...)
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  • Alternative formulations of multilevel selection.John Damuth & I. Lorraine Heisler - 1988 - Biology and Philosophy 3 (4):407-430.
    Hierarchical expansions of the theory of natural selection exist in two distinct bodies of thought in evolutionary biology, the group selection and the species selection traditions. Both traditions share the point of view that the principles of natural selection apply at levels of biological organization above the level of the individual organism. This leads them both to considermultilevel selection situations, where selection is occurring simultaneously at more than one level. Impeding unification of the theoretical approaches of the multilevel selection traditions (...)
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  • A critical review of philosophical work on the units of selection problem.Elliott Sober & David Sloan Wilson - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):534-555.
    The evolutionary problem of the units of selection has elicited a good deal of conceptual work from philosophers. We review this work to determine where the issues now stand.
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  • Evolution, phenotypic selection, and the units of selection.Timothy Shanahan - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):210-225.
    In recent years philosophers have attempted to clarify the units of selection controversy in evolutionary biology by offering conceptual analyses of the term 'unit of selection'. A common feature of many of these analyses is an emphasis on the claim that units of selection are entities exhibiting heritable variation in fitness. In this paper I argue that the demand that units of selection be characterized in terms of heritability is unnecessary, as well as undesirable, on historical, theoretical, and philosophical grounds. (...)
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  • A structural approach to defining units of selection.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):395-418.
    The conflation of two fundamentally distinct issues has generated serious confusion in the philosophical and biological literature concerning the units of selection. The question of how a unit of selection of defined, theoretically, is rarely distinguished from the question of how to determine the empirical accuracy of claims--either specific or general--concerning which unit(s) is undergoing selection processes. In this paper, I begin by refining a definition of the unit of selection, first presented in the philosophical literature by William Wimsatt, which (...)
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  • Contextual analysis and group selection.Charles J. Goodnight - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):622-622.
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  • (1 other version)Units and levels of selection.Elisabeth Lloyd - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The theory of evolution by natural selection is, perhaps, the crowning intellectual achievement of the biological sciences. There is, however, considerable debate about which entity or entities are selected and what it is that fits them for that role. This article aims to clarify what is at issue in these debates by identifying four distinct, though often confused, concerns and then identifying how the debates on what constitute the units of selection depend to a significant degree on which of these (...)
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  • Relative Significance Controversies in Evolutionary Biology.Katherine Deaven - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Several prominent debates in biology, such as those surrounding adaptationism, group selection, and punctuated equilibrium, have focused on disagreements about the relative importance of a cause in producing a phenomenon of interest. Some philosophers, such as John Beatty have expressed scepticism about the scientific value of engaging in these controversies, and Karen Kovaka has suggested that their value might be limited. In this paper, I challenge that scepticism by giving a novel analysis of relative significance controversies, showing that there are (...)
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  • Conceptual change and evolutionary developmental biology.A. C. Love - 2014 - In Alan C. Love (ed.), Conceptual Change in Biology: Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives on Evolution and Development. Berlin: Springer Verlag, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. pp. 1-54.
    The 1981 Dahlem conference was a catalyst for contemporary evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-devo). This introductory chapter rehearses some of the details of the history surrounding the original conference and its associated edited volume, explicates the philosophical problem of conceptual change that provided the rationale for a workshop devoted to evaluating the epistemic revisions and transformations that occurred in the interim, explores conceptual change with respect to the concept of evolutionary novelty, and highlights some of the themes and patterns in the (...)
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  • Group selection and the group mind in science.Gordon M. Burghardt - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):613-613.
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  • Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences.David Sloan Wilson & Elliott Sober - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):585-608.
    In both biology and the human sciences, social groups are sometimes treated as adaptive units whose organization cannot be reduced to individual interactions. This group-level view is opposed by a more individualistic one that treats social organization as a byproduct of self-interest. According to biologists, group-level adaptations can evolve only by a process of natural selection at the group level. Most biologists rejected group selection as an important evolutionary force during the 1960s and 1970s but a positive literature began to (...)
