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Rob Lovering [17]Robert P. Lovering [3]Robert Lovering [1]
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Rob Lovering
College of Staten Island (CUNY)
  1.  28
    Three Errors in the Substance View's Defense.Rob Lovering - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):25-58.
    According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing known as the “substance view,” all human beings have intrinsic value, full moral standing and, with these, a right to life. The substance view has been defended by numerous contemporary philosophers who use the theory to argue that the standard human fetus has a right to life and, ultimately, that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong. In this paper, I identify three important errors committed by some of these philosophers in (...)
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  2. On What God Would Do.Rob Lovering - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2):87-104.
    Many debates in the philosophy of religion, particularly arguments for and against the existence of God, depend on a claim or set of claims about what God—qua sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being— would do , either directly or indirectly, in particular cases or in general. Accordingly, before these debates can be resolved we must first settle the more fundamental issue of whether we can know, or at least have justified belief about, what God would do. In this paper, (...)
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  3. The Substance View: A Critique.Rob Lovering - 2013 - Bioethics 27 (5):263-70.
    According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the ‘substance view,’ what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency – a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human fetuses have (...)
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  4.  69
    Prostitution & Instrumentalization.Rob Lovering - 2017 - Philosophy Now (123):14-17.
    Is prostitution immoral? Various philosophers have put forward arguments for thinking so, one of the most notable being that, by engaging in sexual activity with someone for payment, the prostitute instrumentalizes himself or herself. In this paper, I identify two meanings of "instrumentalize" and, with them, two versions of the instrumentalization argument for the immorality of prostitution. I then critique each version of the argument.
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  5. Divine Hiddenness and Inculpable Ignorance.Robert P. Lovering - 2004 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (2/3):89-107.
    J. L. Schellenberg claims that the weakness of evidence for God’s existence is not merely a sign that God is hidden, “it is a revelation that God does not exist.” In Divine Hiddenness : New Essays, Michael J. Murray provides a “soul-making” defense of God’s hiddenness, arguing that if God were not hidden, then some of us would lose what many theists deem a good thing: the ability to develop morally significant characters. In this paper, I argue that Murray’s soul-making (...)
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  6. The Problem of the Theistic Evidentialist Philosophers.Rob Lovering - 2010 - Philo 13 (2):185-200.
    That theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make the evidential case for theism to atheistic evidentialist philosophers raises a problem—a question to be answered. I argue here that—of the most plausible possible solutions to this problem—each is either inadequate or, when adequate, in conflict with the theistic evidentialist philosophers’ defining beliefs. I conclude that the problem of the theistic evidentialist philosophers—the question of why theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make their case to atheistic evidentialist philosophers—is a problem for theistic (...)
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  7. On the Morality of Having Faith That God Exists.Rob Lovering - 2012 - Sophia 51 (1):17-30.
    Many theists who identify themselves with the Abrahamic religions maintain that it is perfectly acceptable to have faith that God exists. In this paper, I argue that, when believing that God exists will affect others, it is prima facie wrong to forgo attempting to believe that God exists on the basis of sufficient evidence. Lest there be any confusion : I do not argue that it is always wrong to have faith that God exists, only that, under certain conditions, it (...)
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  8.  31
    A Defense of Abortion. [REVIEW]Rob Lovering - 2003 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 20:214-17.
    This is a review of David Boonin's A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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  9. Does Ordinary Morality Imply Atheism? A Reply to Maitzen.Rob Lovering - 2011 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 16 (2):83-98.
    Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that ordinary morality implies atheism. In the following, I argue that the soundness of Maitzen’s argument depends on a principle that is implausible, what I call the Recipient’s Benefit Principle: All else being equal, if an act A produces a net benefit for the individual on the receiving end of A, then one cannot have a moral obligation to prevent A. Specifically, the Recipient’s Benefit Principle (RBP) must be true if premise (2) of Maitzen’s argument (...)
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  10. Does God Know What It's Like Not to Know?Rob Lovering - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (1):85-99.
    The topic of divine omniscience is well-trodden ground, with philosophers and theologians having asked virtually every question there is to ask about it. The questions regarding God's omniscience to be addressed here are as follows. First, is omniscience best understood as maximal propositional knowledge along with maximal experiential knowledge? I argue that it is. Second, is it possible for God to be essentially omniscient? I argue that it is not.
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  11. Does a Normal Foetus Really Have a Future of Value? A Reply to Marquis.Robert P. Lovering - 2005 - Bioethics 19 (2):131–45.
