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  1. Negation on the Australian Plan.Franz Berto & Greg Restall - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 1:1-26.
    We present and defend the Australian Plan semantics for negation. This is a comprehensive account, suitable for a variety of different logics. It is based on two ideas. The first is that negation is an exclusion-expressing device: we utter negations to express incompatibilities. The second is that, because incompatibility is modal, negation is a modal operator as well. It can, then, be modelled as a quantifier over points in frames, restricted by accessibility relations representing compatibilities and incompatibilities between such points. (...)
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  • The Firmest of All Principles.Francesco Berto - 2015 - In Channa van Dijk, Eva van der Graaf, Michiel den Haan, Rosa de Jong, Christiaan Roodenburgh, Dyane Til & Deva Waal (eds.), Under Influence - Philosophical Festival Drift (2014). pp. 82-93.
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  • A Modality Called ‘Negation’.Francesco Berto - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):761-793.
    I propose a comprehensive account of negation as a modal operator, vindicating a moderate logical pluralism. Negation is taken as a quantifier on worlds, restricted by an accessibility relation encoding the basic concept of compatibility. This latter captures the core meaning of the operator. While some candidate negations are then ruled out as violating plausible constraints on compatibility, different specifications of the notion of world support different logical conducts for negations. The approach unifies in a philosophically motivated picture the following (...)
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  • Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207.
    Is there a notion of contradiction—let us call it, for dramatic effect, “absolute”—making all contradictions, so understood, unacceptable also for dialetheists? It is argued in this paper that there is, and that spelling it out brings some theoretical benefits. First it gives us a foothold on undisputed ground in the methodologically difficult debate on dialetheism. Second, we can use it to express, without begging questions, the disagreement between dialetheists and their rivals on the nature of truth. Third, dialetheism has an (...)
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  • Extensionality and Restriction in Naive Set Theory.Zach Weber - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (1):87-104.
    The naive set theory problem is to begin with a full comprehension axiom, and to find a logic strong enough to prove theorems, but weak enough not to prove everything. This paper considers the sub-problem of expressing extensional identity and the subset relation in paraconsistent, relevant solutions, in light of a recent proposal from Beall, Brady, Hazen, Priest and Restall [4]. The main result is that the proposal, in the context of an independently motivated formalization of naive set theory, leads (...)
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  • Shrieking, Just False and Exclusion.Gareth Young - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):269-276.
    In a recent paper, Jc Beall has employed what he calls ‘shriek rules’ in a putative solution to the long-standing ‘just false’ problem for glut theory. The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, I distinguish the ‘just false’ problem from another problem, with which it is often conflated, which I will call the ‘exclusion problem’. Secondly, I argue that shriek rules do not help glut theorists with either problem.
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  • Could Everything Be True? Probably Not.Matteo Plebani - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):499-504.
    Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest shows, finding a non-question-begging argument against it turns out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I propose a statistical argument against trivialism, developing a strategy different from those presented in Priest.
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