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Switch to: References
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Le présent article veut (1) montrer que la théorie qualitative de la vérisimilarité exposée par Karl R. Popper dansConjectures and RefutationsetObjective Knowledgeest compatible avec sa méthode des conjectures, corroborations et réfutations; (2) faire voir pourquoi cette théorie apparaît néanmoins trop forte d'un point de vue intuitif; (3) montrer comment le système poppérien permet de contourner la preuve formelle présentée par Pavel Tichy en 1974 à l'encontre de la théorie qualitative de la vérisimilarité; (4) proposer une nouvelle définition de la vérisimilarité (...) |
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In September 2007, more than 100 philosophers came to Prague with the determination to approach Karl Popper's philosophy as a source of inspiration in many areas of our intellectual endeavor. This volume is a result of that effort. |
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This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly 'naturalistic' forms of scientific (...) |
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SummaryIn this essay I critically discuss the views of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend on the succession of scientific theories. I argue that, if Karl Popper's desiderata for theory succession are properly explicated, they constitute a basis for refuting the “incommensurability“ thesis of Kuhn and Feyerabend. Popper's claim that a new theory must constitute an “improvement” over the old implies that the new theory must be able to be interpreted as referring to most of the phenomena as its predecessor.RésuméDans cet (...) |
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SummaryIn this essay I critically discuss the views of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend on the succession of scientific theories. I argue that, if Karl Popper's desiderata for theory succession are properly explicated, they constitute a basis for refuting the “incommensurability“ thesis of Kuhn and Feyerabend. Popper's claim that a new theory must constitute an “improvement” over the old implies that the new theory must be able to be interpreted as referring to most of the phenomena as its predecessor.RésuméDans cet (...) |
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In a short 1997 book entitled Simplicity as Evidence of Truth, the Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne has put forward the following thesis summarily: ‘… for theories (of equal scope) rendering equally probable our observational data (which, for brevity I shall call equally good at “predicting”), fitting equally well with background knowledge, the simplest is most probably true’. |
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History of science, it has been argued, has benefited philosophers of science primarily by forcing them into greater contact with "real science." In this paper I argue that additional major benefits arise from the importance of specifically historical considerations within philosophy of science. Loci for specifically historical investigations include: (1) making and evaluating rational reconstructions of particular theories and explanations, (2) estimating the degree of support earned by particular theories and theoretical claims, and (3) evaluating proposed philosophical norms for the (...) |
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A standard problem in empirical inquiry is how to adjudicate between contending theories when they work from different fundamental assumptions. In the field of political sociology, several strategies are adopted, from metatheoretical and comparative historical approaches to the recent formal models of scientific growth proposed by Imre Lakatos and Larry Laudan. After considering the limitations of these approaches, I develop an alternative strategy—"second—order empiricism"—based on the idea that successor theories have an onus to explain the apparent success of their rivals, (...) |
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This paper argues that it has been widely assumed by philosophers of science that the cumulative retention of explanatory success is a "sine qua non" for making judgements about the progress or rational preferability of one theory over another. It has also been assumed that it is impossible to make objective, Comparative judgements of the acceptability of rival theories unless all the statements of both theories could be translated into a common language. This paper seeks to show that both these (...) |
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Like most philosophers, Laudan [7] believes that by and large science makes cognitive progress and that the development of science is more or less rational. His book deals with two major problems:(a)In what sense does science progress? What is scientific progress?(b)Wherein lies the rationality of the growth of science? What is scientific rationality?In the main body of this paper, I first summarize and evaluate some of Laudan’s criticisms of his predecessors. Then I outline and criticize Laudan’s own theory of scientific (...) |
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