    The traditional approach to the abortion debate revolves around numerous issues, such as whether the fetus is a person, whether the fetus has rights, and more. Don Marquis suggests that this traditional approach leads to a standoff and that the abortion debate “requires a different strategy.” Hence his “future of value” strategy, which is summarized as follows: (1) A normal fetus has a future of value. (2) Depriving a normal fetus of a future of value imposes a misfortune on it. (...)
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  12. Mary Anne Warren on “Full” Moral Status.Robert P. Lovering - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):509-30.
    In the contemporary debate on moral status, it is not uncommon to find philosophers who embrace the following basic moral principle: -/- The Principle of Full Moral Status: The degree to which an entity E possesses moral status is proportional to the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties until a threshold degree of morally relevant properties possession is reached, whereupon the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties may continue to increase, but the degree to which E (...)
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  13. The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2).Rob Lovering - 2014 - Bioethics 28 (7):378-86.
    In my initial critique of the substance view, I raised reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among others. In this follow-up critique, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of this conclusion. I begin by briefly presenting the substance view as well as its defense. (For a more thorough presentation, see the first part of my critique.) (...)
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  14. The Ever Conscious View: A Critique.Rob Lovering - 2011 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 18 (1):90-101.
    Elizabeth Harman has recently proposed a new theory of moral status, the Ever Conscious View. It is the view that "a being has moral status at a time just in case it is alive at that time and there is a time in its life at which it is conscious" (Harman, 2007, 220). In other words, all and only beings that (1) are alive and (2) either were, are, or will be conscious have moral status. In the following, I examine (...)
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  15. The Virtues of Hunting: A Reply to Jensen.Robert Lovering - 2006 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (1):68-76.
    In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate that environmental virtue ethics (EVE) fails to provide sufficient justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals. In order to do this, I examine an EVE justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals and argue that it gives rise to the following dilemma: either EVE justifies the hunting of both human and nonhuman animals, or it justifies the hunting of neither. I then submit that the first lemma ought to be rejected as absurd and, (...)
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  16. God and Evidence: Problems for Theistic Philosophers.Rob Lovering - 2013 - Bloomsbury Academic.
    For nearly two millennia, theistic philosophers have had to contend with problems raised against their theistic beliefs. Typically raised by nontheistic (atheistic and agnostic) philosophers, these problems have ranged from critiques of theistic philosophers’ arguments for God’s existence to arguments for the nonexistence of God. In this book, I present a new set of problems for theistic philosophers’ theistic beliefs. The problems pertain specifically to three types of theistic philosopher, to be referred to here as “theistic inferentialists,” “theistic noninferentialists,” and (...)
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  17.  79
    On Moral Arguments Against Recreational Drug Use.Rob Lovering - 2016 - Philosophy Now (113):22-4.
    There is a wide array of arguments for the immorality of recreational drug use, ranging from the philosophically rudimentary to the philosophically sophisticated. But the vast majority of these arguments are unsuccessful, and those that succeed are quite limited in scope. In this article, I present and evaluate a few examples of such arguments.
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  18.  58
    The Substance View: A Critique (Part 3).Rob Lovering - 2017 - Bioethics 31 (4):305-312.
    In my articles ‘The Substance View: A Critique’ and ‘The Substance View: A Critique,’ I raise objections to the substance view, a theory of intrinsic value and moral standing defended by a number of contemporary moral philosophers, including Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Christopher Tollefsen, and Francis Beckwith. In part one of my critique of the substance view, I raise reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as (...)
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  19. Futures of Value and the Destruction of Human Embryos.Rob Lovering - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 463-88.
    Many people are strongly opposed to the intentional destruction of human embryos, whether it be for purposes scientific, reproductive, or other. And it is not uncommon for such people to argue against the destruction of human embryos by invoking the claim that the destruction of human embryos is morally on par with killing the following humans: (A) the standard infant, (B) the suicidal teenager, (C) the temporarily comatose individual, and (D) the standard adult. I argue here that this claim is (...)
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  20.  8
    What Will We Do? Well, What Have We Done? [REVIEW]Rob Lovering - 2003 - Medical Humanities 17:2.
    This is a review of Anita Guerrini's Experimenting with Humans and Animals: From Galen to Animal Rights (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).
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  21. A Moral Defense of Recreational Drug Use.Rob Lovering - 2015 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    Why does American law allow the recreational use of some drugs, such as alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine, but not others, such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin? The answer lies not simply in the harm the use of these drugs might cause, but in the perceived morality—or lack thereof—of their recreational use. Despite strong rhetoric from moral critics of recreational drug use, however, it is surprisingly difficult to discern the reasons they have for deeming the recreational use of (some) drugs morally (...)
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