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What is a Contradiction?

In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--72 (2004)

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  1. Islamic Contradictory Theology . . . Is There Any Such Thing?Abbas Ahsan - 2021 - Logica Universalis 15 (2).
    The application of paraconsistent logics to theological contradictions is a fascinating move. Jc Beall’s (J Anal Theol, 7(1): 400–439, 2019) paper entitled ‘Christ—A Contradiction: A Defense of ‘Contradictory Christology’ is a notable example. Beall proposes a solution to the fundamental problem of Christology. His solution aims at making the case, and defending the viability of, what he has termed, ‘Contradictory Christology’. There are at least two essential components of Beall’s ‘Contradictory Christology’. These include the dogmatic statements of Chalcedon and FDE (...)
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  • Dialectical Contradictions and Classical Formal Logic.Inoue Kazumi - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):113-132.
    A dialectical contradiction can be appropriately described within the framework of classical formal logic. It is in harmony with the law of noncontradiction. According to our definition, two theories make up a dialectical contradiction if each of them is consistent and their union is inconsistent. It can happen that each of these two theories has an intended model. Plenty of examples are to be found in the history of science.
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  • Conjunction and Contradiction.Achille C. Varzi - 2004 - In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays. Clarendon Press. pp. 93–110.
    There are two ways of understanding the notion of a contradiction: as a conjunction of a statement and its negation, or as a pair of statements one of which is the negation of the other. Correspondingly, there are two ways of understanding the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), i.e., the law that says that no contradictions can be true. In this paper I offer some arguments to the effect that on the first (collective) reading LNC is non-negotiable, but on the second (...)
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  • A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements.Hans Rott - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):167–189.
    The paper addresses the situation of a dispute in which one speaker says ϕ and a second speaker says not-ϕ. Proceeding on an idealising distinction between "basic" and "interesting" claims that may be formulated in a given idiolectal language, I investigate how it might be sorted out whether the dispute reflects a genuine disagreement, or whether the speakers are only having a merely verbal dispute, due to their using different interesting concepts. I show that four individually plausible principles for the (...)
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  • Άδύνατον and Material Exclusion 1.Francesco Berto - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):165 – 190.
    Philosophical dialetheism, whose main exponent is Graham Priest, claims that some contradictions hold, are true, and it is rational to accept and assert them. Such a position is naturally portrayed as a challenge to the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). But all the classic formulations of the LNC are, in a sense, not questioned by a typical dialetheist, since she is (cheerfully) required to accept them by her own theory. The goal of this paper is to develop a formulation of the (...)
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  • Normativity, Probability, and Meta-Vagueness.Masaki Ichinose - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3879-3900.
    This paper engages with a specific problem concerning the relationship between descriptive and normative claims. Namely, if we understand that descriptive claims frequently contain normative assertions, and vice versa, how then do we interpret the traditionally rigid distinction that is made between the two, as ’Hume’s law’ or Moore’s ’naturalistic fallacy’ argument offered. In particular, Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s ’rule-following paradox’ is specially focused upon in order to re-consider the rigid distinction. As such, the paper argues that if descriptive and (...)
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  • Penetrating Historical Discourse's Truth Matrix: A Corpus Analysis of Oral History Testimonies.Christopher Fitzgerald - 2020 - Journal of Corpora and Discourse Studies 3:75-95.
    Historical Discourse’s Truth Matrix was first posited by Michel Foucault to describe the emergence of a discourse of historical events subsequent to the cessation of war and established by the most powerful arbiters of those events. This paper adapts the implements of Foucault’s toolbox to conceptualise the dimensions of subjectivity that historical events pass through from the original event to the subsequent depictions of those events in historical writing or other media. The Corpus of Irish Historical Narratives is a one-million-word (...)
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  • La deriva genética como fuerza evolutiva.Ariel Jonathan Roffé - 2015 - In J. Ahumada, N. Venturelli & S. Seno Chibeni (eds.), Selección de Trabajos del IX Encuentro AFHIC y las XXV Jornadas de Epistemología e Historia de la ciencia. Córdoba, Argentina: pp. 615-626.
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  • Remarks on Epistemology Musicalized.Masaki Ichinose - 2007 - Philosophical Studies (University of Tokyo) 25:1-12.
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  • Vagueness of Free Will.Masaki Ichinose - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:53-58.
    I aim to bring the idea of “degree of free will or freedom” into philosophical debates on free will by rejecting the formulation, ‘we are either free or not’. This idea is based upon my viewpoint of regarding freedom as a realistic phenomena actually occurring. First of all, I focus on the fact that it is vague whether an agent is free or not. This vagueness is interpreted as ontic vagueness, corresponding with the status of freedom as real. However, Evans’s (...)
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