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  • The professionalization of science studies: Cutting some Slack. [REVIEW]David L. Hull - 2000 - Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):61-91.
    During the past hundred years or so, those scholars studying science have isolated themselves as much as possible from scientists as well as from workers in other disciplines who study science. The result of this effort is history of science, philosophy of science and sociology of science as separate disciplines. I argue in this paper that now is the time for these disciplinary boundaries to be lowered or at least made more permeable so that a unified discipline of Science Studies (...)
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  • Aggregate, composed, and evolved systems: Reductionistic heuristics as means to more holistic theories. [REVIEW]William C. Wimsatt - 2006 - Biology and Philosophy 21 (5):667-702.
    Richard Levins’ distinction between aggregate, composed and evolved systems acquires new significance as we recognize the importance of mechanistic explanation. Criteria for aggregativity provide limiting cases for absence of organization, so through their failure, can provide rich detectors for organizational properties. I explore the use of failures of aggregativity for the analysis of mechanistic systems in diverse contexts. Aggregativity appears theoretically desireable, but we are easily fooled. It may be exaggerated through approximation, conditions of derivation, and extrapolating from some conditions (...)
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  • Calibration of laboratory models in population genetics.Robert A. Skipper - 2004 - Perspectives on Science 12 (4):369-393.
    : This paper explores the calibration of laboratory models in population genetics as an experimental strategy for justifying experimental results and claims based upon them following Franklin (1986, 1990) and Rudge (1996, 1998). The analysis provided undermines Coyne et al.'s (1997) critique of Wade and Goodnight's (1991) experimental study of Wright's (1931, 1932) Shifting Balance Theory. The essay concludes by further demonstrating how this analysis bears on Diamond's (1986) claims regarding the weakness of laboratory experiments as evidence, and further how (...)
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  • The maintenance of behavioral diversity in human societies.Christopher Wills - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):638-639.
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  • Group selection: The theory replaces the bogey man.David Sloan Wilson & Elliott Sober - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):639-654.
    In both biology and the human sciences, social groups are sometimes treated as adaptive units whose organization cannot be reduced to individual interactions. This group-level view is opposed by a more individualistic one that treats social organization as a byproduct of self-interest. According to biologists, group-level adaptations can evolve only by a process of natural selection at the group level. Most biologists rejected group selection as an important evolutionary force during the 1960s and 1970s but a positive literature began to (...)
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  • Vehicles all the way down?Nicholas S. Thompson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):638-638.
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  • Semantics, theory, and methodological individualism in the group-selection controversy.Eric Alden Smith - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):636-637.
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  • Adaptation and natural selection: A new look at some old ideas.Jeffry A. Simpson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):634-636.
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  • Nongenetic and non-Darwinian evolution.Anatol Rapoport - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):634-634.
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  • Why is group selection such a problem?Randolph M. Nesse - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):633-634.
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  • Hominids, coalitions, and weapons: Not vehicles.Jim Moore - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):632-632.
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  • Beyond shared fate: Group-selected mechanisms for cooperation and competition in fuzzy, fluid vehicles.Geoffrey F. Miller - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):630-631.
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  • Group evolutionary strategies: Dimensions and mechanisms.Kevin MacDonald - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):629-630.
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  • Rx: Distinguish group selection from group adaptation.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):628-629.
    I admire Wilson & Sober's (W & S's) aim, to alert social scientists that group selection has risen from the ashqs, and to explicate its relevance to the behavioral sciences. Group selection has beenwidely misunderstood; furthermore, both authors have been instrumental in illuminating conceptual problems surrounding higher-level selection. Still, I find that this target article muddies the waters, primarily through its shifting and confused definition of a "vehicle" of selection. The fundamental problem is an ambiguity in the definition of "adaptation." (...)
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  • Replicators and vehicles? Or developmental systems?P. E. Griffiths & R. D. Gray - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):623-624.
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  • Empirically equivalent theories.Harmon R. Holcomb - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):625-626.
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  • Different vehicles for group selection in humans.Michael E. Hyland - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):628-628.
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  • Taking vechicles seriously.David L. Hull - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):627-628.
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  • Recent philosophy of biology: A review.David L. Hull - 2002 - Acta Biotheoretica 50 (2):117-128.
    Academia is subdivided into separate disciplines, most of which are quite discrete. In this review I trace the interactions between two of these disciplines: biology and philosophy of biology. I concentrate on those topics that have the most extensive biological content: function, species, systematics, selection, reduction and development. In the final section of this paper I touch briefly on those issues that biologists and philosophers have addressed that do not have much in the way of biological content.
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  • Groups as vehicles and replicators: The problem of group-level adaptation.Kent E. Holsinger - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):626-627.
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  • Reconstructing the real unit of selection.Adolf Heschl - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):624-625.
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  • Evo-Devo as a Trading Zone.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther - 2014 - In Alan C. Love (ed.), Conceptual Change in Biology: Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives on Evolution and Development. Berlin: Springer Verlag, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
    Evo-Devo exhibits a plurality of scientific “cultures” of practice and theory. When are the cultures acting—individually or collectively—in ways that actually move research forward, empirically, theoretically, and ethically? When do they become imperialistic, in the sense of excluding and subordinating other cultures? This chapter identifies six cultures – three /styles/ (mathematical modeling, mechanism, and history) and three /paradigms/ (adaptationism, structuralism, and cladism). The key assumptions standing behind, under, or within each of these cultures are explored. Characterizing the internal structure of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Causal Explanation in Laboratory Ecology: The Case of Competitive Indeterminacy.James R. Griesemer - 1988 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (1):337-344.
    In this paper I contrast two causal explanations of the outcome of a set of laboratory experiments in population ecology conducted by Thomas Park in the 1940s and 1950s. These experiments shed light on the problem of adducing evidence for the operation of competition (see Lloyd 1987 for a recent philosophical discussion) and are central to the group selection controversy because they form the empirical base for experimental studies of group selection conducted over the last 12 years (see Griesemer and (...)
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  • Putting the cart back behind the horse: Group selection does not require that groups be “organisms”.Todd A. Grantham - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):622-623.
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  • Me, you, and us: Distinguishing “egoism,” “altruism,” and “groupism”.Margaret Gilbert - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):621-622.
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  • Group selection and “genuine” altruism.Robert H. Frank - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):620-621.
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  • (2 other versions)Confirmation and explaining how possible.Patrick Forber - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41 (1):32-40.
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  • Some philosophical implications of the rehabilitation of group selection.John Dupré - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):619-620.
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  • Subtle ways of shifting the balance in favor of between-group selection.Lee Alan Dugatkin - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):618-619.
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  • Burying the vehicle.Richard Dawkins - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):616-617.
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  • Bottled Understanding: The Role of Lab Work in Ecology.Adrian Currie - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):905-932.
    It is often thought that the vindication of experimental work lies in its capacity to be revelatory of natural systems. I challenge this idea by examining laboratory experiments in ecology. A central task of community ecology involves combining mathematical models and observational data to identify trophic interactions in natural systems. But many ecologists are also lab scientists: constructing microcosm or ‘bottle’ experiments, physically realizing the idealized circumstances described in mathematical models. What vindicates such ecological experiments? I argue that ‘extrapolationism’, the (...)
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  • In praise of replicators.James F. Crow - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):616-616.
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  • Group selection's new clothes.Lee Cronk - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):615-616.
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  • Unnecessary competition requirement makes group selection harder to demonstrate.F. T. Cloak - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):614-615.
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  • Ambivalently held group-optimizing predispositions.Donald T. Campbell & John B. Gatewood - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):614-614.
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  • The consequences of group selection in a domain without genetic input: Culture.C. Loring Brace - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):611-612.
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