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Phylogenetic Inference

In Aviezer Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 231–242 (2008)

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  1. Simple is not easy.Edison Barrios - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2261-2305.
    I review and challenge the views on simplicity and its role in linguistics put forward by Ludlow. In particular, I criticize the claim that simplicity—in the sense pertinent to science—is nothing more than ease of use or “user-friendliness”, motivated by economy of labor. I argue that Ludlow’s discussion fails to do justice to the diversity of factors that are relevant to simplicity considerations. This, in turn, leads to the neglect of crucial cases in which the rationale for simplification is unmistakably (...)
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  • Taxa hold little information about organisms: Some inferential problems in biological systematics.Thomas A. C. Reydon - 2019 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 41 (4):40.
    The taxa that appear in biological classifications are commonly seen as representing information about the traits of their member organisms. This paper examines in what way taxa feature in the storage and retrieval of such information. I will argue that taxa do not actually store much information about the traits of their member organisms. Rather, I want to suggest, taxa should be understood as functioning to localize organisms in the genealogical network of life on Earth. Taxa store information about where (...)
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  • When to think like an epistemicist.Matthew Mosdell - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):538-559.
    Epistemicism is the view that seemingly vague predicates are not in fact vague. Consequently, there must be a sharp boundary between a man who is bald and one who is not bald. Although such a view is often met with incredulity, my aim is to provide a defense of epistemicism in this essay. My defense, however, is backhanded: I argue that the formal commitments of epistemicism are the result of good practical reasoning, not metaphysical necessity. To get to that conclusion, (...)
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