Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. No Outcome Is Good, Bad, or Evaluatively Neutral for Anyone.Michael Rabenberg - 2024 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (5-6):654-670.
    I argue that no outcome is good, bad, or evaluatively neutral for anyone. My argument concerns non-comparative personal evaluative properties alone; it does not support (say) the conclusion that no outcome is better for anyone than any other outcome. First I argue that there is a sequence of outcomes with the following properties, and that the existence of such a sequence supports the conclusion that no outcome is good for anyone: (i) the first member of the sequence is good for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On neutral value and fitting indifference.Andrés G. Garcia - 2024 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):337-347.
    A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fitting target of indifference, where this is understood not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark